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PREP'ACE: 
This study has a two-fold nature. In one sense the focus of attention 
is on the Apologists. The chapters on Clement and Athanasius attempt 
to follov through the ballic questions raised by the Apologists. But 
in the other senee, wat I have presented is four independent studies 
dealing with Justin, the other Apologists, Clement and Athanasius's 
Contra Gentes. Although IlUch the same questions have been asked in 
all four section, there has been no rigid attempt to systematize the 
anBVers. This may vell be one of the strengths as well as one of the 
weaknesses of the work. 
There is a major omission in the study. This is the lack of serioos 
consideration of Celeus. He forms an essential part of the background 
to the Apologetic era, and it seellB that an eYl!Jmination of his attitude 
towards reason would h1gh~ht and explain much of Justin's reaction 
towards philosophy. 
Real difficulty has been experienced throughout the year due to 
unavailability of literature in Sooth Africa. Another difficulty 
has been the elementary knowledge of and proficiency in German. The 
folloving are books vhich needed to be ...,..mined but could not be for 
either of the above reasons: 
. H Chadvick: Contra Celsus (CUP,1957h 
C. Andresen: Logos und Nomos: Die Polemik des Kelsoe das Chrlstentum 
(Berlln,1955) • 
M. Elze: Tatian und seine Theologie (G8ttlngen,196Q) J 
E. Molland: The Conception llf the Gospel in Alexandrian Theology 
(Oslo,1938); 
F.L. CroBs: The Study of Athanasius (OUP,1945). 
I only managed to browse in, but not tully digest, Ii. Hyldahlf s 
Philosoph1 e und Christen tum. Einer Interpretation der Einleitung zum 
Dialog Justine (Kopenhllgen,l966), but van Winden seems to be correct 
v 
in his assessment of this vork (cf'. belov, p. Vf) . 
References: 
All references to Albinus are to the page and line number of' Platonis 
Dialogi, vol. VI, eel. C.F. Hermann (Leipzig,18S4). 
References to all other vriters, except AtMnasius, are to the chapter 
end verse of the particular vork cited; the brackets contain firstly 
the page lIlIIIlber in the Ante-Nicene Christian Library (Edinburgh,1867f), 
this is folloved by the reference to the relevant volUllle or Migne. 
Athenasius is referred to by the chapter and verse from the Librar:r 
of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. IV, folloved by the Migne 
reference. 
All quotes are from the ANCL or above, except vere otherwise stated. 
Finally I mnst thank my vife, Lynette, for her continual support end 
interest, and especially for reading the text and pointing ont many 
stylistic and grammatical errors. 
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I . JUSTIN MARTYR. 
(1) Introduction: 
The second century vas a period of crisis end rapid trensition tor 
the whole Christian ChlIrch. The points of conflict which had to be 
resolved can be divided broadly into wo - firstly, the internal 
struggle against Gnosticism end Marcionism, end seCondly, the external 
struggle both against the state end the Hellenistic vorld. While 
in many ways Gnosticism is representative of the Hellenistic milieu, 
the real struggle in the time of the Apologists appears to have 
been against the rationalism of the philosophical schools. The 
conflict beween the Church and Celsus is indicative of a deeper 
end more general tension. 
The glimpses we have of the Church life in the second half end the 
second century are mainly to be taken from somewhat earlier llitnesses, 
that is the Apostolic Fathers. Here the communities are portrayed 
as being intimate, closely knit groups wich are in virtual opposi-
tion to the whole surrounding culture. These groups ere centred 
on the confession of Christ as Lord in their worship. This confes-
sion vas in conscious opposition to the Emperor cult. It is aut of 
such a context of vorship that the early confessions of faith, such 
as that of Ignatius' Eph. 7, come. or this type of confession 
w. Bousset writes that their distinctive mark 'is a reveling in 
contradiction' .1 This appeal to the irrational, experiential 
element of religion is a characteristic of the Church which vas vell 
!JUlted to ite social background at the time. As has been stated, 
it is this element in Christianity which vas so offensive ·to the 
2 
vell-educated pagan, end lIhich undoubtedly became a stumbling 
(1) lyrios Christos (New York, 1970), p. 327. 
(2) cf. E.R. Dodds: Pagan and Christien in en Age of Anxiety 
(CUP, 1965), p. 120. 
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block in the missionary "ork of the Church. This element of the 
Church's life sur.faces in Justin in the many instances where he 
appeaJ.s to what 've have been taught', 3 and where he uses quasi-
credaJ. formulations vhich clearly come .from the liturgical life ef the 
Church.4 Justin IS tradi tiQnaJ.ism is also seen in his use not only 
of the Old Testament, but also of what vas yet to become the New Testa.-
ment. 5 
Another major point concerning the Christian background to Justin 
is the extreme concern 'ldth morality in the post-Apostolic period. 
This is taken so .far that it amounts to a legalism which is a 
deniaJ. of grace. Although the subject of ethics is not GUr immed-
iate concern, the inheritance of this tradition by the Apologists 
can be seen in their refutation of the charges of immorality 
brought against the Church. There is also the central matter of 
grace, which ve 'Idll be concerned with in this study mainly as 
the conflict betveen reason and revelation. In many \lays, hovever , 
this background has been cotlpled by the Apologists vi th a similar 
concern in the philosophical tradition . Theophilus is probably the 
Apologist most influenced by the Judaeo-Christian legalism. 
But the time had to come wen the isolated, invard-looking nature 
of the Church became an obstacle conflicting 'ldth the priority of 
mission. The vorld vas threatening the Church on every front . 
(3) cf. I Apol. 10.1(13,3400), and aJ.so R. Holte: "Logos Spermat-
ikos : Christianity and Ancient Philosophy according to St. 
Justin1s. Apologies", Studia Theologic~, 12 (1958), p. 117. 
(4) cf. J.N .D. Kelly: Early Christian Creeds (London, 1971), 
pp . 70ff , andal.so J. Dani&lou: Gospel Message and Hellenistic 
Culture (London, 1973), p. 22. 
(5) cf. W.A. Shoivell: The Biblical Exegesis of Justin Martyr 
(SPCK, 1%5), and also R. Heard: "The Apomneumoneumata in 
Papias, Justin, and Irenaeus", !IT§., 1 (1954- 5), pp. l22ff. 
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Both Gnosticism and Marcionism can be interpreted as attempts of 
parties \litb.1n the Church to come to terms \lith their environment. 
Thus A. von Harnack could call Gnosticism 'die akute Verveltlichung 
des ChristenthUll18,.6 !bese heretical attempts to barst out of 
isolation had to countered, but it vas not sufficient to shav their 
elTar; something positive had to be substituted far them. !be 
wole Apologetic tradition is such an attempt, not only to defend the 
Church e.gaillst the influence of its environment, bnt also to present 
the gospel message in comprehensible terms. In this sense all the 
Apologies are to be regarded as then'mlssionary literature or the 
. 7 
second century, the presentation or the Gospel in a pagan vorld'. 
The appearance of such literature at this particular time was no 
doubt due to the nev flavering of philosophy in many forms. The 
emergence of Middle-Platonism and Marcus AlIrelius' patronage of all 
philosophy provides part of the background that produced men life 
Justin and Athenagaras, wo are vell-schooled in the pagan Jililoso-
phies and have crossed over to Christianity, and thus span both 
vorlds . In this regard these Apologists fo11av in a noble tradition 
of l/hich they vere not unaware, namely, the tradition or Jewish 
apologetic. The Wisdom or Solomon, Philo, the Sibylline Writings 
and even St. Paul are all precursors to Justin, and Justin in parti-
cular vas familiar vith Hellenistic Judaism. But in the Apologist 
it is far the first time that the Church found itself actively 
engaged in real dialogue vith the Greek warld. It no doubt looked 
back to the tradition ve have mentioned as legitimation for this 
task. Although the so-called Hellenization of Christianity cannot 
be said to have begun \lith the Apologists, it seems reasonable to say 
that it vas vith them that the encounter with the pagan vQrld set in 
in earnest. This process vould eventually come to its climax \lith 
the conversion or Constantine. 
-4-
It is of imIIlense significance that, in niany regards, Christianity 
found a valuable ~ in philosophy. Both vere fundamentally at 
odds vith the polytheism of the times, and the Apologists found a 
special friend in Middl_Platonism because of their common belief 
in the transcendence of God.8 Also useful to the Apologists vas 
the ground which philosophy had prepared for them by appealing to 
reason. The primary thrust of Justin's apologetic is the appeal 
to the reason of his reader, and espec~ to that of the Emperor, 
on the grounds that the Christians have the true Reason, the Logos 
of God. By this subtle play on the vord X~~oS , Justin is able both 
to apologetically accomodate his audience and to be very critical 
of the reasonableness of the philosophers. This proclamation of 
the reasonableness of Christi!lllity may even have arisen out of the 
criticisms of the Church by the pagan vorld. It definitely intends 
to be !Ill Illlsver to the criticisms of a Celsus. Because of this 
apologetic it is really quite ironic that Justin should have been 
martyred under the 'philosopher-king'. 9 
When one inquires more closely into Justin's background, matters are 
no longer so clear. It seems that, because of a lack of direct 
evidence of dependence betveen Justin and the limited number of 
representstives of Middl_P1aton1sm, the precise nature of his 
background will alvays be a matter of some ccmjecture, recent 
10 
advances notvithstllllding. Another point of controversy in Justin's 
(6) Dogmengeschichte (Freiburg, 1898), p. 48. 
(7) Dan1&lou, Ope cit. p. 9. 
(8) cf. ibid. pp. 2Of. 
(9) cf. W. Jaeger: Early Christianity and Greek Paldeia (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1962), pp. 27f. 
(10) For the Middle Platonic background cf. C. Andresen: "Justin und 
de:r mittle:re PlatonisllltlS", ZRW, 44 (1952-.3), pp. 159-199; 
Holte, ope cit., and nov Dan1&1ou, ope cit. 
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knowledge of, and thereby dependance on, Philo. Here one can 
discern the inevitable - scholars finding dependance betveen things 
about which they knOll the most. H.A. Woli'son, being an expert on 
Philo, finds that all the Church Fathers have an intimate knowledge ef 
11 Philo. Likevise E.R. Goodenough finds many points ef similRrity 
betveen Philo and Justin and he presumes that these similarities imply 
dependance.12 While such a dependance 1s definite in the case of the 
Alexandrians from C1ament onvards, it is by no means certain in the 
case of Justin . In an indirect vay it has been questioned by 
pannenberg,13 and directly challenged by Shotwell, who concludes 
that the differences betveen Justin and Philo outveigh the similari-
ties, and that these similarities are best explained by postulating 
a backgrOlUld to Justin influenced by Philo, or even by ideas and 
methods represented in Philo. 14 And so while Philo can shed much light 
on Justin's background, it vould be rolly to presume a relationship 
of dependance. A similsr problem exists over the question of the 
background to Justin's Logos theology. Part of the problem here 
is whether or not Justin knew or John's gospel. In turn this 
question raises the wole problem of the history of the gospel of 
John in the early second century. It appears to have been used in 
(11) The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Mass. , 1956), 
p. 233. 
(12) The Theology of Justin Martyr (Amsterdam, 1968), passim. 
(13) "The Appropriation of the Philosophical Concept of God as 
a Dogmatic Problem in Early Christian Tlleology", Basic 
Questions i:il Theology (SCM, 1971), vol. 2, p. 151. 
(14) Ope cit. pp. 99-109. 
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Gnostic circles and consequently it vas suppressed or regarded as 
not the best source of authority in orthodox circles. Again scholars 
disagree on all fronts. Without apparently realizing the problem, 
Wolfson presumes that Justin used Philo 'as a sort of commentary on 
. 15 16 the Prologue of the Gospel according to John'. C.F.D. Moule 
quotes J.N. Sanders17 to shov hOW' uncertain Justin's knovledge of 
John is. This debate has been taken up by T.E. PollardlB and 
J. Hovton.19 The sum total of the evidence seem to be quite inconc-
lusive, either to shOW' that Justin knew John or that he did not. 
Because of this ve cannot look to this source for the background to 
his Logos theology. We shall have to be content vith the Stoic 
and Middle-Platonic traditions. 
Methodologically criticism appears to have resolved itself fairly 
neatly into tvo camps. The one has concerned itself with theological, 
and the other vi th philological issues. 20 In this study, 1Jhi1e the 
main emphasis is theological, ve have tried not to avoid philological 
issues when they are either necessary or vhen they facilitate the 
exegesis. We have tried to be exegetical, to examine Justin and the 
other authors for what they seem to be saying on the topic under 
discussion. Scholarship is further subdivided because of the scope 
(15) ope cit. p. 233. 
(16) The Birth of the New Testament (A and C Black, 1966), p. 195. 
(17) The Fourth GosPel in the EaTly Cmn-ch (CUP, 1943), p. 31. 
(18) Johannine Christology and the Early Chnrch (cup, 1970), pp. 39f. 
(19) ftThe Theology of the Incarnation in Justinb, Studia Patristica, 
9 (1966), pp. 232ff. 
. . . . , 
(20) cf. J.C.M. van Winden: An Early Christian Philosopher: Justin 
Martyr's Dialogue vith Trypho. Chapters One to Nine (Leiden, 
1971), pp. If. 
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of the various enquiries into different aspects of Justin's thought. 
Ftar instance, Holte is concerned vith the Apologies and does not 
seriously concern himself vith the Dialogue. On the other hand, 
van Winden deals vith Dial. 1-9 and not vith the Apologies. While 
such specialization is inevitable, it is to be regretted, since 
neither approach is in a position to really assess the whole pictUre. 
It is because 'of this specialization that Holte maintains that the 
theory of the 'is not mentioned in the Dialogue'. 21 
This is quite true but not the whole truth, since the rejection in 
Dial. 1-9 of the Platonic idea. of the immortality of the soul and 
thereby of rational apprehension of the deity, surely has a vary 
important bearing on the adaptation of the Stoic idea of the ~b~os 
"ii~~'t.'1<.~5 in the II Apol.22 In this study an attempt is made 
to see the issues in the broadest possible perspective. Becanse of 
this aim, detail of an inessential nature has at times had to be 
overlooked. 
These considerations lead naturally to our final point of introduc-
tion. This concerns the relationship of the different vorks to 
each other. The main difference between them is clearly that the 
Apologies are vritten for Greeks and the Dialogue is a , conversation 
with a Jev. Here ve are at the central me:thodological problem of 
all critical vork dealing vith apologetics. How lIltlch is the author 
influenced by his audience and hov does the critic deal vith this 
influence? Is there a Justin who is not apologetic and can the 
critic reach him? Luckily in the case of Justin he seems to give 
himself !l\I8.y to a certain extent. While this issue is dealt vith in 
(21) ope cit. p. 110. 
(22) For these issues in more detail, cf. bel.ov, pp. 34rf. 
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more detail 'belov,23 ve can note here that, despite some controversy, 
there is no conclusive proof that the I and II Apologies are really 
part of' the same work. 24 
(2) The Doctrine of God: 
In an important article W. Pannenberg argued that one of the major 
theological problems of the apologetic era vas the appropriation of 
" 25 
the philosophical concept of God into Christian theology. 
Pannenberg maintains that the main difficulty facing the Christian 
theologian vas not the transcendence of God, nor even the elements 
of the Greek idea vhich desoribe God as completely impersonal, but 
indeed the tendency in all forms of Greek thought to regard God as " the 
highest essence of the vorld. Even 1iIhen God is described as 
'\ I I ') I 
'beyond all essence' (~;;bl(.6o,.vtl. it""1<' ~'f (7,,,f":,,,S), he is still regarded 
, I 
as the --rx 1 of the vorld, in the sense of' God being that vhich 
makes sense of the vorld or as the logical copula binding all 
existence together. > I • I In this sense "'tX1 becomes ident~cle vith tl-},."S 
and God is still very much part of the vorld. Pannenberg regards 
this a.ttitude to be in basic opposition to the biblical viov, were 
God is not ever thought of as the prime ontologioal or even oosmo-
logical entity, but he is free from the universe and is the sovereign 
of it. In this sense God being the ~~, is interpreted very diff-
erantly - he is not the explanation of the existence".of the vorld, 
that vhich makes sense of the llorld, but the aotual creator of the 
vorld, and the vorld is dependant in every sense for its existenoe on 
God and not vice-versa. ) I • God then, as the iXi of the vorld ~s the 
(23) cf. belov, pp. 42£'. 
(24) For this debate, cf. A.V.F. Blunt: The Apologies of Justin 
Martyr (CUP, 1911), pp. xliv.,xlvii. 
(25) op. cit. 
(26) cf. R.P.C. Hanson: God. Creator, Saviour, Spirit (SCM, 1960), p. 18. 
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absolute sovereign and ruler of the world both in its creation and 
in its continued existence. It 1s because of the question of Gotd's 
absolute sovereignty over the world that the question of creatio 
ex nihi10 is going to be of immense importance throughout this thesis. 
When we turn to Justin, asking how he haa adapted the philosophical 
concept of God, the first issue is to define what philosophical 
concept we are dea11ng with. That this is the Middle-Platonic 
concept ill now almost an exiom of the scholarship concerned with 
thill period. 'Ibis seems to have come to Justin through the 
'SchulplatonislllUs' for lIhich Albinus is our chief source. But 
before describing Justin ' s use of this tradition, it is important 
to notice that this background is by no means the ouly source fer 
his doctrine of God. Another maj or source is to be found in 
Hellenistic Judaism. Here there arises a major problem for the 
critic, for it is not always possible to trace one thought to 
the Middle-Platouic background and another to the Hellenistic 
Judaism. The thought of the time is so syncretistic that there 
appear to have been many features in common between the two, and 
novhere is this more apparent than in the doctrine of God. 'Ibis 
is immediately apparent !rem even a partial glimpse at Philo. 
But it is nevertheless important to bear in mind the fact that 
Justin is not a clean, shiny product of the 'Schulp1atonislllUs' . 
This Jewish background seems mainly to be evident in the 111Ilguage 
describing God as 
to dV'.laUr ~~v) 
in the Dialogue. , 
( \1 'the Father and Maker "to'( Ii"L,U'I'tcl.. as opposed 
of the heavens and the earth', Zl Wich abounds 
This is quite natural considering the Jewish 
audience of that work. In the Apologies the creative activity of 
(Zl) Dial. 74(19O,649A) and (191,649B). For JV"lcNf f' cf. 
I !pol. 8.2(12,337B), 13. 1(16,345B), and fer ~h'''1t''~ 
cf. 13.4(17,348A). 
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God is presented in Greek terms. In I Apol. 10 God ill described 
( ' -') as the 'provider of' all thingll' nolfl-)(t'td. u;!.,,~... and the 'llource 
. 28 
of' all good virtues'. Justin goes on: 
He in the beginning did of His goodnesll. for DIIlIl' s 
seke create all things out of' unformed matter (f.1 
~, tJ\ . . 29 "t4'~'" ""'IS ) • 
<J. 
'!he term u~~ is a technical term agreeing vi th the Platonic 
doctrine, but it vas apparent17 adopted f'rom Aristotle into Middle-
Platon1sm.30 '!he presence of tho ~}.'t is a point of' oontention is 
all the vr1 ters oonsidered in this stud,.. Justin's use of this 
tradition of oourse oorresponds to Gen. 1.2 and the Tilll&811S 29d. 
Of interest to later studies on this subj ect is the next statement 
, 
~f Justin's, that 'He (Gad) created us when ve vere not' (""' ..... 
~,,'e""S ). He explains this b,. sa;r1ng: 'For the ooming into being at 
first vas not in our paver'. From this evidenoe ve JllU8t conclude 
) ')/ 
that the eN \4 in "" 1<.. cWt.lS is not used absolutel,., and its use 
is here quite oompatible vith the lingering idea of' the eternal 
~>'i }l 
In this respect Justin has not managed to relllOTe the undesirable 
elements from the ph1l.osophical conoept of God. Justin's doctrine 
or oreation is, hovever, used as a polemical tool both against Cynioal 
determinism and Marcionism. The determinism, so strong a feature 
(28) 10.1(13,3400). 
(29) 10.2(14,3400). 
(30) i.e. llbinus: Didaskalos 9(163~10f). and, of' oourse, Wis. 1l.17. 
(31) cf. also I !pol. 59.1(57.416Bf') where Justin writes as he 
",)/ l' I \&\\ 
agrees vith Plato: "~1\1 J.rop~tN ""u." '1pt-f"'''1:d. i:iN r:7t<;N 
I _" 
""0(V't0v ., OL'l6d-L . 
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of Gnosticism, is refuted by reference to creation 'for man's sake' .32 
Determinism has no place in a creation where all 'things eartAl,.' 
are IJUbj oct to man and when God's care and providence rule over 
all. 33 Very similar to these refarences are both Justin's attacks 
on Karcion.34 An element arising from this is the connection of 
this part of Justin's thought with his very close linking of Christ-
ianityand the Old Testament. ~e God who created all things and 
revealed himself in the Old Testament through his Logos is the same 
God who reveals himself through the LQgGS in the f'ulf'ilment of the 
Old Testament. The insistence that creation was J'J,. 4N ~DI.l may 
also indirectly be against Marcion. We will return to this later.35 
Justin's debt to the Middle-Platonic . tradition becomes more evident 
when he defines God's relaticmship with the world in negative terms. 
( ) ~ \)/) God is 'very Being' (.."-h"o to "" ,having 'no oolour, no form, no 
\/ 1.)/ greatness'; he is 'beyond all essence (4-ii ..... c ..... """ ii 6,\1 ""&''''5), 
>I L. I 
unutterable (~~~ ~~~"" ) and inexplioable, but alone honourable and 
gGOd' .36 Other words of similar meaning used by Justin are 
~X~f1t .. ~ 37 and ~ff~t.>S .38 These both have a very strong basis 
in Middle-Platonism.39 Of more interest is the description of God 
(32) cf. II !pol. 4.2(75,452A). 
(33) cf. II Apol. 5.2(75,4528). 
(34) I !pol. 26.5(29,368C) and 58.1(57,4161). cf. also 45.1(45,3960) 
and 46.5(47,397C). This point is noted by Goodenough, op. cit. 
p. 134, n. 4 
(35) · of. below, pp. 45f. 
(36) Dial. 4(91,484A). Here Justin 111 quoting Plato with apparent 
"), If) I 
approval. For the precise meaning of 6.ilt-Kh ..... ito.6,\S CN6-(.01.5 
and the hiStory of its use of. below, P. 136. 
(37) Dial. 127(261,7728). 
(38) I Apol. 9.3(13.340B). 
(39) cf. Danielou. op. cit. p.33l. and Albinus: Did. 10(164.7). 
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as l~:"'Y'1,'toS.40 Goodenough regards Justin's use of the term as 
a mistake 'quite natural in a philosophical duettante,.41 G.L. 
Prestige h~s hovever shown, despite Lightr()()t,42 that there seems 
to have been no little confusion in our period between ~3tvv1l:"S and 
1.d~~ 'toS .43 A still more recent contribution to the debate 
, ') I 
comes trom Danie101l, vho maintains that the use of olt'lf'1l:o~ should 
be traced through Josephus to Philo and thereby to the 'language of 
Jewish apologetic', vhilst ~~J.vV','t"S should be traced to Middle-
Platon1sm.44 Without more detailed argument trom Danil!lou it is 
impossible really to assess this suggestion, but it is an unlikely 
, ~ I thesiS. Danie10u suggests that the use of o ..... 1'tOj in Philo is 
derived trom Jewish apologetic, but it seems mch more likely that 
the term '/Comes straight trom Plato. Justin anyhov seems alllPst 
certainly to be unavere of the difference in meaning between the 
two words.45 Of course, as Prestig,e puts it: 'In so fer as God 
vas thought of as the universal Father, there vas little need to 
distinguish between generation 8Jld creation I. Because of this 
'God vas the only being to which either vord could properly be 
applied, •46 Probably, despite Justin's apparent ignorance of 
) I , I 
d.bMi,l:OS , the term 'iI.~NV'ltd! may often be interpreted in the light 
(40) e.g. lApel. 14.2(17,348B) and 25.2(28,365B). 
(41) OPe cit. p. 130. 
(42) Apostolic Fathers (London, 1885), vol. 2, pp. 9Off. 
(43) God in Patristic Thought (SPCK, 1959), pp. 37ft. cf. also 
J .F. Bethune-Baker: The Early History of Christian Doctrine 
(Landon, 1962), p. 122, n.1. 
(44) , ope cit. p. 324. 
(45) ) ( cf. Dial. 5( 94,488Bf). where d-~'wT'05 is used where one vwld 
expect lobr1'CoS • 
(46) Ope cit. p. 41. 
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of a oontrast between God the Father and the Son, wo is the 'first-
begotten' .47 This is also noticed by" Dani61ou, but he takes the 
matter too far by suggesting that in this slight adaptation of the 
Middle-Platonio doctrine we find the beginnings of a doctrine of the 
Trinity.48 
As in Plato, the immediate problem of suoh language is hov a God . 
wo can only be described in negative terms can be knovn. The 
original Platonic theory seems to be represented in libinus, were 
God, or the first cause, or indeed the whole intellectual realm, 
can only be grasped by the mind.49 The significance of this 
tradition vill be realized wen loIe come to deal with the doctrine 
of the Logos. 50 H.A. Wolfson maintains that Philo is the first 
person to take this tradition a step further and to maintain that 
God is unknovable. In this he claiJDs that Philo is really indebted 
to his Jewish heritage. This applies also to the description of 
God as 'mmamable' (.l~ovori6tO\l), Wich plays a large part in 
Justin's thought especially in the Dialogue. Philo describes God 
as 'incomprehensible' (.lI<.,j.UI-~;li~"" ).51 This is taken to mean that 
'He is not apprehensible even by the mind, 'save in the fact that He 
is' .52 That Philo develop~ this into an integral part of his 
(47) cf. lApel. 14.1(17.348B), 49.5 (48,40lA), 53.2(52.405c). 
This suggestion is made by Prestige, op. cit. p. 39. 
(48) . op. cit. p; 330f; . -
(49) cf. libinus: Did. 10(165.4): :-!?~'1<CS J' h. .. \. I<A~ <:~ -t~ r~";! >-, r.t~S . 
For this point cf. Dani~lou, op. cit. p. 333. 
(50) of. belOlol, pp. 29f. 
(51) ~. I,ll,67. cf. H.A. Wolfson: Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1<)62). 
vel. 2, p. ill. cf. also Sextus Emperious: Sentences 28 • 
(52) IlDlIlI1t. 1,3,62: ~ I)~", 
'.'"1 I to """",,j..\. ro''''' • 
.,M "'"' '"' .\ ,<I , \ 
"',,' to ~ ';;." v~ 1I.».bV. '1 iit t>S' 61: < 1"1 -
cf. also Wolfson, op. cit. pp. ll9-121. 
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his doctrine of GGd has been questioned by Pannenberg who argues 
against Wolfson.53 We tend to side with Wolfson. Albinus' ~1~'~ 
and Justin's 1 .... ~,')\1iiJS seem to be decisive.54 This tendency in 
Philo towards a Neo-Platonic doctrine of God is in some \laYS 
mirrored in Justin. The main 1I0uree for this tendency is in the 
Dialogue. It ill again at this point that we notice the close 
similarity betveen the p~osophical tradition and Hellenistic 
Judaism. The central argument of the Dialogue is f!!1r the existence 
of a second God. The premiss for thill argument is that lIince God 
cannot be named, he is properly speaking unknowable. As Pannenberg 
shows, this ia not a peculiarly philosophical argument. 55 It 
seems rather to have been part of the common milieu of the time. 
It is hinted at in Middle-Platonism, and Justin's statement that the 
names given to God are 'but appellations derived from His good deeds 
and functions' is a natural statement both for a Middle-Platonist 
and a Jew.56 From this premiss Justin uses the argument of the 
imposaibility of God appeering in a theophany to prove that there 
must be a second God to reveal him.57 God is thus: 
(He) who remains ever in the supercelestial places, 
invisible to men, holding personal intercourse vith 
none, whom we believe to be Maker and Father of all 
things.58 
(53) Ope cit. p. 129, n. 33. 
(54) Dial. 3(91,4810). 
(55) op. cit. p. 150. 
(56) II Apol. 6.2(76,453A). cf. also I Apol. 10.1(14,3400) and 
61.ll(60,42lB). 
(57) cf. Goodenough, Ope cit. pp. 143ff. for the Platonic, Philonic 
and Rabbinic background to this argument. 
(58) Dial. 56(158,596D-597A). cf. also Goodenough, OPe cit. pp. 126f. 
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This fixing of God's 'locality' is not to the total exclusion of his 
activity in the vorld: 
He sees all things, and know all things, and none of 
us escapes His observation; and He is not IlOved or 
confined to a spot in the \/hole vorld, for He existed 
before the vorld vas made. 59 
But despite this, God has 'personal intercourse vith none', and 
he wo has the smallest intelligence vi1l not venture 
to assert that the Maker and Father of all things, 
having left all supercelestial matters, vas visible on 
a little portion of the earth. 60 
It is because of this kind of transcendenoe and remoteness of God 
that he sent forth his Son as an intermediary wo appears 'sometimes 
in the form of fire, and sometiLle8 in the likeness af angels'. 
And: 'He declares vhatever ve ought to knOll, and is sent forth to 
declare vhatever is revea1ed,.6l 
This argument leads to a conundrum. On the one hand God is the 
creator and maker of all things, but on the other he has nothing 
to do vith the created order. One might like te describe the tension 
as existing betveen the Greek and Jewish canceptions of God as 
inherited by Justin, but this problem cannot be so simply explained, 
since the same problem existed in Hellenistic Judaism. This same 
difficulty is really manifest in the doctrine of the Logos, for hov 
can this schema avoid deep subordinationism if various key attributes 
(59) Dial. 127(261, 7l'2J3). For a similar view cf. Origen: Contra 
Celsus VI, 64(406, 1396B). 
(60) Dial. 6O(168f,612C). 
(61) I Apol. 63.5(61,424Af). 
- 16 -
of the deity are ascribed to God but not to the Logos? One can see 
\/by Justin uses the argument to justigy the belief in a second God 
and it certainly does achieve this, but the problem is that this 
62 
'second God' mast eventually end up being the Arian Logos. So 
far as the doctrine of God is concerned we can see how the difficulty 
arises over the vax:ed question of how God related to the world. 63 If 
Justin had got his doctrine of creation right and integrated it 
into the rest of his thought, there would be no problem, but as it 
is, the tendency of his thought is for all of God's relations with 
the world to be understood and described in terms of the Logos. 
If the only God so far as the world is concerned is the Logos, the 
relationship betveen God. and the Logos becomes of vital importance. 
If God is cousidered only as the originator of the Logos and other-
vise has only negative attributes, it becomes very difficult for the 
Logos not to become God in actual fact, and for Justin's God to 
dissappear somewhere along his apophatic way. In this way the doctrine 
of God reduces to the doctrine of the Logos. 
In conclusion then, ve can say that in essence Justin has made no 
significant contribution to the problem of the appropriation of the 
philosophical concept of God into Christian theology. \!hat he 
presenup.s mainly Middle-Platonism with its God made mOl'e personal 
vith tinges of Hellenistic Judaism. His attempts to make this 
specifically Christian seem to fail because he never really comes 
to terms with the question of creation and of how God, rather than a 
'second God', relates to the created order. 
(62) cf. H. Chadwick: Early Christian Thought and the Classical 
Tradition (OUP,1966), p. 16. 
(63) For this question in Middle-Platonism of. R.E. Witt: Albinus 
and the HiStory of Middle Platonism (Amsterdam, 1971), pp. 123f. 
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(.3) The Doctrine of the Logos: 
(a) The Logos and God: 
The most consistent vay that Justin uses to describe the relationship 
of the Logos to God is that the Logos lI8.S begotten from God. Thus, 
J.v ~ l.ll~ 64 
the Logos is the first f ."~ from the «t"lI'ltN !7I-tN. He 
is the .l' ,""ct Co"-D\ r:"'.9~ • An example of this kind of lallguage 
is the following: 
••• and that Jesus Christ is the only proper Son 
( 
I ) ~I , I ) 
rHOS """'S UlOS who has been begDtten of God 
(ht"lI'j t.olt. ), being His Word and first-begotten 
(.r""~~1:of<""~ ), and pover (J~Vd.J'-l\ ).65 
To llIlderstand this kind of lallguage it is necessary to turn to Justin's 
use of the Wisdom tradition, and espec1al.ly to his exegesis of 
Prov. 8.22£f ( in all cases LXX). It is the thesis of H.A. 
Wolfson that all the Church Fathers can almost be classified by 
their different exegeses of this passage, and therefore by their 
different theories of the origin of the Logos. 66 
In Dial. 129 ve see hav Provo 8.22£f is used to describe the 
relationship of the Logos to God. Prov. 8.22 specifically is 
used to establish the ssparate existence of the Logos from God. 67 
In this whole passage it is quite clear that Wisdom is identified 
(64) cf. p. 1.3 above, and also I Apel. 12.7(15,.344B): 'God who 
begat (~W r"1""'''u,.) him'; 21.1(25,.360A):"f' .... 'OO<N t v,,1/"" ; 
Dial. 129(26.3,777B) etc. 
(65) I Apol. 2.3.2(27,.364!). cf. also 46.2(46,.397.8) and 5.3.2 
(52,4050), where there is a close connection of the 'first-bern' 
(.rW"th .. ' .... ~ ) vith the 'Unbegotten God' (c:~ ~tv,+:~ 8,-.;}); 
also 6.3.15(62,425B) and finally 58;.3 (57,416B) , where i\r\Jt.~d<NO~ 
oc=s in the same sense Il.S "f"'t.ot. .. ~S • 
(66) The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). 
passim. 
(67) 129(26.3,77713):' ••• and that that lIbich is begotten is numerically 
distinct from that which begets, anyone vill admit., 
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with the Logos. This act of generation ill described in several 
places, and is often, as in Prov. 8.22, linked with the creation 
of the world. This is the case in Dial. 61. Here we IIIt18t depart 
from the ANCL and translate: 
. / 
••• God has begotten (td-w"J .... t-) a beginning before all 
') \ _, / I 
created things ("'r~1'( nro ,".J,vcu.'y r;J..r I<..t.~'r'"t"wv'), 
a rational power from himself, wo at one tille is called 
the glory of the Lord by the Holy Spirit, at another 
Son, at another Wisdom, at another Angel ••• 68 
Here the begetting of the Logos and the creation of the world appear 
to be temporally separated. This quote, together with evidence 
\ .., - / 6 such as the 11('0 T:""'I IIO''\!'''''tW .... of II Apol. , leads Wolfson to 
conclude that Justin :firmly advocated what he calls a 'twofold stage 
theory of the Logos' .69 Actually there is one slight complication 
to this view. This is the interpretation of the ~"t ~ in II Apol. 6 
(76,453A) • Here there is almost a contradiction. The Logos is 
_ \" I . . \ \ If" described as nro ,"w.I r.""1~rw.t,"KsM. 'uv>.i.N I<.d..I.. ~C-\(v'1"'h'OS , o1:t-
,'I n'~ 1 ()( ," II/ "t~Vd('~1" tl ol.veav (1\.~05) nol-vCol. ~w.:t.~t-)<'<k.<k0o/'i'~ (OIi-O~). 
TIl -, '"' - '~.,. balan db th I <I 70 e "ro 'Cu.N ~G~r:\""" ~s ce y e ~I-W~ol' Oct- ••• 
Because of' this it is advisable to bear in mind the warning of 
Bethune-Baker: 
Some of his (Justin's) phrases imply that the Logos 
existed with God before the creation potentially only 
coming to actuality when the liTorld was made.?l 
This IIIt18t just be iI. cautionary note because 'Wolfson is undoubtedly 
correct. The following puts the matter beyond all doubt: 
(68) Dial. 61(170, 6l3Bf). 
(69) op. cit. p. 192. 
(f (70) For the interpretation of the o"t.~ , cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 154. 
(71) op. cit. p. 124. 
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But the offspring wich vas truly brought forth from 
(' \ ... \ ... " ,~, ,...".. \ the Father I\).~ ... 'r1Ni:O 'to ~'t ""'rot.. ",.". 'teN Itd.tpO~ 
li'fo~l~ tv"r)' vas vi th the Father before ~ 
creat;:Jres, and tile Fatiler communed vith Him ( .......... 
~.,(,i:~ ~ il"6-t1r 'fp06 0/",,)..11) .72 
Having established tile time (if it can be called time) of tile 
begetting of the Logos, that is before creation, ve can nov go on 
to examine the mode of begetUng itself. In Prov. 8.22ff a number 
, )/ J ') L-o.J..~ , t"I 
of verbs are used: \o(\) f 'O\ !:-1I..1:l'~ (-k, {-19'r"'''''66- and ii.'14.ol1.. are 
used of creation, and iij>0 ""~v is used of the springs welling 
v / 
up; tilsn f1ne.lly tile 6-... t<'t-rt- is taken up and expressed as 
What is startlingly noticable in Justin's use of this 
~ 
verse is that he ignores tile other verbs and uses the ~v~ rf:" 
almost exclusively.73 Also this language loIhich VGuld naturalls" be 
used of the Father-Son relationship is freel:y used of the relationShip 
of God to his Logos.74 Justin explains the use of the term, in order 
to counter this difficulty, vift an almost Athanasisn comment on the 
nature of analogy: 
And ii' ve assert that the Word of God vas born 
(t'~t-v'1"s.,...... ) in a peculiar manner, dii'ferent from 
( " \ I ordinary generation il<I-(>d- 1:,,\ V .... o<"'\v ~t-Vl-~W ), 
let this, as said above, be no extraordinary thing to 
you.75 
/ 
Although Justin almost always uses ~HVd.~ , there are instances 
were other verbs OCC1lI'. One of these has already been quoted, 
Disl. 62(172,6170). Here ve find what seems to be one of the fev 
/ 
instances of the use of 1T('O~W , and here this very gnostic 
(72) Disl. 62 (172, 6170) . 
(73) cf. Dial . 129(263,777B) . 
(74) cf. M. Wiles: "Eternal Generation",!cr§., 12 (1%1), p. 284. 
(75) I Apol. 22.l(26,36lA). 
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~ ~I idea is qualified by Tw IN"... , \/hich is clearly Juatin' s attempt 
.. 
76 . I 
to free the word from its gnostic connotations. "FOii1SolW is 
used in Dial. 128(262,776A}, and the same usage of this word occurs in 
Tatian: Orat. 5(9,813C). This word does not seem to have Imy special 
connotations, excspt perhaps a connection with the word coming forth 
from the mind. ~iib ... <:~\..l is used in I Apol. 63. 5 (61,424B). in 
conjunction with Christ being called 'angel and apostle'. Only 
once does ileo .. V~N appear to have been used and this is only in an 
analogy similar to that of Prov. 8.24. When a comparison is made with 
Tatian, for instance, this reticence to use the more gnostic verbs, 
I 
especially "eO ~<I.~>'"," and i\~Q~t}tN , seems to indicate an awareness on 
Justin's part of the dangers inherent in such vocabulary. When we 
come to discuss Justin's use of the J0v~'S tradition this con-
clusion will be strengthened. 
Having dealt with the actual verb used to describe the act of begett-
ing, we can now move on to describe \/hat other hints are given as 
to \/hat this verb signifies. A very important text in this regard 
is to be found in Dial. 61: 
(76) 
For He can be called by all these names, since He 
Ministers to the Father's will ('ttl lio.~fHI<-? fl<N>'~L), 
and since He was begotten by the will of his Father 
( ' ,.., \ ~ '- \ C\ \' ~ 1'1. 77 eK. ~"" .... ~ ~cN '~tre ~ "'''''1' h 6t-~ h ,,\6 <7'O-l . ) ; 
I "Po~wiS also used in Dial. 61(170,616A), \/hich is quoted 
below. ForiiFQ~.t\\...:l and the resultant 1lF"~o~~ cf. 
Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. I.I.1(5,445A} and I.I.2(5,449A}. 
This chapter Shows evidence of a confusion between 6t-~e-(16~ 
"f\ '-A\ I 
and d'-\ 1-VV'..,6 <>,-H,. • We first find 0 "'1-0) tl~ (('11/.. ... 
r, ,0' '~'\ ,,- \ 1\\1# I "fl . d"V~t-v" t,vok , then (,oK. tIN <>lito c:"" (I\L1:f'~ "'-"\1 61-1 tdE-Y~b~. 
I I I 
These are rolieved by dINt ;-'''''''' ( YariantJ<V or f:"vN ) and 
1/ A / AI>F ~,"Uwrh(. The use of ahl'1'""'" cannot really be 
considered since the WO y -ed ),(.'Y'l:Jj.V.'vv-l never occurs. 
Th Y I ~\. ? '" I )~I en most importantly we find ",,-,,'to) Ii.N O"VC.~ 0 ""~ \ alII 0 
-- \ '" (J\ fi ,, ' tIN \I .. t~.\ "t1>.N ol.wJ ~'Y'I71)'<1.S, \/hich is directly parallel to 
the )~~""..,,(,~ already-quoted. '" "l' J~v"'r~ C'd..~~l''' 
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I 
just as ve see happening (~~II'. /~.J'" ) among ourselves: 
, 1 l 
£or wen ve give out some vord (""~",, bil-F 1:,,,,,,, 
"r· ~c\..'>.h<Nt:t-'», ve beget the vord ().~r" }.HVWj-kI ); 
> I") .p 
yet not by abscission (CN ,y.~ 0..0'"1'""'), as :when 
ve give out a vord ve do not lessen the reason in us · 
( ' '"' '"" \' ) tiN fr,f '1r-~v ""'66../ : and just lUI ve see also happen-
ing in the case o£ a £1re, which is not lessened vhen 
it hlUl kindled (another), but remains the same.78 
In this passage Justin implies that the begetting of the Logos is 
\1 ) ).'" , best understood in the manner of the ""0<» tv '<LCtH·"y'itpo~6p"I.OS 
, 
IIchema. It ill lIignilicant that the verb "~o~':'~1.l is used only on 
the human side of the analogy. This text is evidence of the non-
technical nature of the language of the period. 
I 
ii' po ~J..\'\w can be 
toN16 B.k. • I equsted vith \f-vVd.w , and there can be conf'usion over 
) ('I 0 I 
The C-Vcll"'~l-to,; / ltro~.F III..0S schema is not only used in the analogy, 
)\~.,... \ f'I\1 
but is hinted at by the begetting o.\i. '<:N 1\d-1:.ro~ D'f-1I1"1. There 
is also a close connection between minstering to the Father's vill 
'" '" \1 /\' (t~ \td. ~P' "';'l ~NIo.I~'V and the C>'f-}.1f'D' of the Father in the 
begetting of the Logos. This phrase is a £avourite o£ Justin ' s 
and is strong evidence £or a background of the 'HSl~Q(-CoS/ 
I \1 > (,IA ilfO~OP\K..~ kind. For, il the (\C1~OS t-"'lold-crh:oj i& the 'vill o£ 
the Father', then the 'vill of the Father' is a most convenient link 
~r ., ~/l'. . f 
betveen the I e~os C ..... cllc/..~tos and \\'rO~O~lIc..o~, vhich quite 
naturally can apply to the relationship between God and the Logos. 
But vhile Justin ~ses this schema as en analogy, he novhere formally 
( ) 
., .1\ •. )_\ n":'r-. I 
77 cont. ~~NV16~ 01..\'0 'r'CN (1cI-'t!"'S occurs in Dial. 128(262,776B), 
and 6~~wq"~ occurs in the same sense in I Apol. 22.1 
(26,36IA1. This confusion is surprising in the ~t of 
") , . ) I 
Justin's use of ..ldl-vll'1'tO\ inlltead of Q.~NI"tO\ , where no 
confusion exists. There is also no evidence £or lIurpoSing 
that the matter is a textual dllficulty. 
(78) Dial. 61(170,616A). The translation is adapted. 
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introduces it, as does Theophilus.79 This too may be significant, 
but it is difficult to see what he gains by not introducing it. 
The formal schema vith the direct analogy of the "ouS begetting the 
~t~os could have been used to connect God and the Logos in a IlIllch 
stronger fashion than Justin's subtle play on ~~60S' Goodenough 
thinks that Justin avoided the schema in order to avoid a cosmic 
duality of the Logos, vhich is the necessary implication of the 
\ I ) (" I n. ,/_ I 80 i'obOS t-vcll"c/..O'C'te>¥ II ('0 ~o pc~S schema. This seems quite likely, 
but his reticence to accept this schema does make his poSition more 
subordinationist than it need be. This is clear when Justin is 
compared to Athenagoras for instance.8l 
The passage from Dial. 61 concludes vith a f=ther analogy of a fire 
not being diminished ldlen it lights another fire. This, together 
with the analogy of the raJS of light from the sun, seems to be more 
'rl 
closely connected with Justin's use of the ~U"d-r\5 tradition. It 
is at this point that Justin is closest to the Gnostic doctrine of 
emanations end it is important to examine his qualifications of that 
tradition in some detail. 
In the Middle-Platonic tradition the J.$w'r~S is closely connected 
vith the vorld soul,82 and vith creation.83 That Justin "'as avare 
(79) cf. belov, pp. 69£. 
(80) OPe cit. p. 151. Danielou (op. cit. pp. 352ff.) groups all 
the Apologists together in their use of the schema. This 
overlooks a lot of the subtilty of their thought. 
(81) cf. belov, pp.76f. 
'\ 'f')\"1 -(82) cf. Albinus: Did. 14(169.30): ~c ~1" Y'''Xjv' <It" pl.1-t =6<,L" <<11> 
, , , A ( ,(\ I ) \ \ ' A \ I \ ,"" ,~ \ _ ~ 
K06(-<N eN,," .0\(. ..... 0 O'kS, ",,,,,do ~t.I""~) """'- -e ... v~ 6.~tr\\. __ " ....... lIenhll" 
and also (171.10): ~;~ 1 J'~ !r;;:6<lV 1 lI..w~w J~wr'~ "Ii' ~~>'~"oC' 
(83) 
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of this traditiion is certain from I Apol. 60, which is remarkably 
similar to Albinus: Did. 14. But this almost Stoic element in 
both Middle-Platonism and Plato has been modified by 'Judaeo-Christian' 
elements, so that the S~v~1 comes from God and retains its cosmo-
logical function but loses its too intimate association vith the 
1l0rld.84 The ~~~ 't~ 8~J:J i8 considered more as an emana.-
tion from God than as an element of the Ilorld. Thus Justin writes: 
And: 
t , r' ) And the first poller (1 "'t"''tj oU">i./,-'5 after God the 
Father and Lord of all is the Word, Ilho is also the 
Son.85 
It is wrong, therefore, to understand the Spirit and 
. (' N , '" ~ .., the poller of God tIl( tJuwrtl/ ti" it." ... ~"" O'~ ) 
as anything else than the Word, Ilho is also the first-
born of God.86 
In Dial. 128 the emanation of this J'~,,"t-'S is explained and qualified: 
••• but (they) maintain that this poller is indivisible 
'" \ and inseparable from the Father (vcr1'tcN' j(p.~ 
" ~- ') . o(x"'e'6~<N 'teN ""'tpOS , just as they say that the light 
of the sun on earth is indivisible and inseparable 
from the sun in the heavens; as when it sinks, the 
light sinks along Ilith it; so the Father, \lben He 
• tI, 
chooses (<IU.\1 ~""~1'td..~), say they, causes His poller 
to spring forth, and Ilhen He chooses, He makes it 
return to Himself. 
Justin, after ascribing to the angels the same kind of origin, 
continues: 
(84) Dani~lou, op. cit. p. 347. 
(85) I !pol • .32.10(.35, .380B). 
(86) I Apol • .3.3.6(36,38IB). 
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And that this power which the prophetic word calls God, 
• •• , and Angel, is not nwnbered only as the light of 
the sun, but is something numerically distinct, I 
have discussed briefly in what has gone before; wen 
I asserted that this poyer vas begotten from the Father, 
( ' rl I "lI by His pover and vill t1" 'JV"~v' 'ed-\tttl \f-d~Wi6"''''-<. 
,_, "' "" , ~ I \ \"') ~ q 0(.110 'toN 1IiJ.'tf0t I OIlY:A(-h I'$L ~'l1 olvtOlJ ), but not by . 
abscission, as if the essence of the Father vere 
') , ') \ ')_ \ (,,_ ~ I ..., 
divided (01.)..>. 01\) ,....to( 0(.11 ot';l"1" I '-'IS"''' 0r1./ r-f-v'jS t'~S 
~.c i\;,.'t~S J,.£"S). B7 . 
Apart from the theologioally rather dubious implication that .the Father 
could ohoose to stop begetting his Son, these qualifications of the 
J'S,,"t"q tradition are an important development. The union and the 
separation of the Father and the Son are balanced, although under the 
circumstances it is more important for Justin to emphasise the union. 
There is one rather strange thing, Which appears to be echoed in 
Tatian. This is that the pover is begotten from the Father by his 
poyer. Could this be similar to the qualifioation of the >'~s 
) r I l\ I 
1,,{CI ....... C1~~.s /"'r,,~I!>(>'W'OS schema, vhere authors are concerned lest the 
>'(,~5 coming forth be thought to render the "..vS vithout its 
rationality (~b30S)1 The last qualification hints at what later 
) I 
came to be the. identity of ""'Id. between Father and Son.88 One 
vonders hoy Justin vould have tried to reconcile the shared aJ6~'" 
vith his argument derived from the impossibility of God appearing in 
a theophany. for the basis of this is surely that the Logos does not 
have the identical ~,~ as the Father. It is interesting that in 
the argument from theophanies the language of God and Logos is used, 
but here in the SJV~l.S tradition God becomes the less exclusive 
Father. 
(B7) Dial. 128(262,776A-B). 
(88) For Tatian on the same question, cf . below, pp. 66f. 
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When one bears this tradition in mind, and especially the Middle-
Platonic doctrine of the world-soul, the confusion between the Logos 
and the Spirit in Justin is not at all surpriSing.89 The tendency 
to give all sorte of names to one entity is part of the general 
milieu, and might go back to very early syncretism, when the gods of 
other nations were apologetically regarded as one's 0'Wll gods under 
dif'ferent names.9O One can observe a direct contrast between the 
Middle-Platonic tradition, lIhere the vorld-soul is the only real 
, I 
intermediary between the world and the K.6 6FS VQlto\ or God, and the 
less philosophical tradition vhich involves the multiplication of the 
intermediaries. This in its extreme fOrD) is manifested in Gnosticism. 
In Justin the vorld_soul is elevated so that instead of contemplating 
the divine ideas, it is identified vith them,91 but Justin has not 
maneged to reconcile this vith his steadfast belief in other divine 
povers . The result is that, lIhile he can speak of them as separate 
things in one instance, there is a1veys the tendency to equate all 
the names vith one object. So Justin can refer to the Logos and the 
Spirit, but also reveal that he really considers them to be the same 
thing. It is this kind of background vhich seems to explain the 
dreadful confusion of I Apol. 6, vhere the angels seem to be placed 
between the Logos and the Spirit, lIhich gives the impression that 
they have a superior status to the Spirit. 
There is, hovever, yet another side to Justin's thought on .the subject. 
There are many passages vhere Justin's language is completely orthodox 
(89) cf. I Apol. 33.6(36,38LB). For the apparent identification of 
the pre-existent Christ vith Wisdom in Paul and the resultant 
confusion over the pre-existence of the Spirit, and the sjmllar 
problem in Johannine theology, cf. Wolfson, OPe cit. pp. 177-191. 
(90) A good example of this is the syncretism involved with the incor-
poration of El into the Hebrew religion . Another example is 
the identification of Wisdom vith Isis lIhich lies behind the 
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and innocuous. Most of these passages are however just the outlines, 
which vould probably be explained by Justin in terms of the generation 
or emanation of the Logos as discussed above. Interestingly many 
of these comments are closely associated with references to the incarna-
tion. 92 The more traditional side of Justin also surfaces in the 
inst!lIlces vhere the Spirit is given a separate existence: 
••• and that ve reasonably worship Him, having learned 
that He is the Son of the true God Himself, and holding 
• (' do I I ) Hl.m in the second place ~" "'ot .. p~ >\wr~ , and the 
prophetic Spirit in the third U" t fr .. ~ "C~ ~ft ) , 
ve vill prove. 93 
This is clearly the beginnings of a kind of Trinitarianism. Not only, 
however, is this quote subordinationist, bnt Justin continues: 've give 
. (dt I I to a cruci1'l.ed man a place second b-u'tf.r-v )('"f"' .... ) to the tmchangeable 
and eternal God, the Creator of all'. The undeveloped nature of this 
. I I 
quote, vith its seemingly identical use of )\""'~ and ~cI-~1 S , 
is to be compared vith a similar statement made by Athenagoras that 
avoids subordinationism.94 Apart from this instance and that of 
I Apol. 6, vhich has already been mentioned, all the Trinitarian 
formulae clearly come from the context of liturgical vorship.95 
The element of vorship is even present in the quote from I Apol. 13. 
From this it is quite clear that Trinitarianism is not an integral 
(90 cont.) book of the Wisdom of Solomon. cf. W.L. Knox: St. Paul 
and the Church of the Gentiles (CUP, 1961), pp. 6lff. 
(91) For this and other differences between Justin and Middle-
Platonism, cf. Dani~lou, OPe cit. p. 351. 
(92) cf. I Apol. 12.7(15,3448) and II Apol. 13.4(83,465C). The 
J.JJ.'~o5 of I Apol. 12.9(15,345A) is similarly connected with 
the incarnate J,J'~I<..M.j of 13.3(16,345B). 
(93) I Apol. 13.3(17,348A). 
(94) cf. belov, p. 89 
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part of Justin's thought. Wbare Trinitarian references do occur 
they point directly to the contrast betveen Juatin' s theological 
thought and hia traditional Church life, but the two are in no ve:r 
integrated.96 
(b) The Logos as Revealor: 
Here ve find attrse1ves at the heart or Justin'a theolGgy. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that it ill here that controversy rages. As 
vas suggested in the introduction to this chapter, much of thia 
controversy revolves around too limited a field. It aeems that, 
\/hen the evidence of all three vorks ill considered, a fa:lrly clear 
picture emergea. Essential to the wo1e doctrine of the Logoa, and 
especially to that of the Logos as revea1or, is the nature and origin 
of philosophy. If this question is reao1ved all other aspects of 
Justin's thought seem to fall into place. 
(i) The Nature and Origin of Philosophy: 
Since this is the central subject under discussion in Dial. 1-9, and 
because this is Justin's most considered statement of the issues at 
stake, it is proper to start attr investigation from this point and 
then to go on to consider the evidence from the other vorks. The 
interpretation of Dial. 1-9 ia a matter of some contention. Especially 
acute ia the controversy between J.C .M. van Winden 97 and N. Hy1dahl.98 
(95) cf. I Apo1. 61.:3C59,42OC) and 61.13 (60,42lB) , both in the context 
of baptism; 65.3(64,428Af) in the context of the eucharist, and 
67.2(65,429B) in a more general sense. 
(96) cf. Goodenough, ope cit. p. 186, and Barnard, Ope cit. p. 105. 
(97) An EarlY Chrilltian Philosopher: Justin Martyr's Dialogue \lith 
Trrpho. Ch.la 1-9 (Leiden, 1971). 
(98) Philosnph:le lInd Chrilltentum, Einer Interpretation der Ein1eitung 
ZUllI Dial,Justins (Kopenhagen,l966). 
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On the surface these chapters read as a dialogue lIith a Jw named 
Trypho. \/hen the preliminaries are over, TryPho' s question' sets 
the stage for 10lhat follOlls: 
Tell us your opinion of these matters, and lIhat idea 
( I I _ \ l'I ~'1 you entertain respecting God 'LV .... 6v'1'"t '<If' "'~V 
~X/'~ ). and wat yo= philosophy' is. 9 
Justin then narrates his philosophical pilgrimage and reports an 
extended discussion \lith a mysterious old man wo leads him to 
conversion. From this struct=e it could be thought that Justin 
regarded Greek philosophy as a praeparatio evangelica but, Wilst 
this is certainly a large element in Clement's thought,lOO Justin 
is a lot more critical of philosophy than this. \/hen Trypho asks 
'Do not philosophers turn every disco=se on God?', Justin replies 
\lith an almost total dismissal of all philosophers . lOl He maintains 
that the true nature of philosophy should be 'to investigate the 
Deity', but that philosophers do not concern themselves vith this. 
And so, Wile Justin complains about the philosophers' total lack of 
concern over the number of gods and the nature of providence, his 
real criticism is not directed at anyone school. van Winden lITites : 
Justin is not refuting anything here; he makes it olear 
that most Greek philosophers are not interested in the 
proper task of philosophy. viz., to inquire about the 
divine (~1"'t.~h" iitf~ "~~KtN ) .102 
It is in the vake of this criticism that Justin speaks about his 
pilgri~e to conversion and criticizes each of the most important 
contempory sohools. He ends vith the Platonic school, vhich in its 
(99) 1(86f,476B). 
(100) cf . belov, pp. ll7f. 
(101) 1(86,47JB-C). 
(102) Ope cit. p. 32. 
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turn is to receive a lengthy scrutiny and severe criticism at the 
hands of the old man. The essence of this criticism is foreshadowed 
in Justin's closing comment: 
And so the perception of immaterial things quite over-
powered me, and the contemplation of ideas furnished 
f1IY mind with wings, so that in a little while I 
supposed that I had become wise; and such vas f1IY 
my stupidity, I expected to look upon God, for this 
is the end of Plato's philosophy. 103 
It is on this matter of the knowledge of God that the old man centres 
his attack: 
How then ..... should the philosophers judge correctly 
about God, or speak any truth, when they have no 
knowledge of Him, having neither seen Him at any time 
nor heard Him?104 
To this criticism, which is familiar to modern man as the basis for 
logical positivism, Justin replies with the Middle-Platonic doctrine 
that 'the Deity cannot be seen merely by the eyes, but is discernible 
Here the issue is 
laid bare. The Platonic or Middle-Platonic doctrine is at stake.l05 
The old man shows that if the mind is to know God it mtlst have some 
affinity with God: 'Is the soul also divine and immortal, and a part 
of that very regal mind?'. After the posing of this question, the 
rejection of the Middle-Platonic doctrine follows from the easy step 
of denying the immortality of the soul, at least in the sense that 
the soul cannot be 'ingenerate' or 'unbegotten': 
(103) 
(104) 
(105) 
(106) 
, "I Nor ought it to be called immortal (oI.C1.;.voJ-1:N ); 
for if it is immortal, it is plainly unbegotten 
(~~tv"i't"S ) .106 
2(88,477C). 
3(91,481C). 
cf. above, p. 13. 
5(93,485C) • 
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) I 
By draving a clear distinction beween God llho is ol~h'''I<:''S and 
)I \1"\ \ I 1ll~~toS WId 'all other things' (tot. cI~ '"''"''' iI ... ~t"" ) wich are 
\ \ 1\ . I Oi-wy .... f«j.L ~-rCol, Justin can go straight on to his conclusion and 
ShOll that the soul lives because of God and is not naturally immortal: 
Nov the soul partakes (f'<!-C~Xh ) of life, since God 
vills it to live. Thus, then, it vill not even 
partake (aJ J'-H9~l",) (of life) wen God does not vill 
it to live. For to live is not ita attribute as it 
. God' 107 J.S s. 
This llhole argument against the immortality of the soul has been 
shovn to be that used by Atticus and is in its origin Aristotelian.l08 
It is of interest that Justin does not recognize it as such. In 
his rejection of the immortality of the soul, Justin uses the Platonic 
idea of r.91tS to define the soul's proper relationship to God. But 
in using the idea care has been taken. Not only does he carefully 
but also the statement quoted above defines the relationship as not . 
a necessary one. These statements are important for our discussion 
of the relationship beween the divine Logos and human reason. 
If the soul is not naturally immortal then it cannot have knovledge 
of God. The Middle-Platonic theory has collapsed. With the collapse 
of the the old man has opened the vay for revelation. The 
main thrust of the argument is clear: God can only be kno.vn because 
he has revealed himself'. In Dial. 7 the prophets of Israel, WO are 
'more ancient than all those llho are esteemed philosophers', are the 
agents of this revelation.l09 This is undoubtedly the position adopted 
(107) 6(95,489B). 
-(108) cf. van Winden, op. cit. p. 101 and R.M. Grant: "Aristotle and 
the Conversion of Justin", JTS, 7 (1956), pp. 2461'. 
(109) cf. van Winden, op. cit. pp. lllf. 
- 31-
by Justin and is not to be confused with the apparent reference to 
the Posidonian prophets of Dial. 2. There is some evidence for 
~ , 
regarding the 1i~""'" of Dial. 2(87 ,476B) as on a par with the prophets, 
but as van Winden points out, they seem to be more the founders 
of the philosophical schools than of tne Posidonian Ur_philosophie. 110 
This stress on revelation is even taken so far as to question the 
validity of 'logical proofs': 
For they did not use demonstration (~ • •• f'-t-,,~ 
~"o/~~~~ ) in their treatises, seeing that they 
were witnesses to 
(J. ... wt'~w il~ ~I 
the truth above all demonstration 
~i\oJ~~t-wS ) . 111 
But yet, after all this most devastating criticism of the philosophy 
of his time, Justin can still claim that this revelation is the 
philosophy vhich he has fotmd 'alone to be ,safe and profitable,.112 
But in this definition of philosophy, Justin has undercut the wole 
philosophical tradition. It is indeed a s ,trange philosophy which is 
so completely based on revelation and so critical of reason. The 
vord has become packed vith a totally nev meaning. This seems to 
be the general attitude of Justin towards philosophy in the Dialogue . 
Thus, the rest of the Dialogue, which is so full of Old Testament 
exegesis, would also be called philosophy. 
But when we turn to the I Apol., we find what appears to be a very 
different picture. Here Justin's description of the relationShip 
beween Christianity and philosophy contains three features. The 
first is the play on the word ).~d'0S ; the second is the loan theory, 
and the third, vhich is coupled to the second, is the theory of demonic 
interference. 
(110) ibid. p. 44, and cf. Holte, Ope cit. pp. 164£. 
(111) 7(96,492B). 
(112) B(96,492C). 
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The play on the word A~60S is a constant feature of Greek thought in 
general. I n the Apologists the appeal to the reasonableness of the 
Emperor is closely linked vith the demonstration of the reasonableness 
of the Christian faith.113 To understand how this kind of connection 
can be made, it is necessary to return to the question of creation. 
Although in I Apel. 10 there is no reference to the activity of the 
Logos as the ~ '1f'''''i ~~ s , there is reference to man's rale in his 
~ 
ovn redemption as being 'by means of the rational facnlties (J; ::.... 
••• >'.lfv-2N Jo,)v~t-w.l) He has Himself endowed us vithl.l14 In 
II Apol. 6 this hint is developed by connecting the order within 
the universe with the agency of the Logos in creation: 
He (God) created and arranged all things 'by Him 
(J.' c(.~~crG ) (Who) is called Christ, in reference to 
His being anointed and God's ordering ('Co ....... 6r16 ... l ) 
all things through him (J'.) ... h ... " ).115 
A connection should be made between this ordering activity of the 
Logos and the Wisdom tradition. The similarity of ideas between 
the Stoic A~O.S and the Wisdom tradition is very close. In Justin 
we notice the endpoint of a development. The Stoic/Wisdom idea was 
that rationality is part of the universe, 116 although in the Wisdom 
tradition it vonld undoubtedly be ascribed to God's activity in 
creation, as in Prov. 8.22ff. But then, as a later development this 
rationality assumed a separate existence,l17 and finally, through 
the identification ' of ~~O.S and 'o~{... in Philo,1l8 the transcendence 
of the immanent A~60S / 6o~ .... is achieved as ve find it here in Justin. 
(113) cf. above, p. 4. 
(114) 10.4(14,34lA). 
(115) 6.3(76,453A). 
(116) cf. G. von Had: Wisdom in Israel (SCM, 1972), pp. 145ff. 
(117) Thus von Had regards even Prov. 8.22, and similar passages 
in Provo 1-9, as a development of the original Wisdom idea, 
cf. ibid. pp. 147f. 
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r, ~"I The reference to creation hoL 'I"", j 'O~cN 
tion between the ~~oS of man and the 
gives a sure point of connec-
"I ...,"'~ "obo~ t:cN (.l'(-c!U, and it is 
this implicit connection that explains Justin's attitude towards 
human reason and philosophy. Thus man is created 'with the power 
I 
of thought ("0 ~f~ ) and of choosing the truth ••• for they have been 
, 's, I 119 born rational and contemplative' (),0bL"-'" IoUM. h...>f'1~ll<-'>l ). 
The question that faces the critic is whether this acceptance, indeed 
.... ~ propagation of the Middle-Platonic 7't' "":: , rejected in the Dialogue, 
is wholly an apologetic device similar to the appeal to the reason of 
the Emperor. This difficulty has also been noticed by S. Laeuchli, 
who writes of a 'deep conflict which exists between I Apel. 68, 
which represents the primacy of reason, and Dial. 7, which insists 
on the exclusi vism of revelation,.120 It seems that it is the 
balancing of these two sides of Justin's thought which leads scholars 
to different conclusions as to Justin's attitude towards philosophy. 
But before continuing with this particular inquiry we must briefly 
mention the loan theory, because it deals with the same issue from 
an historical point of view .121 The theory is simple. It states 
that Greek philosophy is a bad copy of the pure philosophy which was 
given through Moses. The distortions in Greek philosophy are due 
to the interference of the demons. This theory has clear implica-
tions for a doctrine of history. The whole of Greek history would 
be interpreted in the light of the struggle between the truth and the 
demonic distortions of the truth.122 The theory as such can be 
used with a positive or a negative intention. It can be used either 
(ll8) cf. Leg. All. 1.65, and~. 51; also 'lWNT, vol. 4, pp. 88f. 
(ll9) I Apol. 28.3(31,372C). 
(120) The Language of Faith (London, 1965), p. 179. 
(121) cf. H.A. Wolfson: Philo (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), vol. 1, p. 160 
for the loan theory in Philo. 
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to discredit Greek philosophy or apologetically to explain the simil-
arities between Greek philosophy and the Christian fa! tho From 
wat we have already discussed it seems possible that Justin is 
using this theory much more positively in the I Apol. than in the 
Dialogue. In the I Apol. the theory is used to say that Socrates 
\ f · 
knew the divine Logos, that Greeks who lived rationally (r.-r:. ... Xo6"" ) 
are Christians and that fundamentally there is no divergence of goals 
between philosophy and Christianity.123 This is very different to 
the picture of Dial. 1-9, where the discontinuity rather than the 
continuity between philosophy and Christianity is stressed. The 
problem is whether or not we can legitimately ascribe this discrepancy 
in Justin's thought to the apologetic intention of the I Apol., or 
whether there is really a deep conflict in his vritings. To come 
to grips with this same problem at a deeper level we turn no'\l to the 
specific question of the relationship of the divine Logos to human 
reason. 
(11) The Divine Logos and Human Reason: 
The problem of Justin's Logos doctrine is a puzzle that despite rapid 
advances is still something of an enigma. Once again it vould seem 
that, where scholars have come to definite conclusions, they have 
either ignored serious difficulties or not examinied all the evidence. 
For the moment let us consider the problem as it exists in the 
Apologies alone. It lies in the interpretation of both the state-
ments in the I Apol. about men sharing in the Logos, and in the 
I 
'i\~~L.\ "'-"'Sdoctrine of the II Apol. In the I Apol. ve 
find the following. 
(122) cf. Danielou, op. cit. p. 33. 
(123) cf. I Apol. 5.4(lO,336B) and 46.3(46,397C). 
And: 
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For not only among the Greeks did rell.8on prevail to 
condemn these things through Socrates(E..!... ~WKrd.l''''') 
~ii~ f\:~ ~~:c\"Xs, 't".:;t.:I,), but also among the 
Barbarians vere they condemned by Reason (or the 
( ' , ,~ '" 1\' ) Word, the Logos) Himself ul!" Cl.vtN ~<N O~cN , 
vho took shape, and became man, and ws called Jesus 
Christ. 124 
We have been taught that Christ is the first-born of 
God, and ve have declared above that He is the Word 
(>..t~f" ~'t.~) of Whom every race of men are partakers 
I , (rHHXl- ); and those vho lived reasonably (rl-'t.O»O 
)"b~oV ) are Christians, even though they have been 
thonght atheists.125 
The difficulty in bOth these texts is to distinguish f\~~oS as the 
divine Logos and >'£0°5 as human reason. In every instance the 
capitalization or othervise of the lambda prejudges the case. 
Theologically the issue at stake is that, if Justin's play on the 
vord goes so far as to obscure the difference betveen them, then he 
represents a reductionist point of viev vhich viII be very difficult 
to distinguish from real Stoicism. Bearing this in mind, let us 
return to the interpretation of the first passage from I Apol. 5. 
Here Holte's translation needs to be considered. It reads: 
For not only among the Greeks through Socrates 
(i.e. through his reasoning) Vere these things revealed 
126 by Logos ••• 
Here the issue is clearly revealed. Do the ~ i\ ~ )..~ and the .s IT) 
") ...... ,., \ I 
"",v"t",, ~"" ""0"'3 both refer to the Logos or not? Holte vould maintain 
that they do, although, by the insertion of 'i.e. through his reasonii1g' 
(124) 5.4(lO,.336B). 
(125) 46.3(46,397C). 
(126) op. cit. p. 1.31. 
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in brackets, he aliovs for an ambiguity in the first instance. But 
(\\1 (, ........ \/ 
the difference beween u\\o ""b~ and vii' t411tOV l:"", ""OeN is surely 
L',.., "\' greater than this. The vn o.lJ?cN 'tel\) I\~ seems to distinguish 
this >-~S from the first, which is even vithout the article. From 
this point of viev perhaps the ANOL translation might be better, 
since it distinguishes beween 'reason' and 'Reason'. This inter-
pretation is supported by the reference to 'true reasoning and definite 
1'\1\" ,\ ~ 
evidence' (>-00~ 0'-1\,\"''''' """' 'iH-.: .... t\l'-wS), which occurs earlier in 
the same chapter. The >"!d~ o(.\,i)c..;' seems to be the equivalent of 
, _, \ I 
\J \\ 0 I\~CJ\) • It is just possible that the use of ~i\:' instead of the 
dative may refer to a more personal agent, but it is just as likely 
'_I )\' 1\ \1 
that the V,"O is a result of the passive 1"/-dX Cf1 ' whereas the ADO":! 
) n 
follovs a middle - ~j;L"" f""t:o. The ANOL translation is at fault 
I '">&,'_ 
vhen it translates the participles j'-0f~w ($hltcS \l..cl.L 0.'( -l-...J'\\('" 
, 
t"'~)'-'""cN as a relative clause. Holte is undoubtedly correct that 
this should be taken as temporally qualifying the revelation to the 
barbarians. 
A very similar problem exists in the second passage. Holte insists 
, \ , )1 , \ I 
that both the /\.~." 'N""o.. and the t-~t;rJ.. ""ao-J refer to the Logos, 
but by far the most straightforvard interpretation is that they again 
reflect Justin's apologetic, vitb. the first refe=ing to the Logos 
and the second to human reason. 
The truth of the matter seems to be that Holte does not exegete 
these texts vithout the bias of his thesis. This is derived from 
texts in the II Apol. and especially the folioving which he translates 
as: 
For the seed and imitation of something, imparted 
according to capacity, is one thing, and quite another 
is the thing itself (i.e. Logos), the participation and 
imitation of whom is effected through the grace coming 
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from Him.lZ7 
(( cr 
This sentence is structured around the contrasting r:;;:~f<N ••• E-tt-fIN , 
and it clearly separates the participation in the Logos from the Logos 
1 
itself. Holte goes on to show how the references to the 4. "~f~ 
,..,,1 128 \1 1129 
<:,,,,, 1\0(jCN and the I\O~O~ 'li'-rr-6-t'I\<.o5 in the II Apol. 
I 
can be best interpreted along these lines. He shovs that the 'ill-fr 
is that part of the Logos which is in man, but that this 
seed, although it is connected with the divine Logos, is not the Logos 
"« \1 I (l-~~fN ••• ~~~rrN). On the other hand the I\OOO~ '"f['rtI I<-05 
I is the Logos sowing the 6r.~rrr;. in the hearts of man. By this 
exegesis, w4ich is now universally accepted,130 he can maintain a 
clear distinction between the Logos and human reason. The only 
difficulty which still remains is the texts of the I Apol. which ve 
have already mentioned. 
Holte goes on to show how Justin envisages the relationship between 
the Logos and human reason. Two theories appear to have been used 
by Justin to describe this relationship. The first is from Stoicism. 
>1 ,_' The clue to this is the use of f-f'~u't"" \\Gf~ in II Apol. 8.1 
(also 6.3 and 13.4) and the Stoic implications of the >'~o.s 
I 
'(if:-rr .... ~I""oS. The background to this is the Stoic theory of 
,,' I \ \ ." 
the (-r-~u<:", iir0>'I\fh~and thel<..o.W-~ ~\,)6<lU)..l '-vvC'\d-~. Holte 
shows how this Stoic Iir~>'lt,s doctrine has been modified in a 
Platonic direction. Evidence of this is Justin's use of i!r~\nos 
in II Apol. 6.3, where an opinion (to~ ) of God is implanted in 
human nature.131 Further evidence of such an adaptation is taken 
(/ 
from the same passage at the end of II Apol. 13 where the E-<:~rcN ••• 
(lZ7) 13.6(83,468A). 
(128) Ope cit. pp. 138f, II Apol. 8.1(78,457A) and 13.5-6(83,468A). 
(129) 8.3(78,457B) and 13.3(83,46SC). 
(130) cf. A. Grillmeier: Christ in Christian Tradition (London, 1975), 
p. 92, n. 193. 
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I " . , N 
occm-a. Here the 6ii~('<I- ••• ~ r'r'V"o... ~t .... dV __ j'-~v' 
,I (. I , ' I 
is contrasted vith ~ >\"'1'-" •••• '1 ~tN61.d- K_ t-t'"1 t~\ • 
( 
The Stoic idea of the (.ii1r is coupled rlth the Middle-Platonic 
'( A\'" \, I' I 132 theory of 0t-<nwfnS crht' K.Clt:;: .... ~o ""yo. td'l. But both of 
\ I 
these are bluntly contrasted rlth the ~cj.. x,rAftv' • This adaptation 
is exactly parallel rlth Justin's rejection of philosophy in Dial. 
'"' .., 1-9, vhere the Middle-Platonic '<''i ,,":! represents the Io<,d..~ t~ J"vo-tN 
\ I 
and the need for revelation corresponds to the ~~~ Xdftol. As 
Holte puts it: 
This is the fantastic statement \lith vhich Justin 
undermines the claims of Ancient philosophy to be able 
to lead Man to a telos, i.e. to salvation and perfection.133 
The other theory that Justin uses in this regard is the Platonic 
f{,&(/i
'
\ doctrine. The Stoic theory originated in the field of ethiCS, 
but the Platonic idea originated in the need to connect the forms and 
the objects derived from them. It is possible, as Holte maintains, 
r 
that the t-I:-"'i:f.)(~ of I Apol. 46.3(46,3970) really has a Stoic back-
ground. This detail is not important here. There is just a small 
adaptation needed to use the Platonic theory of the relationship of 
God to man. This Justin might have found in Middle-Platonism.134 
Hov closely Justin is follO\ling Plato can be seen from the comparison 
of the folloving: 
(131) Holte, OPe cit. p. 139. 
(132) cf. Albinus: Did. 28(181-25f). 
(133) Ope cit. p. 141. 
(134) ~f. ibid. p. 145, n. 119, vhere reference is made to Plutarch: 
de Iside 53, 372F. 
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Despite the very close connection betveen these tvo statements and . 
the siJnilar use of the idea of r~l~ in these quotes, there is a 
I 
nev element in Justin vhich cannot be ignored. In Plato the /,,~c9?S'!. 
is alvays the relationship of the ideas vith objects, or, as in the 
case of the quote from the Sophist, betveen 'being' and things vhich 
are neither 'being' nor 'non-being'. Justin apparently uses the 
vord in this sense.137 But the whole context of the quote from 
Justin is the rejection of the Platonic In Justin then, 
~ ~ 
ve find Platonic epistemology (~'t' v,:: ) and Platonic cosmology 
(r~'s ~ ). Justin rej ects the first and accepts the second. 
One vould expects such meddling vith a philosophical system to cause 
further difficulties. In Plato, hovever, it is not at all sure h01l 
his epistemology relates to fue l'~fS(S doctrine. In a sense the 
'"' " '1'w v"-J and the postulate of an i;nmortal soul are an attempt to 
c c 
I 
describe some kind of f'i-64~<) betveen the intellectual and the sensible 
realms, but in this it is unsuccessful since it just necessitates 
the further definition of the relationship betveen the soul and the 
body. This is the old tritos argument. The rejection of the immortal 
soul as a solution to the epistemological question is 
to the criticism of the /'"&c9c-)l5. idea itself in Parm. 
very similar 
132f. Both 
are fundamental problems of any dualistic system. And so it is that 
lie are left by both Justin and Plato not being sure \/hat !~I-Sl~ really 
(135) Plato: Sophista 259a. 
(136) Dial. 6(95,489B). 
(137) cf. Holte, op. cit. p. 143. 
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means. Both stress the ~"F"" ... (let-fa" and both are uneasy about 
the positive description of the relationship between -the two sides 
of the sharing. Justin's positive contribution is eventually his 
IY-~~ xJrl'J , and even if this could be criticized as begging the 
question, it is probably the most satisfactory Christian ansver. 
The sum total of all this is that the II Apol. agrees with Dial. 1-9 
on the relationship between Christianity and philosophy, and therefore 
of that between the divine Logos and human reason. They are highly 
critical of both philosophy and human reason and explain any truth 
philosophy might have to the loan theory. The relationship between 
the Logos and human reason is clearly defined in a manner which 
criticizes the Platonic idea of ~r1."':;6-,.S \~~ t~ J'IJVd-t~v' with 
an emphatic reference to grace. This is very similar to the stress 
on the need for revelation in Dial. 1-9 and the rejection of the 
possibility of knowledge of God even ",,'ww t~ v.:J • But Holte appears 
I '"' \. " 
to have ironed out the difficulty \.I'hich still remains. The texts 
of I Apol. are still a problem. Are they to be interpreted so that 
they conform to the pattern of Justin's other works, can they stand 
on their Olol'n, or should they be interpreted as apologetic concessions? 
Although Holte attempts the first of these alternatives, he also 
adopts the last and regards any hints of a positive relationship 
between Christianity and philosophy as being 'presented in purely 
apologetic interests,.138 Goodenough, being earlier than Holte's 
contribution to\.l'ards the debate, interprets Justin's attitude towards 
philosophy as positive even if rather selective.139 Harnack is 
often reported as presenting the reductionist evaluation of Justin, 
but this is not the case. He even seems to have antiCipated Holte 
(138) op. cit. p. 110. 
(139) op. cit. pp. 106f. 
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He does deal with the Logos ambivalence but stresses the importance 
of revelation in Justin. He wites: 
For the tinal stage has nov arrived and Christianity . 
is destined to put an end to natural human philoSophy.14O 
Harnack does, therefore, represent an earq version of the position 
that we have adopted. Laechli, not having the excuse ot being· 
pre-Holte, seems to tail comp1eteq in his estimation ot Justin by 
accusing Justin of perverting Christianity by equating philosophy and 
rationality with belief.14l Barnard, as if! his vont, is too simplistic, 142 
and Jaeger agress with the traditional interpretation folloving 
Harnack .143 
lIhat seems to be a more reasonable solution to this dilemma. is to try 
to avoid forCing the exegesis ot the I Apo1. by postulating a difference 
betveen it and the later vorks due to apologetic tact, together with 
a development of viewpoint. It 1s the insistence on absolute con-
sistancy and uniformity that ve criticize in Holte. He ·fails to notice 
( "~.!. that all the developed arguments and references to the C.1l:("'fr l<N 'jrN 
\ I I 
and the "'h0S .6~r~'tIlU>S occur in the II Apo1. This, together 
with the ~~a-f ••• <t'-efcN and the evidence of Dial. 1-9, seems to 
group the II Apo1. and the Dialogue together as a development of a 
fairq simple but dangerous apologetic in the I Apo1. It might be 
possible to couple this hypothesis with yet another evaluation of Dial. 
1-9. As is now generally accepted, the literary form of this conforms to 
(140) cf. The Riston of Dogma, trans. N. BuchlUllUl (Lond..on,lS96) vol. 2 
pp. 179-1SS. 
(141) op. cit. pp. lSlf. 
(142) . OPe cit. p. 89. 
(143) OPe cit. p. ll9, n. 13. 
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a stylized pattern. This , together with the content; forces one to 
the conclusion that it is not meant to be directly historical. Here 
Barnard again misses the point, insisting on the historicity of the 
Dialogue and that Dial. 1-9 represents Justin's historical journey 
to conversion.145 One suspects that Barnard's criticisms are more 
than a little conditioned by parallel controversies in the realm of 
biblical studies . But accepting the conclUllion of Goodenough, van 
Winden and others, might it not be possible to take the matter a 
step further? All previous scholarship seems to have regarded Justin 
in Dial. 1-9 as giving a critique of current philosophical schools 
from his Christian perspective. But, since this critique represents 
a more developed theological position than the I Apol., two options 
are open. Either one regards the I Apol. as totally apologetic 
and the Dialogue, therefore, as historical in at least its theological 
outlook, or one can r egard Dial. 1-9 as representing criticisms of 
philosophy and an assessment of the position of human reason that 
Justin had, at the time of writing the I Apol., as yet not developed. 
Since we are unwilling to regard the theology of the I Apol . as totally 
apologetic, the second alternative is to be accepted. Our hypothesis 
will, therefore , include the postulation of a gap between the I and II 
Apologies sufficient to allow for such a development. Although this 
suggestion requires much more detailed examination than can be given 
here, a fev points can be made. These concern mainly the attitude 
towards Platonism in the I Apol. In general, despite the loan theory 
and the demonic interference, Justin seems favourable disposed to 
Plato. He is quoted with approval146 and is regarded as being in 
(145) op. cit. pp. 7-11. 
(146) 8.4(12,337C) and 59.1(57,416B). 
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fundamental agreement ~ith Christianity over the ,question of the 
cosmological significance of the cross.147 This, together ~ith the 
positive references to Soctrates, does not portray the polemical 
attitude of the Dialogue. This contrast is, ho~ever, softened 
by the real apologetic of I Apol. 20, ~here Justin can even dra~ 
an analogy bet~een Christian and Stoic doctrine. The problem of 
separating the apologetic from Justin's real thought ~ill al~ays 
remain. Another question ~hich must be an~ered, if the I Apol. 
is to be interpreted as purely apologetic, is why the II Apol. is 
not apologetic in the same ~ay. The difference bet~een the two 
is not all that easily explained a~ay to apologetic intentions, 
since both are meant to be apologetic. In the case of Justin there 
are obvious passages ~hich are plainly apologetic, but to postulate 
both a pure and an apologetic version of that thought seems to 
ignore the very real apologetic nature of his thought, even at its 
core. When this is borne in mind such distinctions are not very 
helpful. 
Whatever the outcome of this particular debate the position of the 
II Apol. and the Dialogue on the relationship between philosophy 
and Christianity seems to be Justin's considered judgement on the 
issue. Here the original true philosophy ~as handed by God to Moses. 
Thus philosophy is not the seeking of God by human intellect, but the 
true acceptance of God's revelation. Part of the distortion of 
~ ~ 
Greek philosophy is that it can claim to kno~ God -r .... "wand thus 
~ , 
to deny the grace of revelation. In stating this position Justin 
makes a clear distinction be~een the Logos and human' reason, which 
shares in the divine Logos by grace. This capacity of man to share 
in the divine Logos is connected ~ith the activity of the Logos in 
creation. 
(147) 6O.I(58,417A). 
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(iii) The Logos in the Old Testament: 
As has been shown above, for Justin the Old Testament stands in a 
very special position. It is the prime source for knovledge of 
God. To explain hov it came to be in this position Justin has a 
doctrine of inspiration. At this point Justin's confusion betveen 
the Logos and the Spirit is once more revealed. The inspiration 
of the prophets is 'by the Divine Word wo moves them', 148 but 
the prophets also spoke 'those things alone vhichthey sav and vhich 
they heard, being filled with the Holy Spirit,.149 Inspiration is 
really the only function of the Spirit.150 But Justin is emphatic 
<,' "'" that all revelation is through the Logos (,,\.do.. 1:"", I\Dd"'.) ). The 
Logos is regarded as the sole and total source of knovledge of God. 
After quoting Mt. 11.27 Justin continues: 
Nov the Word of God is His Son, as ve have before 
said. And He is called Angel and Apostle; for He 
declares vhatever ve ought to know, and is sent forth 
to declare watever is revealed; as our Lord Himself 
says, "He that heareth me, heareth Him that sent me n • 151 
The connection betveen the Logos as revealor and his relationship 
to the Father is made explicit in Dial. 128. All the different 
names given to the Logos for different modes of revelation culminate 
in the following: 
••• and they call Him the Word, because He carries 
tidings from the Father to men.152 
(148) I Apol. 36.1(38,385A). For an examination of Justin's theory 
of prophetic inspiration cf. Goodenough, op. cit. pp. l77f. 
(149) Dial. 7(95,492B). cf. also I Apol. 6.2(11,3360) and l3.3(17,348A). 
(150) cf. I Apol. 31.1(32,376A), 32.2(34,377B), 33.2(35,38lA). 
(151) I Apol. 63.4-5(61,424B). cf. also 63.10(62,4258). 
(152) Dial. l28(262,776A). 
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The background to the Logos being the sole agent of revelation is 
the impossibility of God himself appearing in a theophany.153 As 
has been mentioned, the result of this argument is that all our 
knoYledge of God comes from the 'second God'. The difficulties 
of this have already been noted, but here ye can see that, because 
of the subordinationism yhich is part of the argument, the splitting 
of revealedness and remoteness in this yay tends to make it difficult 
for the revealing Logos to reveal anything other than himself. 
This is, of course, the same as the reduction of the doctrine of 
God to the doctrine of the Logos, but vieyed from a slightly different 
perspective. , 
Part of Justin's intention in stressing the Old Testament may have 
been to attack Marcion. We have already noted hoy his doctrine of 
creation implies such a polemic.154 Further, by linking the 
inspiration of the Old Testament by the Logos vith the Logos who 
became man, Justin forges a very clear and unbreakable connection 
betyeen the tvo very things Yhich Marcion YaS unable to reconcile. 
Justin's thought is so Logocentric that Marcion' s division must have 
been almost completely incomprehensible to him. By so connecting 
the incarnation and the Old Testament, Justin safeguards himself 
from Marcion's dualism but, since Justin separates God from the revela-
tion in the Old Testament, this dualism tends to appear in a sub-
ordinationism. But this dualism viII alvays tend to reduce to a 
monism of th~ Logos.155 The difficulty of this doctrine of revela-
tion has been very succintly stated by Bethune-Baker: 
••• there is a danger, on the one hand, of the Logos 
being identified vith God. His essence (0-3,~ .... ), 
as it vere, rests eternally in God - immanent: his 
hypostaSis is conceived only in the york of revelation.156 
(153) cf. above, pp. 14f. 
(154) cf. above, pp. lOf. 
(155) cf. also belov, p. 54. 
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Such a split betvean <NtnA and \)"o6,"'&\~ is imposaib1e. Bethune-
Baker alBo quotes Loofs as 'Writing: 
••• it ill not God who reveals HimBelf in Christ, but 
the Logos, the depotentiated God, a God lIho as God 
is subordinated to the highest God. l57 
It seems that this must be true if Justin's thought is built up into 
a rigid system. But as it stands Justin is not so systematic. He 
is very caref'ul to explain that the 'second God' of the Dialogue is 
not separate from the Father and that he is truly God. These 
qualifications must be given their full veight, for they are evidence 
of Justin's attempts to extricate himself from a system of thought 
Wich is fundamentally at variance with Christian Trinitarianism. 
This becomes abundantly clear quite apart from the question of the 
necessity to distinguish between the Logos and the Spirit. 
(4) The Incarnation: 
Many of the references to the incarnation follov a similar pattern.158 
The more detailed of these mention all the particulars of the schema 
of the Logos being the divine Son of God, beooming 'Jesus Christ, 
our teacher', then, folloving the credal . pattern of birth and passion, 
one moves to the Ascension by lIhich one is pointed back to the 
universal Logos. Many of these references are hOlol'ever more or less 
abbreviated. An interesting case is that of I Apo1. 12-D, lIhere 
first the divine Logos is rather indiscriminately confused with the 
incarnate teacher Jesus Christ,159 but later this teacher is quite 
definite~ he lIho 'was crucified under Pontius Pilate, procurator of 
(156) OPe cit. p. 128. 
(157) ibid. p. 120. 
(158) I Apo1. D(16f,3458f), 21.1(25,36OA), 42(43,3928), 46(47,497C), 
63(62,4258); II Apo1. 6(76f,453Af); Dial. 63(173,620B), 
67(180,6290), 71(187,644A), 76(193,653C), 85(205,6760), 
87(2Q9,684A), 95(219f,70lBf), 100(224,709B), 106(232f,721Cf), 
113(241,737A), 132(266,7810). 
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160 Judaea, in the times of Tiberius Caesar'. Moreover it is this 
person vhom 'we reasonably worship', 'holding Him. in the second place 
161 (to the true God), and the prophetic Spirit in the third'. Justin 
takes great care to explain that it is the divine Logos who became 
man. Of this there is no doubt. In some instances there is, 
however, a notable lack of reference to the inoarnation. Although it 
is not the subject under discussion in Dial. 128-9, one suspects 
that it would be impossible for Justin to have coupled the theory of 
the Logos being a U"'Y""\~ 'C.,;:) f}t-cN with the incarnation, without 
rl ~ -suggesting that Jesus the man was nothing more than a d VVrAj'-l '> <-CI\) 
Ab(f"". Justin never suggests this. It is the Logos himself who 
becomes man. As such the incarnate Logos can be confessed to be 
162 163 God, and to be both God and man. 
How the incarnation comes about is of interest . Sometimes this 
is just' through the will of the Father' .164 This is similar to 
the generation of the Logos himself. The other explanation is of 
(159) 12.8-9(15f,344Bf). 
(160) 13.3- 4(16,345Bf). 
(161) I Apol . 32.2(34,380B). 
(162) cf. Dial. 68(184,636B). Here there is a difficulty in 
exegesis. The text runs: 1->"~6f.6B ..... J~ ~ ila-8h\', K.ol~ 
\~ ,_ 'I .tI\e ~<i.6\l\tv' ...... I I-ld-l UrO'\L1J\I'\"t<N ~1:-'lH.Cl.M. 0("""" 0to"OW:;"'lV. The 
I l\. A\ (a I problem is whether to take }t-v~6 ~ I;'(-<N with "pC 6 I<.IJV1tiN 
of directly with ~t'0~O~~'l~ like the other infinitives in 
the sentence. The !NeL translation tries to get the best of 
both alternatives by treating both the TIfo"<"IJI/,~:..., and the 
~E.-V'-&s.~~ as independently dependent on or,,~o~aG v.v : 
'But they admit that he will come to suffer •• • and to be worshipped, 
and to be God'. 
(163) Dial. 71(187 ,644A) • 
(164) i.e. I Apol. 63.10(61,424C) and 23.2(27,364A) . 
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course the birth by Mary, and here, yet once again, there is confusion 
betveen the Logos and the Spirit. The confusion is clearly caused 
(" ~ n ~ by the biblical references to the (, 'JVd.rc s ~ "" l.7{-uv. Justin 
follows the Lukan tradition and identifies this with the Spirit, 
but then also with the Logos.165 This we have now come to expect. 
But here the confusion is taken even further with the 
,... .t\, ,... r/" \ I 166 ~N I:7l:""cN being called the CNwr\) 'l!"" ""dcV • Some such 
confusion may even exist in the New Testament, were there occurs a 
fusion of the pre-existent Jesus and the Spirit.167 The solution 
J ' '"' \1 offered by Goodenough is that, where the phrase ')yo.r'~ ta--> 1\06'''' 
occurs, 'the d~V"rlS of the Logos means here a faculty or ability 
168 
of the Logos, not a personal Power'. The difficulty with this 
answer is that in the context there seems to be no reason why the 
meaning of J~vott-<S should change so radically just because of its 
qualification. There appears to be an unsolved confusion at this 
point. 
The belief in the full humanity of the incarnate Logos is made clear 
by the repeated formal references to Jesus' birth from the Virgin 
and his suffering under Pontius Pilate. The significance of these 
references will be returned to very shortly. Despite them there 
has been a fairly lively debate as to wether Justin had adopted an 
Apollinarian solution to the incarnation or not.169 While all 
such technical debates are quite alien to Justin, there is some 
(165) cf. I Apol. 33.6(36,38lBf). In I Apol. 32.10(35,380B) it is 
I ('I '\ _ I I 
the ilru>~"\ o"'wrcS rr~ 7:tN Ild-t<-fo<. ",S-Vtw./ wo takes Iflesh 
(6;.fl<..o ;'0"\ $~~ ) and beoomes man. 
(166) I Apol. 46.S(47,397C) and Dial. 139(274,796B). 
(167) cf. Wolfson, Ope cit. pp. 155-167. 
(168) OPe cit. p. 237. 
(169) cf. ibid. pp. 24lf and Barnard, OPe cit. p. 119. 
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advantage in examining the issue very briefly. Although, at one 
level, Justin simply accepts that Jesus vas a man, at another he 
denies that this humanity vas derived from Mary. Thus, Jesus 
just as not man, but God, has begotten 'had blood, but not from men; 
the blood of the vine' .170 Justin apparently contradicts himself 
that the Christ 'assumed flesh by the Virgin' .171 vhen he says 
But the sum total of the evidence seems to be correctly assessed by 
Goodenough: 
Christ vas a nev creation, like the first creation of 
old, made directly by God. Thus the Logos did not 
assume humanity, but became a human being. He vas a 
man like men, but He had no real blood relationships 
vith the human race.172 
This kind of thought is actually counter to the Church's interpretation 
of the Virgin birth, lIhich is that it is precisely from the Virgin 
that Jesus received his humanity.173 While denying the rale of the 
Virgin does not in any vay deny the humanity of Jesus, it does open 
the door to docetism. 
Returning once more to the form of the references to the incarnation, 
it is of immense importance to note that many of these are couched 
in quasi-credal language. A typical example is the folloving: 
But ~y, through the pover of the Word, according to 
the vill of God the Father and Lord of all, He vas born 
of a virgin as a man, and vas named Jesus, and vas 
cruCified, and died, and rose again, and ascended into 
heaven, an intelligent man ••• 174 
(170) Dial. 76(193,653A). cf. also Dial. 54(156,593Cf) and 
84( 204, 673Bf) • 
(171) Dial. lOO(224,709B). 
(172) op. cit. p. 242. 
(173) i.e. Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. III.19.3(346,94lBf). 
(174) I Apol. 46.5(47,397Cf). 
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These stereotyped references reveal a number of important points. 
As J.N .D. Kelly points out, they are glimpses into the liturgical 
life of the Church of the time.175 For our purposes here the 
relationship of these texts to the early creeds is not of great 
significance. But loIhat is significant is that the heart of Justin's 
thought on the incarnation is expressed in these terms. Almost every 
mention of the incarnation calls forth an autome.tic response of this 
semi-formal nature. If one vere to remove all such instances from 
his vritings, one vould be left vith very little reference to the 
incarnation indeed. It is also remarkably striking hov this language 
of a credal nature is almost forcibly inserted into loIhat is othervise 
language related to Justin's Logos theology.176 The conclusion is 
irresistable. and is attested to by the vhole credal tradition of the 
Church: that the Logos theology fails to be a basis for an incarnation-
al theology. Justin's main emphasis is not on the incarnation but 
on the Logos as the revealor. The revelation in the incarnation 
has an important position but it is not essential. Justin's theology 
vould remain much the same vithout it. The difficulty of the 
incarnation of the Logos seems even to have been realized by John, 
of course. In. 1.14 is stated in its full paradoxical force and 
left there only to be taken up in other terms. Here in Justin the 
same paradox is perhaps felt in the relationship betveen the Logos 
theology and these credal interspersions. What makes Justin's 
methodology difficult is that there is no inherent relationship 
beween the wo halves. The Logos theology does not entail an 
incarnation. He may not be able satisfactorily to veld his thought 
(175) Ope cit. p. 72. 
(176) This has been noticed by Laeuchll, OPe cit. p. 183. 
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into a unity, but his experience and faith have made him realize 
that the tvo do necessarily belong to each other. In this lIay ve see 
hov traditional Justin is and hOll the tradition of the Church, in 
\/hich he is soaked, has provided a safeguard to the other side of 
his thought. It is precisely at this point that Justin differs 
from the other Apo1ogists. l77 
An important area in Yhich Justin does relate his Logos theology 
and the incarnation is in his approach to the Old Testament. -By 
insisting that the Old Testament is inspired by the Logos and that 
it refers to Christ, he sholls that he regarded the incarnation to 
be the hermeneutic key to the Old Testament. Again it is f1 t ting 
to mention that by this link the Yhole of the Dialogue can be regarded 
as a massive repudiation of Marcion. It is difficult to assess 
this question in great detsil because Justin did not have the 
problem of directly relating the Old and the Nev Testaments. But 
if one lIere to guess at Yhat his approach to this problem lIould be, 
one lIould not be far wong, it seems, to suppose that he 1I0uld 
have tended to interpret both Logocentrically. Even the Nev Testa-
ment, that is the incarnation, would be used to point to the Logos. 
Thus in relating the Old and the Nell Testaments, he lIould have so 
united them that he would probably have obscured the differences 
between the two. This would be very similar to many modern 
'fundamentalist' interpretations. 
In Justin the soteriological aspect of the incarnation is also 
present, and an examination of this will help us to assess further 
the previous conjectures. First of all the incarnation is both 
"')' " part of God's OClt..ovofld- and the OLI<.O'lO,. .... itself. This 1I0rd 
is especially related to the conquering of evil demons: 
(177) cf. belOll, p. 93. 
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••• this Christ, Son of God, who ~as before the morning 
star and the moon, and submitted to become incarnate, 
and be born of this virgin of the family of David, in 
( r\ ~) , order that, by this dispensation <)\4. "1\ O(ll..O"0,r-'''-S 
the serpent that sinned from the beginning like him, 
178 
may be destroyed, and that death may be contemned ••• 
, , 
In this Justin closely connects the 00 "-"vo r-V>A.. of the passion 
- , 
vith the IId.-r..v61d... But ~hen lie come to look more closely at the 
) I • 
Q< "-0"","'''' of the passion, lie find Justm' s thought a 11 ttle thin. 
Most of the significance that Justin sees in the passion is connected 
~th the defeat of evil, and especially evil demons.179 Here the 
part played by the Cross in exorcisms is undoubtedly important 
180 background. The cosmic significance of the crucifixion is 
hinted at in the reference to Plato's chi placed 'cross-~ise' in 
the universe.181 But in all this it is not made clear why Jesus 
had to become ~ to achieve these ends. An exception is the 
follolling: 
If then, the Father of all ~ished His Christ for the 
), 
, 
~hole human family to take upon Him the curses (\o<.d.1:al.r"" $ ) 
of all, knolling that, after He had been crucified and 
~as dead, He IIould raise Him up ••• 182 
The blood of Jesus also has significance, especially in connection 
vith the passover.183 But despite these references and a fell 
others like them,l84 Goodenough appears to be co=ect when he 
(178) 
(179) 
(180) 
(181) 
(182) 
(183) 
(184) 
) I 
Dial. 45(144, 572Of) • For Justin's use of o<"-$v~4\.cf. 
Danielou, op. cit . p. 158f. 
cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 252. 
cf. ibid. p. 258 and Dial. 85(205,6760) and 100(225,709Df). 
cf. I Apol. 60(58,417Af). 
Dial. 95(219,70lBf). 
cf. I Apol. 32.7(34,380B) and Dial. 111(238,7320). 
cf. Goodenough, op. cit. p. 259 and Barnard, op. cit. p. 124. 
states: 
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It is in the incarnate Logos that men come to knov the 
entire Logos, but the special value of the fact that the 
Logos became man is not included in this theory of the . 
york of Christ.185 
This deficiency in Justin is yet another bit of evidence for the 
conclusion that Justin's thought is fundamentally Logocentric rather 
than Christocentric, and therefore cosmological rather than soteria-
logical.186 The problems in his description of the incarnation 
seem to arise from his starting his thought from the Logos rather 
than from the radical paradox of the Logos become man. Because 
of this, the human side of the incarnation fails to have any real 
significance. ThiS, apart from Justin's clinging to tradition, 
vould either have left him vith a docetic incarnation or led him 
to ignore the incarnation altogether. This particular subject is 
one of the major issues in the next chapter dealing vith the other 
Apologists. As ve vill point out there, one of the major problems 
in assessing the vhole question of the incarnation in these vriters 
is, once again, the apologetic nature of the yorks. While ve must 
leave a conclusion to this debate to the next chapter and indeed to 
the conclusion of this vhole study, ve must note here that despite 
Justin's apologetic intent, he finds it essential to include the 
incarnation, even if he cannot integrate it successfully vith the 
rest of his thought. 
(5) Conclusion: 
Justin vas a theologian of the Logos and every aspect of his thought 
must be assessed by hoy it relates to the Logos. His doctrine of 
God is fundamentally that of Middle-Platonism, but instead of including 
(185) op. cit. p. 257. 
(186) For the latter observation cf. Danielou, op. cit. p. 345. 
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the Logos into this, Justin tends to exclude it. Even the idea of 
the >'Jt } i-.tJ,-J.9"""to~, although present in an undefined -way, has 
been suppressed. This, together "With the stress on the generation 
of the Logos by God "Which is adopted from the Wisdom tradition, is 
po"Werful evidence of an underlying subordinationism. But because of 
Justin's description of God, this subordinationism does not resolve 
itself into a dualism, but rather into a monism "With God diss-
appearing altogether. As ve stated, the doctrine of God reduces 
to the doctrine of the Logos. 
From the other side, "We sa"W ho"W a similar reduction occurs betveen 
the incarnation and the Logos. The tendency for the incarnation 
to be vieved totally from the perspective of the cosmic Logos 
meant that the incarnation failed to have any fundamental significance. 
Indeed, "We found that it "Was only due to Justin's traditionalism 
that he retained the incarnation in his thought; it is not an 
essential feature of his theology. And so, not only does God 
reduce to the Logos, but the incarnation is also resolved back into 
the Logos. 
It is at this point that Justin rather paradoxically does not carry 
his thought through. One vould expect the failure of his Christology 
to reflect itself in his theory of revelation. A similar reduction 
either of human reason to the Logos or vice-versa should occur. 
This "Would set the seal on a completely monistic tendency in his 
thought. As "We have been at pains to point out, this reduction does 
not occur. The qualifications in the II Apol. and Dial. 1-9 of the 
Logos theory of the I Apol. emphatically reject this. It is, indeed, 
these qualifications themselves "Which reveal ho"W inherently possible 
this reduction is to any Logos theology, particularly \/ben the ambi-
valence betveen the >:'005 as divine Logos and human reason occupies 
a central position. The lIhole strength of Justin I s theology lies in 
the avoidance of this danger. It is very likely that this too is the 
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result of his traditionalism, for his rejection of monism at this 
point amounts to an affirmation not only of the transcendence of God, 
but also of revelation as the sole means of knovledge of God. 
In this Justin has tackled the central issue of Greek thought, 
which always gave Stoicism the edge on Platonism, and which has made 
the monistic solution to all problems more readily acceptable than 
the dualistic. 
But why is this very advanced thought not represented in the other 
areas of his thought? If the thesis of development which has been 
suggested is accepted, then one partial explanation might be 
forthcoming. It is in the I Apol. that there is the most obvious 
clash between the Logos theology and the credal language used to 
f 
describe the incarnation, and it is here that the Ao~os ambivalence 
tends to lead to the reductionism that Justin later rejects. 
Could it be that these two things are conneoted? It seems likely that 
this is so. It would be marvellous for this thesis if a developed 
incarnational theology could now be found in the Dialogue. But 
what we must conclude is that the development made in Justin's 
theory of revelation· has not as yet been paralleled in his Christology. 
We would like to find the development from reason to revelation 
paralleled by a move from Logocentricity to Christocentricity. In 
This way the incarnate Christ instead of the Logos would be the supreme 
revelation of God. For this adaptation, or perhaps real rejection of 
the Logos theology, we must wait for Athanasius. 
An important aspect of Justin's Logos theology appears to have been 
missed by other scholars. This is its relationship with Marcionism. 
By connecting all spheres of his thought to the Logos, Justin creates 
a theology which has presuppositions fundamentally at variance with 
Marcionism. Marcion had difficulty in reconciling the natures of 
God and the Logos - to use Justin's terms. Although Justin and 
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Marcion were concerned with very different aspects of the nature of 
God, it is precisely this same problem which occurs in Justin and 
which produces his subordinationism. The dualism of Marcion is 
quite foreign to Justints subordinationism, and the reduction of 
God to the Logos \/ould be the ultimate horror to Marcion. But in 
both Marcion and Justin the problem of God still remains; for the 
one it is a moral problem and for the other a more abstract philo-
sophical difficulty. In this similarity Justin and Marcion are found 
to be contempories, but products of very different backgrounds. 
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II. TATUN, THEOPHILUS AND A'IHENAGORAS. 
When Tatian, Theophilus and Athenagoras are compared with Justin, 
ve find some notable advances and some equally notable regressions . 
Part of the problem of dealing vith these three is that we have 
comparatively little of their work extant. This has given rise, 
especially in the case of Athenagoras, to questions as to what he 
might have written in a work intended to be Christian theology as 
opposed to apologetic . But we can only analyse the texts we 
possess to the best of our ability. There is no possibility of 
assessing what other works contained, if they every existed in the 
forms suggested. 
In this chapter a different methodology is employed. Each of the 
three apologists is examined in turn in three sections. In this 
way the contrast between the three is highlighted. Constantly all 
three are to be compared with Justin. The three sections employed 
do not directly correlate with the sections of the previous chapter. 
This is inevitable since the characters of the works differ. 
(1) Christianity and Philosophy: 
(a) Tatian: 
In Tatian we find almost the complete antithesis . to his teacher, 
Justin. 1 Even though Justin's developed position is critical of 
philosophy, he was most diligent to describe the relationship between 
the two and is not above using similarities to apologetic advantage. 
But Tatian openly and bluntly rejects philosophy altogether: 
••• you who parcel out visdom are cut off from the 
wisdom that is according to truth.2 
(1) cf. esp. Ch.'s 2-4, 8-10. 
(2) 26(3lf,861C). 
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Tatian's conscious, vitriolic attack on philosophy precludes any 
apologetic. The contrast is even greater than this" for Tatian 
does not appear to have any real knowledge of the higher forms of 
Greek culture. He indiscriminately groups together philosophy and 
the crudest forms of Hellenistic polytheism and directs his polemiC 
against both) Thus, in the only instance lIhere he ackno1l1edges 
the existence of philosophers as such, their doctrines are totally 
ignored, lIhile Tatian only concerns himself with their inability 
to come to consensus: 
Wherefore do not be led allay by the solemn assemblies 
of philosophers lIho are no philosophers, who dogmatize 
one against the other, though each one vents but the 
crude fancies of the moment.4 
Tatian also indirectly sh01ls himself to be aware of the loan theory 
by being much concerned vith proving that Moses lIas prior to Homer.5 
He regards the loan theory as a negative tool used to exclude rather 
that include philosophy, \/hereas Justin could use it in both senses. 
There is no finesse in Tatian. He is not concerned with persuading 
his reader. But nevertheless, Tatian is most interesting because, 
while he completely rejects the Hellenistic 1I0rld in his attacks on 
it, he uses very Hellenistic thought forms and language to describe 
God and the Logos. And so, as he rejects Hellenism out of the 
front door, ve lIill find that he has allolled it to sneak into the 
back door and to penetrate every nook and cranny of his thought. 
Because of Tatian's complete rejection of the possibility of the 
Greek 1I0rld having any knovledge of God, he can also tremendously 
(3) e.g. 21(27f,852A) and 34(39,876Bf). 
(4) 3(8,812Af) and also 25(30f,860Af). For a similar comment 
cf. Justin, Dial. 2(B7,476B). 
(5) cf. Ch.'s 31, 36-41 and also Theophilus: Ad. Aut. III, 20-30. 
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simplify the doctrine of revelation as found in Justin. The 
complex relationship between the Logos and human reason, or between 
\' I 1 ~ \( . l\O~o) b"t"('ro-t\\<.o~ and '"t-pF C'cN "bd~ , is all foreign to 
Tatian. This total rejection of philosophy and, by implication, of 
human reason is at least partially the logical conclusion of Justin's 
'I Cf H~(f>/ ••• 6-"~ • If one vere to trace the development from Justin's 
I Apol. to the II Apol. and the Dialogue one stage further, in many 
respects one vould fi..~d oneself ..,i~~ Tatia."'l. Tatian C&''''l thus be 
seen to be Justin's pupil, vho like most pupils has not understood 
the full subtilty of his master's thought. 
(b) Theophilus: 
When ve move on to Theophilus ve find a more sophisticated account. 
Like Tatian he attacks pagan idolatory, 6 and the crudity of the 
Greek gods.7 These attacks are designed to contrast vith the nature 
of the true God. In this approach all the vriters of the period 
revelled. But Theophilus, unlike Tatian, at least aCknovledges 
that all of Greek culture is not uniformly degenerate. He can align 
himself vith Greek poets and philosophers in attacking the Hellenistic 
deities, 8 but mainly he quotes Greek sources to shov their disagree-
ment vi th each other. 9 This is similar to the criticisms made by 
Tatian, but Theophilus's criticism is mach more videly informed. 
The poets, indeed even Homer and Hesiod, sFOke 'not vith a pure but 
an erring spirit', 10 and vhere there is agreement betveen the two 
(6) cf. I, 10(60f,1040Af) and II, 2(65f,1048Bf). 
(7) cf. I, 9(59f,1037Bf); II, 3(66f,1049Af), 5-8(68-74,1053Af); 
III, 7-8(112-114,ll29Bf). 
(8) cf. II, 36(102ff,1109Cf), vhere he quotes extended passages 
from the Sibyl; also II, 37(104ff,1ll6Bf). 
(9) e.g. II, 5-6 and esp. II, 6(70,l056C): 'BeSides, he is found in 
every Yay to talk nonsense, and to contradict himself' • 
(10) II, 8(74,106lB). 
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vorlda, they 'stole these things from the lay and the prophets ' . 
Here Theophilus follow Tatian in his negative use of the loan theory, 
but at least admits that some similarities do exist. The climax 
to Theophilus' s use of the loan theory is the mammoth, though 
incredibly tedious historical proof of the priority of the Hebrev 
scriptures.12 Theophilus is then almost as derogatory as Tatian 
about the claim of the Greek vorld to truth, but by his readiness 
to quote authors and to admit a certain degree of similarity in 
some instances, he gives a much more satisfactory critique of the 
Greek vorld than Tatian's universal condelln1ation. But neither 
of these has Justin's apologetic thrust, and so they escape the 
resulting theological problem. 
(c) Athenagoras: 
Athenagoras is a complete contrast to these tvo. He is really even 
more apologetic than Justin in that the ethos of his vriting is more 
cultured and seemingly more in tune vith the philosophical frame of 
mind. He approaches Greek culture very pOSitively and quotes 
Euripedes vith approval,13 even using the Stoics as an example of 
the belief in the divine unity.14 He also quotes Plato "\lith approval.15 
To explain this attitude, Athenagoras uses the loan theory positively, 
alloYing that the philosophers have accurate conjectures of the truth 
'by reason of their affinity "With the afflatus from God' .16 This 
(11) II, 37(106,1ll7C). 
(12) III, 18-30. 
(13) ~. 5(379f,900A). 
(14) 6(382,904A). 
(15) 6(381,90lA). 
(16) 7(382, 904B) : 
I (Here li .. itol 
, I L'L. '" _ \ .... 1'- '" 
....... """- (,u t-ltw.. '""'" .... " t I ) II 0. ~ t'"" \7I-C\l 
must be a misprint for itCllfe( ). 
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last statement has a very close similarity with the theories of 
Justin, although phrased in different terminology. Like Justin, 
this connection vith the pagan vorld is sharply contrasted with the 
true revelation through the prophets: 
But ve have for vitnesses of the things ve apprehend 
and believe, prophets, men vho have pronounced concerning 
God and the things of God, guided by the Spirit of 
God. ~7 
Furthermore, appealing to the intelligence and piety of the Emperor, 
he expresses his belief in the absolute rationality of accepting the 
divine revelation: 
••• it vould be irrational (~)..06"") for us to cease to 
believe in the Spirit from God (~:t iI~ <:~ e f-.N 
nv~~~~ ), vho moved the mouths of the prophets 
like musical instruments, and to give heed to mere 
human opinions.18 
And so, in a manner similar to Justin, the pagan is given credit 
for the truth he possesses, but this truth is sharply put into 
perspective by a very definite appeal to revelation. Athenagoras 
also includes the usual attack on idolatory and polytheism,19 and 
20 the immorality of the gods. Even the philosophers previously 
quoted vith approval are criticized,21 and the distortions in the 
Greek vorld are also explained as the result of the activity of 
22 
evil demons. Athenagoras manages, hovever, to blend the positive 
(17) 7(382,904Bf). 
(18) 7(383,9040). 
(19) cf. 8(383f,904Cf), 15(390f,920Af), 17-18(392-5,9210f), 
28(410f,953Bf) • 
(20) e.g. 21-22(393-403,932Cf). 
(21) cf. 19(395f,928Bf); the Stoics are criticized in 22(401,937Af) 
and Thales and Plato in 23 (403ff, 94lBf) • 
(22) cf.26(408,949Df). 
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and segative sides of his thought together to a remarkable degree. 
It is this very subtle apologetic which has led to a difference of 
opinion between L.W. Barnard23 and D. Powell.24 Barnard maintains 
that Athenagoras may have been deeply influenced by Galen and 
Marcus Aurelius. The main issue is that Athenagoras is regarded 
as having moved away from the insistence on the Old Testament as 
the sole source of revelation and as a praeparatio evangelica, 
in order to present the Christian position rather as a universal 
truth than in the exclusivist fashion of the Old Testament. Thus 
Athenagoras is regarded as concentrating more on Platonism as such. 
Barnard's argument as to Athenagoras's knowledge of Galen rests 
mainly on his medical knowledge displayed in the De Ress., and 
he carries these results back into his assessment of the Legatio. 
So Barnards argument depends to a large extent on the common author-
ship of the Legatio and the de Ress. This is not a safe assumption 
since it was severely challenged by R.M. Grant. 25 Powell, on the 
other hand, challenges Barnard's thesis that Athenagoras has moved 
completely away from Justin's use of the Old Testament. He stresses, 
as we have pointed out, that Athenagoras strongly maintains a doctrine 
of inspiration, in this and other ways strongly criticizing the Greek 
26 
world. Powell also maintains that Athenagoras is writing to ansver 
specific charges before a specific audience and that he should be 
evaluated vith this in mind. Although the full complexity of the 
issue viII only become apparent when ve deal vith Athenagoras's 
Logos doctrine, it is possible to conclude here that, while Athenagoras 
(23) "Athenagoras, Galen, Marcus Aurelius, and Celsus", ~, 168(1967), 
pp. 168-181, and the chapter of the same title in his book: 
Athenagoras: A Study in Second Century Apologetic (Paris, 1972). 
(24) ttAthenagoras and the Philosophers", ~, 168(1967), pp. 282-289. 
(25) ttAthenagoras or Pseudo-Athenagoras", Harvard Theological Review, 
47(1954), pp. 121-129. 
(26) Povell, op. cit. p. 284. 
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has not departed from Justin as far . as Barnard maintains, Povell 
has not fully taken into account the full extent of Athenagoras' s 
apologetic. The absence of the Old Testament in Athenagoras is 
most relevant, and vhile one senses that he vauld have appealed to 
it if pushed into a corner, the fact that he does not has the effect 
of making his vriting more universally acceptable. But by turniIlg 
avay from the Old Testament Athenagoras loosens his thought in an 
important respect from the tradition of the Church. And thus, 
vhile in many respects he is a more successful apologist than Justin, 
the question of hov successful a Christian theologian he is is still 
very much open to debate. 
(2) The Logos and Creation: 
In Justin the doctrine of creation, as ve have seen,27 is apparently 
conditioned by a rejection of both Marcionite and other forms of 
dualism. But vhile this is so, Justin has not progressed beyond 
the tradition of Gen. 1.2 and the Platonic idea vhich developed into 
) '(/ 
the Middle-Platonic r:l.1"°r~o~ "'~1. The doctrine of creation is not 
as important in an assessment of Justin I s theology as is the case 
for these other apologists, for vhom it becomes the testing ground 
for almost every aspect of their thought. We sav hoy Justin connected 
the Logos vith creation and hov he exegeted Prov. 8.22.28 It vas not 
possible to ascribe to Justin either a full doctrine of the eternal 
generation of the Logos or, on the other hand, generation just for the 
purpose of creation. If the latter position is adopted the theological 
implications are vide spread and serious. The main question that is 
here raised is the basic matter of hoy God relates to the vorld • 
. 
Indeed, this includes the even more fundamental questions of vho God 
(27) cf. above, pp. 10f. 
(28) cf. above, pp. 17f. 
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is and vhat the vorld is. Thus ve move from creation to the nature 
of God and back again. The dynamics of the tvo questions reveal 
hov the tvo issues cannot be separated. And so it is that in this 
section, although the major question is that of creation, a large 
part of the discussion is over the nature of the Logos and his relation-
Ship to God. 
(a) Tatian: 
In Tatian there are tvo main passages dealing Yith creation, Ch.'s 
4-5 and 12. The first point to note is his descriptions of God 
as timeless and vithout a beginning.29 These statements are to be 
") I 30 
directly contrasted vith the description of the Logos as the ~X1 . 
)! 1\ I 
But in Ch. 4 there is no mention of the Logos. The o/"clfXD \ C1f-05, 
is not the Stoic god,3l but indeed, 'the Maker ••• of the forms that 
1"\ ) ,\,., 
are in matter' ('t'v.J\I t-v c;.\)~n 
This, together vith the description of God as ',the Father of both 
) 1\ f' ') I 
sensible and invisible things' (0(,61:1'1 rW\/' ~ d()Pd.""-l\l), is very 
Platonic and could easily contain the idea of an eternal ~~'1 . 
But in this chapter it is God who is the creator, and it is only 
when these ideas are set out 'more distinctly' in Ch. 5 that Tatian 
incorporates the Logos . This has its implications for the identifica-
tion of the Logos with God. 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
...: 65 -
Ch. 5 is characterized by a movement of thought from God being the 
creator to the activity of the Logos in creation. Thus, at one 
moment the Logos is the creator, but at the next it is God who is 
c. I 
the 'Lord of the Wliverse' and the 'uii.6to<.6,S of all being'. 
This is explained by the statement: 'with Him were all things'. 
( I 
u1io6~.t.',S, therefore, seems to be used in its more proper Greek 
sense as almost the 'groWld of existence'. It refers to the 
dependence of all things on God for their existence both in creation 
and thereafter. Thus there is here a reference to the idea lying 
behind the doctrine of creatio continua. 
< I 
But one of these things of which God is the u ii 0 6t.ol6<S turns out to 
be the Logos himself, wo almost paradoxically 1 subsists ••• in Him 
32 ) (" I by Logos-power' • What follows this is the classical hO< ... &~toY 
"pO~or'I"'~S distinction, with the A~6~S \tro~~~",.6.s being described 
)f _ ( n-' 
as the i<-~~rN II r""~O'l:c> ~ 1'<N \\o..~r"~. This partially explains 
the phrase J'Ja.. ~"6<"'~S cl'u~W-WS which seems to refer to the 
Logos as God's rationality and therefore to be equivalent to the 
A~6oS ~>JJu:r.C}~toS. This interpretation is made possible since 
Tatian could not have thought that the Logos existed eternally in 
God through the activity of the Logos. What we have here is a 
puzzling confusion of the >-~~OS~"J'~&H:oland ii'fo~or\IC.~S .33 
~I \ I 1 t' / " It seems that this u.se of OUII"tIS as the 1\°6°\ h/cJ~d..c:rru~ 
is not Wlderstood in the reference to the ,,~ d~II"r\'< • 
This would turn everything upsidedown 
The I\~~IN d'~v~v' is identified with 
and into complete confusion . 
) \ ..., I 
the "'px" 'l:<N ILO~ and 
is therefore to be regarded as the Logos in action. The continued 
(32) 5(9,8l3C): 
d u vs.t"'t-...l S 
(33) cf. above, p. 29. 
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I' \ \,111. 
existence of the 11°6°'> h<"Ld-~) as the 'Logos-power' means that we 
have what Goodenough calls a 'cosmic-duality' of the Logos. This 
must be the result of the adoption of this schema. And so Tatian 
writes: 
••• the Logos, coming .forth from the Logos-power of the 
Father, has not divested of the Logos-power Him who 
begat Him.34 
This is again the two-stage theory of the Logos.35 The ANCL transla-
tion paraphrases the Greek but brings out the connection of the 
At~os ~"JJ~Co5, which is tile Logos-power (~~ ~qs ~~ ~<:f~~ 
S"'v~f:-W5), with the A~O) l\pO~ot( ... ~S. Here the verb IfpoH.&~ 
is used of this movement of the Logos, in contrast with Justin's 
systematic avoidance of the term.36 But even if this verb does 
\1 'J.lf\ hint at more gnostic vocabulary, the stress on the 1\°60 ~ N 'o..O'f-to 
remaining in God forbids a completely emanantist interpretation. 
Justin's qualification of emanationism, that the emanation is 
) \) \ (I e. I ....... - \ \1 
0\) "" ... ~ d."O~IA."\'" ""S "'ii.rt-r'77"1-"1~ ~\S 1'"" \\.j-~r\ 0\)6~ 
is taken up by Tatian as: r~dcN~ Sl- ~:~~ f'-~'6t-lN, ~ \<.<ll~~ 
) . (37 o/.I\OIL.O",". This appears to be the kind of distortion quite 
possible from aural memory. Justin's second phrase indicates that 
he would not have been at all happy vith Tatian's K</.c'... /"6f16/~6v • 
Tatian's emanantist tendency reveals intself in many other ways.38 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
cf. Wolfson, op. cit. p. 193. The connection of the begetting 
of the Logos with the creation of the world is mysteriously 
denied by V.A.S. Little: The Christology of the Apologists 
London, 1934), p. 187. 
cf. above, p. 20. 
5(9,816A). 
cf. below, pp. 79£. 
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The coming forth of the Logos from the Logos-power is also called 
'begetting', and this is shown to correspond to the generation of 
the world: 
~ 
And as the Logos, begotten in the beginning ( W 
~fX1 ~1-V"1 f)tf.~) begat (J.V7:~lvvtl-) in turn our 
world, having first created (8'V;'WfJ16<1-S) for 
Himself the necessary matter •••• 39 
This quote reveals the last shade of meaning vh1ch is given to the 
") I 
word ~?~ ') • 
) I 
is the OI.f~ 1 
God was ~vdfX 0 ~ but i-v J.PX~ , whereas the Logos 
))-, ")1 
and now is begotten N c:J..tX,1. "'rx,\ is used both 
of a temporal beginning and as the causative source of the world. 
This kind of play on the word, although probably not in any way 
directly related, is similar to that of Col. 1.l5ff and is typical 
of rabbinic methodology.40 Inevitable in this use of the word 
)I 
is the impression that while God is .tvc/..fi\O') the Logos is not. 
This must be so, since the Logos is properly speaking only the 
>.~O~~ iI~o~o~II, .. ~5. In this quote the Logos is begotten explicitly 
) I 
to beget in turn (d..V1:l-df-W16/-) the world. This very close associa-
tion between the relationship of God to Logos and Logos to the vorld 
again points to a slight influence of emanationism. That the 
movement of the Logos from ~VJ'l~ liec.os to i\ro~ !>r"<.b~ is firmly 
conected with the Logos becoming the ~Px. ~ ~~ \<...~6fcN, gives 
support for the idea that the Logos is partially thought of as the 
world of ideas which sprang from the mind of God and out of which 
the world derived its order. This is to be connected vith the 
I 
reference to the 6X,\)<l.Cel in Ch. 4. 
(39) 5(10,8l7A). 
(40) cf. Danielou, op. cit. p. 349 and the reference there to his 
Theology of Jevish Christianity, pp. 166-168. cf. also 
W.D. Davies: Paul and Rabbinic Judaism (SPCK,1948), pp. l5lf. 
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The manner of the creation of the world is a little difficult to 
ascertain with certainty. The question is whether or not such 
statements as the above - 'having first created (dlt'<N!'616oL5 ) 
for Himself the necessary matter' - refer to an actual creation 
ex nihilo of matter (~>-1)' The verb S'1r'CNf4~ definitely 
does not imply such a connotation. Tatian does however directly 
'II '1\ ) I 
contrast God, who is cilv<lf~os , with the IJ/\,\ ' which has an ""p.x. ~ 
The ~~I is also described as a dt""1'i:'1 ' which 'has been brought 
into existence ("to ~/- ~~VAh-, ) by the Framer (JV'"'''''fd-cN ) of 
all things alone,.41 These statements appear to be a rejection of 
'1\ Justin's lingering belief in the eternity of the U(\,' Both 
Danielou42 and Pannenberg43 maintain this, and to a certain extent 
it is true. Tatian may be on the surface attacking the doctrine, 
but his attack has problems and in many ways he himself is still 
clinging to the idea. 
His attack is problematical firstly because of the close connection 
between the begetting of the Logos and the world. If the world's 
begetting is ex nihilo, what about that of the Logos? Also 
the constant description of both God and the Logos as ! 'tJ"iNfd~ s 
has very Platonic overtones. Further, iI\,O{.0.\~ is so very closely 
connected with the Valentiniansthat even if it does allow for a 
certain kind of ex nihilo, it is the kind of ex nihilo that is most 
undesirable. An example of this is the following: 
(41) l2(16f,829C). 
(42) op. cit. p. 357. Danielou does not seem to be correct when 
he maintains that 'for Tatian it is the Father who creates 
matter, and who utters the Logos to impose order upon it'. 
The references to creation by God without the Logos, as has 
been shown, occur before the Logos has been introduced to the 
reader and so no such distinction can be made. 
(43) op. cit. p. 145. 
• 
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••• the lIhole structure of the world, and the whole 
> " creation, has been produced from matter «(,-~ \.>~f) ), 
and the matter itself brought into existence 
(4pO ~ (-~~ 'lri--v\,') by God.44 
Here the created order could be an emanation of the divine, and 
only ex nihilo in the sense that it was not derived from anything 
foreign to God. It is possible that Tatian may have intended a 
contrast between the Logos coming forth (iifo~A<9t",) from God and 
the world being thrown forth (ii~O~~W) from God. There is one 
further positive indication that Justin was clinging to the doctrine 
of the eternal ~).." In an analogy of creation in Ch. 5, he 
compares creation with speech lIhich orders 'the unarranged matter 
(J ... b 6rtl'N ';{~y) in your minds'. 45 
1 r I I 
In Tatian then, there is a use of the A'des ",/,()e,d..~f-(,OS Iii fo<fofllU:>S 
schema in which the coming forth of the Logos is closely associated 
with the creation of the world. 
of the world contains a polemic 
The description of the creation 
(/\ 
against the idea of the eternal Utl~ , 
but in this polemic Tatian appears, in one more way, to have been 
influenced by his Gnostic Background, and so what starts out promisingly, 
ends up not being a proper creation ex nihilo . Furthermore, as we 
shall show, the idea of the evil ~AI seems to have crept into his 
thought at other points not directly connected by him with creation.46 
(b) Theophilus: 
Theophilus is the only Apologist to explicitly mention that he 
~t'(19 I 
adopts and approves of the >.~~&\ (-W~ .... I:-toy il'fo~.~II~o j schema. 
In doing this he does, hOllever, make a major departure from the 
other Apologists by his blending together of this tradition with the 
(44) 12(16f,829C). 
(45) 5(10,817A). 
(46) cf. below, p. 80. 
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Wisdom tradition. The major development that he includes is the 
separation of the Logos and Wisdom.47 Even in his description of the 
generation of the Logos he gives several clues as to hov deeply he 
is influenced by the Wisdom tradition. The Logos vas emitted or 
I 
belched forth (1b-~f-\)~o(rrvos ) 'along llith His Olln Wisdom before 
all things'. The only relevant precursor of the use of this verb 
is Ps. 44(45) .1: ~if(-01ol"t" ; ~J'J,. /AMN A~<N Jdd-sfN 
This is very useful to Theophilus in that it gives him a biblical 
precedent for regarding the Logos and Wisdom as separate entities, 
both proceeding from God. Ps. 44(45).1 refers to the emission 
of the Logos and Prov. 8.22 to the generation of Wisdom. But 
Theophilus does not maintain a rigid distinction betveen these tvo 
events, or betveen the tvo sides of the one event. He also couples 
both with the >.~o~ &.,.J~~61I-'Co, I ilfo~of"J,~ schema. The 
Abdo \ 2-vJ~I-~ is described as 'a counsellor (6~t~o-.:.~ "") being 
His Olln mind ('1~ v ) and thought (it e~ "16 w ),.48 Here the descrip-
tions of "o~(~ as a 6~U.I~CN~O} in Wis. 8.9 and Job. 15.8 are applied 
to the )J,oo~ ~-vJc~~i-"tO). Theophilus does not, hOllever, drall 
the conclusion that the Logos 
, I 
"",,Jl4.i9t'tO\ , but that, llhen 
and Wisdom are identical as the ~~O) 
~ eli I the Logos becomes 1\ pel 0 F Il'-b) , 
they split into the Logos and Wisdom vith Wisdom remaining i-vSJ.~) . 
., r' What happens btu ~BI-t.os remains vague. As in other writers, a 
connection between the tvo forms of the Logos is made llith reference 
to the 11111 of the Father. But even though the ~.!, ilpb~cpl\J,~ 
I I I 
becomes the iI~WNto\l...cN li'c/.(',,\~ \oI.."tc6C:-wS, paradoxically this 'does 
) 1\ \ ) \ '"" '"' (\' 
not empty Him of the Word' (4'l 1'-'-VI.UCth~ ol\)1:CS cN '0<11,). 
Why this can be, is described as follovs: 
(47) cf. belov, pp. 84f'. 
(48) II.22(88,1088B). 
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••• but He begat the Logos (JA.>.k /1.'0"" ~£-w4~, and yet 
(' , ~ "I ,~ He has fello\1ship al\1aye \1ith His Logos \<.d-C!'f "~t' "'Ili"<>ol 
"~o.i'i ... 'lt.bS ~r\ uv' ).49 
This not entirely satisfactory solution does, hovever, again show 
, ,.., 
signs of influence from the Wisdom tradition. The 0r<l\wl/ 1s very 
similar to the description of Wisdom as God's 601<,)'>-"l and to the · 
I 
idea of 6urf<~<S in Wis. 7.28-8.12. 
But returning to the question of creation, ve can see that the descrip-
tion of the >.~'O0~ iipo~of"dfas the tpwd't'O,,-IW ii~\~ 1<~~6~~S 
(another phrase from the Wisdom tradition, cf. Gol. 1.15) is also 
~ , ... el\ 
balanced by the emphatic 1If'" C......,.; Ol\~ • 
I I 
il0/.6~S loI..'C (6("",} becomes even more anomalous in 
Theophilus because of the great stress on the difference betveen 
created and uncreated entities. This differentiation of the 
) I / 
ddt- v 1tO) and the t"'l'to') is revealed in his acute attack on the idea 
(I, 50 
of an eternal \lj'1' Interestingly, this is included in an 
attack on the vhole Greek, and especially the StoiC, concept of God. 
Theophilus clearly regarded the issues of the nature of God and of 
creation 
(I 
as closely connected. He argues that the notions that the 
\J~" is ) I \oL~I-v~'to S and that God is the creator " '1\ -C~ 0(\v.>.J are 
incompatible, and that the incorrect statement is the first. The 
) I LI ) I "~1 being ,;tt"'\tos is shown to be equivalent to it being ,60Skl5 • 
By this development of the implications of the Middle-Platonic 
doctrine, Theophilus includes a subtle attack on the Sto:i.cs. The 
wole argument 
that there are 
(49) ibid. 
depends entirely on accepting the basic Platonic 
) I 
tvo classes of being, the ~~N\ to) and the 
(50) II, 4(67,1052B). 
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151 d("',,\';:OS. 'Ihis distinction is shown to be equivalent to that 
betveen :U-CP'.-,'itos and ~(>C,""t~~. This rejection or the immortal. 
~~'1 is not just an isolated argument but is echoed in all of 
Theophilus's thought. And so, he scoffs: 
And -what great thing is it if God made the vorld out 
of existent materials (f1. \')"()IL.'yt-v'\~ ~~\S ) .52 
In many instances TheophUus refers to creation ~ ~It. ~t VJ'/ 
But the pover of God is shown in this, that, first of 
all, He creates out of nothing ( ~ ~ 1<. 7Jv ;:wJ ) 
according to His vill, the things that are made.53 
By themselves these references vould not have much Significance, 
(1\ but together with the refutation of the idea of the ut\1 ' they 
amount to a very strong case for maintaining that Theophilus taught 
a strict doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. That Theophilus realized 
the importance of the doctrine is not only evidenced by his direct 
exposition of it, but also by his connection of creation vith \/bat 
(51) 
(52) 
) I 
Theophilns is consistent in his use of O\.a('Vi~o~ rather than 
2tdl"VV'\toS. The folloYing does, hOllever, occur \/bich shovs 
that, despite his preference for the single "-ad variety, he 
does not rigidly distinguish them: , \ 
_\ , r\""" ( , '\ I\ , C \ ..., 
111\C/.-t\MI Ot- IU-l '" ~"S 04pf.{,C'WS p(\lt~ D'f-OV~N r0l\cd5\.>(h v, 
) I \ _ ,\ e) t'l 1\ \ 1 ~ d-dl:w .... 'tIN \ ~ \\(/.Z~" •• L c:Jir £>'-n:.\ JC'V1 LOS •••• . 
cf. also belov, n. 53 and also above, p. 20, n. 77. 
II,4(68,1052B). cf. Athanasius: de Inc. 2.3(M25,lOOA), 
and belov, p. 147. 
(53) II, 13(79,l072B). cf. also I, 4(55,1029Af): (God) :'Ay<:l.pxoS 
ry ) 0' I I 1 II, c>~t6~~v ,O'tL ""otvvi'tO$ ~YrL". (The tvo V's are 
unlikely to be significant, cf. above, n. 51). The quote 
. \ ~ U, goes on to descrl.be God as lifO c""" 0" WII , a 
favourite phrase, and as the J\\r,-I!N('d~S who is the 
itd"\"\~il 5 and the \ ... tL'~~~ ~;;J..t ~>.,,,,,, , and he who 
~ \ ~ 'l ) I " \", ,I '\ ') 
c"-. !, ... \ltd, ••• tcil"''16H 6-~ d\.1\G. a-I<W11 ch~ ~o L'Wd-I.., 
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came to be called the I cosmological argument 1,54 and also in his 
lengthy commentary on the Genesis accounts of creation.55 But 
in his description of the Logos, the coming forth of the Logos, 
Ybile it occurs before creation, is still part of the process of 
creation. This perhaps explains Yby in his thought the Logos is 
I I I 
the .. pW'Co'Cc>!<-eN il</.6~S 1<.<:<6,""", S and yet not part of the created 
order. 
(c) Athenagoras: 
Leaving aside, for the moment, the nature of the generation of the 
Logos in Athenagoras, let us first turn directly to his description 
of the created order. Like Theophilus, Athenagoras1s main stress 
in this regard is the complete separation of God from matter: 
But to us, yho distinguish God from matter (dcclCr';;61.v 
, _ \ ... (/, \ r>. . !, ) 
<1.\1 0 e'1 ~ \)"'1 s r~ ~ , and teach that matter is 
one thing and God another, and that they are separated 
by a vide interval ('C'o J~ J~61N ".~~ ) (for that the 
) I ~eJty is 1ll1created and eternal (oIO .... w1tcN ••• ~c4. 
()..ci,-", ), to be beheld by the understanding and reason 
\ ( '('I V alone, yhile matter is created and perishable 
J)'" ~~1V ~h'1"1V I<.~ ~~t<:1v) .• .56 
but it fails to This quote conclusively separates God from matter, 
say anything definite about the status of the ~~'1 • The Platonic 
(54) II, l3(79,1072B). 
(55) I, 10-29. 
(56) 4(379,897B). Here one manuscript, Codex Anglicanua, has 
I I OE-V'v'1'ti1V for dNl~1 y. This may have resulted from the 
I , I ) I 
influece of the previous "'O .... VV I't:l" . Here "'d(-vV'1t~y 
is compared vith o1-ll11:1Y , but e seyhere the single v-ed 
word is used, i.e. in l5(390,920A) ve find ... ~ ~d~V'1t"" 
\' \ \)\ \\))/ 
I<.O-\. '<.. ~(,-v,,\'l:"" , t 6 0" ..... 6-\. 'to ""'II.. eN. Not only does 
this indicate that there is no strict distinction betyeen 
) I J I 
""<l""j'l:"'; and o~\lV1<:"" , but in 19(395f,929A~ quoted beloy, 
tvvlt<N' is used yhere one vould expect otv'\'ttN • 
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nature of t he thought/is brought out even more clearly at the 
conclusion of the same chapter. 
, \ 
Here God is described as ~lltcN 
I , I )'-rJ <N bhl 0r",vN , which is equivalent to ) I ~Ok\r~"" . 
(' I ,I 
This language of process or becoming is continued: 0<:' '('0 <N 
) I ) I '. \ , \ , ')1 57 
Oil atVt-'t.<I-C-, "YI1le/. i:.> 1"1 N. The ci.oW1 t d'l/ is described as 
I >I 1 I \ V {I, ~o ov , while the ~~V~ '1:/IJ is To r 1 N • And since the \)1\ 1 has 
I 
already been described as tVi'1:1V , the implication is that its 
. \ 'U, state of being J.S ~o)"1 v", • By itself this quote, distinguishing 
between the;;' and the 1'1 ' might lead one to the conclusion that 
Athenagoras was deliberately employing the Aristotelian distinction 
between actuality and potentiality. 58 If this were the case, one 
would suppose that Athenagoras would consistantly distinguish betveen 
\ \)1 \) II 
'to 1''1 <N and to (1\J K. IN , were the latter would be absolute 
non-being rather than a potential or relative non-being. 
But that this is so is by no means clear. In a passage very similar 
to the above, Athenagoras, in a polemic against idolatory, distinguishes 
betveen God and matter once more. 59 Here <:'~ ~;vltN is 
\V \ I \ 1 
equated with to cN and ,0 VOiteN ,while ",0 Ol-Vlto,{ is equated 
with 't~ ~ \<. ~ and t ~ Jl6 ~ ~{,.t • , In this context, which 
regards creation as God's ordering 
is very similar ~ AlbinuB, 60 -the 
and shaping of the «,~1 and which 
, 1 )/ 
to ",,\(.,!N _ seems to be equated 
• , \)/ C/\ 
wJ.th to /''\ IN and could have been used to describe the ""1. 
Athenagoras1s use of the Platonic language is clearly revelaed 
in the follOWing: 
(57) 4(379,900A). 
(58) cf. Barnard, op. cit. p. 141, and E. Hatch: The Influence of 
Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church (London, 1897), 
p. 197, n. 3. 
(59) l5(390,920A). 
(60) Did: 8-9(162.3). 
- 75 -
, \ r\ ))\ \) £\ \ I) I 
l'~ "''"" INK ,eN I ~O oll6~~~"" I ~?-VVi~"'" o/fX~hrtN 
<h.Vol!' ~!. ilcJ.uj<WH. 1 
Barnard finds it 'odd that so accurate a thinker should reproduce 
here the Platonic teaching of the unreality of the yorld of phenomena 
which he elseyhere rej ects' .62 It is unfortunate that Barnard 
does not expand on this ststement, because from this examination of 
the evidence it yould appear that Athenagoras is not, at least in 
this regard, so accurate a thinker, nor does he appear to reject 
this idea. There is only one real instance that can be claimed as 
a rejection of the idea of the ~~i and this is so isolated that it 
cannot claim to be an integral part of his thought.63 Rather, 
he uses the Middle-Platonic doctrine of the ~i yith hardly any 
modification. From the evidence 
I that Athenagoras used the~1 yhen 
of our study it is just possible 
dealing solely with the ~~, 
) 
and the a\l yhen there are overtones of the distinction betyeen 
\ I \) f\ J . 
'to v0'l't"" and ~" oll60'~t.<N , but this must remain at best a very 
tenuous possibility. Of course, as \lith all of Athenagoras's 
thought, it is alvays possible that \/hat ye have is plain apologetic 
and that the single reference to the rejection of the idea of the 
~~ betrays Athenagoras's real thought. But lIhile this remains 
a possibility, there does not appear to be sufficient solid evidence 
to really develop this thesis. Athenagoras's viaY of creation is, 
although he strongly separates God and matter, totally Platonic and 
as such far from a creation ex nihilo. 
We turn noY to Athenagorasts theory of the origin of the Logos, and 
then go on to hoy the Logos is connecte~ \lith creation. 
(61) 19(395f,929A). 
(62) op. cit. p. 141. 
In his 
(63) 22(401,937A). There is also 19(396,929B): 'Neither again, 
is it reasonable that matter should be older than God'. 
- 76 -
thought on the Logos Athenagoras seems to show one slight confusion. 
In the one instance he vrites: 
... , \ I 
••• the understanding and reason (vavr, ~~ '-\°00 S ) 
of the Father is the Son of God. 64 
But he also vrites: 
••• for from the beginning, God, who is the eternal 
" mind (vO\) S ), had the Logos in Himself, beiIlg from 
\ I 65 
eternity instinct vi th Logos (1\O~L\' .. o S ) • 
From this it is probable that, despite the first quote, Athenagoras 
'"' regarded God to be the V"  S containing the Logos in himself. This 
would be the A~?f S 2",J'L:'~(,-t.oS , although Athenagoras does not mention 
the term. This Logos does come forth (lifo Mfj~ • to be the idea 
~ N ,'I 
and energizing power (ul~ 1<..6-~ t-V~t"o( ) of all material things'. 
The process of the Logos becoming "fO~Or 1l<..6s is thus closely 
""' linked with creation. The Logos also becomes the TI("'-"''i:<N' 
d N~I:-V<N' .66 But this is the only instance 
where the change in the godhead is described in these terms. The 
traditional language of generation used to describe the relationship 
betveen the Logos and God seems to be scrupulously avoided even when 
he refers to the Father and his Son. Because of this, Barnard 
w.ri tes: 
It is significant 'that he nowhere suggests that the 
the Logos needed to be originated - he merely "proceeds" 
from the Father, being from all eternity the Logos. 67 
(64)10(385,909A). 
(65) 
(66) 
ibid. 
I I 
This conjunction of ~/:-"VjJ'4. and ~'-v'0f1-"W may be intentional, 
in which case it is most Athanasian, or, as is much more 
probable it is due entirely to linguistic awkwardness which 
would result from consistancy in either direction. 
(67) Ope cit. p. 100. 
- 77-
In this Athenagoras appears to be closest of all the Apologists 
\1 "'J/f\ I to the true significance of the "O<>~ l-v \o/...C'!'-tos! rrpo10 p' \lD ~ 
schema. This is due either to his ignorance or his avoidance of 
the Wisdom tradition, which insists on the notion of 'betting'. 
,rJ \)/ 
The phrase l<Jf.d. ~ hlt-fohd. is very closely connected with 
- d) / ., the Logos when "rol O~UI.bS. The Son of God is the Logos H 
)~I \) / 68 ~c:> l'""t \<..d-l c-vt-r ~. From this one gathers that the Logos, 
, J I being &" \.11..&+-;:'0) , could not be called the Son of God. The Logos 
)r/ ') I 
comes forth 'to be the lUhI- "-k (-vt-fdhD. of all material things'. 
By this the procession of the Logos is linked with creation. This 
, \ ., 
is Athenagorasts way of saying that the Logos is the otfX'1 roN 
I 
,~o6!,~. Danielou uses these references as evidence that Athen-
agoras has linked the Son of God with the Platonic 'idea' 'which, in 
Albinus, is identic Ie ith the divine thought,.69 He goes on to 
say: 
In Justin, by contrast, the Son of God is compared to 
the Platonic world-soul, Which is begotten by God and 
distinct from him. 
This statement is, however, very dangerous. Just the use of 
J...,ti~~with its very close association \lith S~V~W.S provides a 
connection with the \lorld-soul tradition. Furthermore, such a 
statement gives the impression that Athenagoras has ignored the world-
soul, and that Justin ignores the Platonic ideas. Neither of these 
impressions is correct. Actually the world-soul is connected with 
the Spirit rather than with the Son of God.70 Where Danielou is 
right is in mentioning the difference as being due to the generation 
(68) 10(385,908B). 
(69) op. cit. p. 348. 
(70) cf. below, pp. 9Of. 
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of the Logos. These issues viII be taken up later. 
Here ve just mention that Athenagoras regarded the distinctions 
within God as 'self-existent' and that the Logos exercises his r81e 
in creation because, as Bethune-Baker puts it, 'he is already in 
idea all that was required for the exercise of the special work of 
creation,.7l And so, by closely connecting the A~~') i\~o~opll'-6l 
\ I t,JL~ "'_TA. with the /lOCOS ". <>-0, ~~ , Athenagoras makes creation an 
action of God rather than of just the Logos. The Logos is the 
reason of God and is identified with the Platonic world of ideas. 
In this side of his thought Athenagorae is much more sophisticated 
than the other Apologists, but in the matter of creatio ex nihilo 
he is a disappointment. 
When we look back over these three Apologists' treatment of the 
origin of the Logos and the creation of the world, we see that all 
of them link creation with the generation of the Logos. They all, 
like Justin, use as the underlying theory of the origin of the Logos 
)J/l\ I 
(-v Ld..C>'"/-t0S I i1'~o~o PIlr..oS schema, but Theophilus is the 
only one to explicity adopt it. In Tatian and Theophilus the Logos 
) I 
comes forth or is begotten to be the c;l.r~j of the world. While 
they add cautionary riders to this theory explaining how the Logos 
is always related to God, they 'cannot escape the tendency for the 
Logos to be part of the created order instead of the absolute source 
of ·it. It is this problem which leaves the yay open for an Arian 
interpretation. This ·may have been sensed by Athenagoras who 
avoids language about the ge~eration' of ' the Logos and reference to 
), ' / . 
the Logos being the ""~x.'1 't03 Ket>t"'''. ' . ~lthough this same idea 
. .) rl \) I 
J.S expressed by the Logos being the ~o~ ~~< &ve-fJhc:l. of the 
world. He manages this by avoiding the exegetical complications 
(71) op . cit. p. 129. 
" 
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of Prov. 8.22ff., and by keeping to the Greek philosophical tradition. 
In Tatian we find the first glinnnerings of a Christian reaction to 
" the Greek doctrine of the u~1 ' and in Theophilus this doctrine is 
clearly rejected and he can therefore maintain a proper creatio 
ex nihilo. This is not the case in Athenagoras. Of the three, 
Athenagoras's theory of the origin of the Logos is by far the most 
sophisticated, and both this and his doctrine of creation are the most 
suited to the philosophical tradition. 
(3) The Logos as Revealor: 
(a) Tatian: 
In the previous section we saw how Tatian accepts the A~~O) 
'<;,1&\ 1 b-v<l~~O'f-t.oS liir~or"<'''S framework and how he relates this to creation. 
Here, however, we must briefly mention the relationship between God 
and the Logos, and then move on to the question of the doctrine of 
the Logos, both apart from the question of creation per Be. 
We noted how Ch. 4 describes creation as an act of God, and how 
this is expanded in Ch. 5 to include the Logos. This in itself 
is very powerful evidence for Tatian's belief that the Logos was 
fully divine. This evidence is strengthened by the caveats regarding 
the manner of the emanation of the Logos, which are similar to those 
of Justin : It is not unreasonable that Tatian could maintain two 
such contradictOry ideas as the full divinity of the Logos and the 
generation of the Logos for the purpose of creation, for the thought 
of the period would have found this quite acceptable. But this 
claim for the Logos to be fully divine is undermined by almost the 
Whole of the rest of his thought. 
Tatian I S emanantist thought is the first serious difficulty. He 
appears to have accepted the Gnostic idea of a progression of emana-
tions. We see this in his distinguishing the spirit of God Inot 
" 
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pervading matter', and 'the spirit that pervades matter' (~b 
J'~ "1S f;'},jS 8~1i<.tN ).72 In this yay he accepts the Stoic 
language of the divine immanence, but splits the Stoic logos into a 
transcendent God and an inferior immanent spirit. This immanent, 
I inferior spirit is called fUX1 and is closely associated vith matter, 
which is also shown to be inherently evil: 
Therefore the demons ••• having received their structure 
from matter and obtained the spirit vhich adheres in 
it, became intemperate and greedy.73 
This earthly spirit turns out to be in conflict with the divine 
spirit. Thus the soul, 
if it continues solitary, ••• tends downwards towards 
matter, and dies with the flesh; but, if it enters into 
union with the Divine spirit, it is no longer helpless, 
but ascends to the regions whither the Spirit guides it.?4 
This very Gnostic passage is continued in Ch. 15, where Tatian stresses 
that 
it becomes us nov to seek for what ve once had, but 
have lost, to unite the soul vith the Holy Spirit, and 
to strive after union vith God. 75 
This union with God is effected by the indvelling of the 'superior 
J' ... - I - I 
spirit' ( \D. 1:<N "ff-OPe"O'\INS "Vl-vt-o. 'toS ). It is this spirit 
(72) 4(9,813Af). 
(73) 12(17,8328). cf R.M. Grant: "The Heresy of Tatian", JTS, 
5(1954), p. 63, where this is compared with Justin and Grant 
points to a similarity with the Valentini an doctrine expressed 
in Clement: Exc. Theod., 72.2(M9,692C), although the similarity 
is not as close as his reference might suggest. 
(74) 13(19,833B). 
(75) l5(20,837A). 
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vhich enables men to escape the tyranny of matter. 
All of this must be evidence for hoy Tatian really conceived of the 
ilf06-".9~"bY vhich he describes the origination of the Logos. The 
relationship between this emanantist tradition, using" the language 
of the spirit, and the Logos doctrine is not very clear. There is, 
however, one indication of a connection: 
I For the heavenly Logos, a spirit emanating (dl-dOY~S) 
from the Father and a Logos from the Logos-pover, 
in imitation of the Father vho begat Him made man an 
image of immortality, so that ••• man, sharing in a part 
of God, might have the immortal principle also.77 
\ ) £I' This 'immortal principle' (to d- C/o-vd- r:~) was apparently lost at 
the fall. Here Tatian advances beyond Justin, although it may well 
have been for the wrong reasons. But, to get back to the point, 
this quote shovs that Tatian saw nO real difference between the 
Logos and the divine spirit, and that probably the only difference 
betveen the tvo vocabularies is that the 'spirit' terminology is 
used in his more Gnostic passages, while he reserves the Logos language 
for his more traditional moments. Because of the close connection of 
the lower spirit vith the vorld, one cannot but speculate that this 
might correspond to the world-soul and that the higher spirit of 
Logos might be more closely connected with the realm of ideas. 
But the Gnostic nature of Tatian's thought does not allow positive 
conclusions On this point, and it may be more accurate to trace 
(76) cf. 15 (21,840A) : "'<'\1 J'~ "(~\ ~uX~~ w:- N-l ..... 6,,:",(0\1 
and 20(26,852.A): I(06rcJ P v..rS l'~, I<..~S6->'''''h, 
r \) I \ v, ) ...,1 
O. oI.~<N\."V t1" ""I" t-ilc 1t:w . Both of these references 
indicate the inherently evil nature of the ~"1' which is, 
of course, almost the basic tenet of Gnosticism, but is also 
present in other traditions, cf. Wis. 9.15 and its parallel 
in the Phaedo. 
(77) 7(11,820B). 
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Tatian's background to the similarity beween Middle-Platonism and 
Gnosticism in so far as they both contain elements concerned yith a 
divine hierarchy. 
The above quote also raises another interesting matter. Tatian 
wi tes of man 'sharing in a part of God' so that he 'might have the 
immortal principle also'. This is strongly reminiscent of Justin's 
I 
6i11:~(d' doctrine. The resemblance is, hOllever, only superficial, 
since in Justin the I " \ I 6ii. ~ ~ 'W-J 1\ 'tl "" really comes d01ln to man 
and operates in his reason, but in Tatian it is impossible that the 
higher spirit could really incarnate itself in the domain of the 
loyer spirit, llhich is Significantly called Y'UX1. Man then, 
does not in his humanness 'share in a part of God', but can only 
share in God by escaping from the tyranny of matter, and thereby 
escaping from his true humanity. This Gnostic picture of revelation 
is carried over quite naturally into Tatian's description of redemp-
tion llhich is, as in Justin, seen as a deliverance from evil demons, 
to llhom man has voluntarily become subject.78 But Tatian takes 
the theory further and tllists it into a dualism involving matter 
by stating that the demons are 'the reflexion of matter and of Yicked-
ness,.79 The conclusion to this is that revelation is seen solely 
in terms of man becoming a part of God, but since this involves man 
becoming free from matter it is not revelation. This difficulty 
is manifested even in Tatian's doctrine of creation. For if he 
hints at creatio ex nihilo and at the same time clings to the idea 
(/\ 
of an evil \) "'1 ' hOll could he possibly maintain that the Logos llas 
the agent of creation? Even the ordering of the ~~1 by the Logos 
, 
-
becomes inconceivable in this dualistic sye.tem. 
(78) 14(20,836Cf). 
(79) l5(2l,840A). 
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These difficulties vould of course reach their most definitive form 
in any description of the incarnation. Tatian only once refers 
l\\ ))l\I_ If' BO 
to 'God in the form of man' (c;;Tf-c>./ f-v oI.Yllo'fWII<N /'-"f 1 ~ ), but 
otherwise there is no mention of the incarnation. As ve have seen, 
Tatian's thought on revelation almost precludes the incarnation. 
Grant notes this and goes on to speculate 1/hat Tatian' s Christology 
may have been. He refers to the notion of the descent of the 
Spirit,BI and thinks that Tatian would have folloved this pattern. 
The result would be that 'the Logos descended to Jesus and v.as 
mingled vith his soul,.B2 Grant shows the similarity of this vith 
the Christology of Theodotus.B3 While Tatian may have held such 
views, we have no evidence that he had any kind of Christology at 
all, and ve have also shown hov even such a Christology vould strain 
the seams of his thought. Further, to attempt to justify Tatian's 
lack of concern vith the incarnation by appealing to his peculiar 
purpose would be unsatisfactory. As Danielou says: 'To Tatian's 
understanding of the Gospel any sort of emphasis on the historical 
was completely alien,.B4 
(b) Theophilus: 
II ) "Ill I 
The adoption by Theophilus of the "o~/" """" ...... C1M:O~ / TtrO~Of"'-"''::, 
schema together with his clear doctrine of creatio ex nihilo character-
(BO) 21(27 ,B52C). 
M' \) r' '-11 \ .., (Bl) cf. 13(19,B33B): I -fOov~ FII <NV 6"vo,,,-.tcoV' oIrX'lCOW to liV~ 
~~ lj'ul\1. There is also just prior to this a reference 
to the 'u'r6~-J.. • 
(B2) op. cit. p. 66. 
(B3) cf. Clement: Exc. Theod., 3.1(M9,653B). 
(84) op. cit. p. 23. 
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ises his vhole theology. On the one hand the connection of the 
I I ) \ '" I >"'C'6t>~ "~O~Or"LO.s vith the ~~~\ t"'-l Il..o6rIN tends to separate the 
Logos and God, but on the other hand, the thought on creation keeps 
the Logos firmly on the godvard side of the Goq/creature divide. 
The Logos is not a created being, at any rate in the sense that 
other things are created beings. 
There are several notable advances in Theophilus. The first of 
these is a nev distinction betveen the Spirit and the Logos. 
This distinction is shovn vhen he vrites that the Logos 'is emitted 
••• along vith His ovn Wisdom before all things'. 85 But this distinc-
I 
tion betveen the Logos and Wisdom is not just in the ~ fO ~ 0 f' ''-''>5-
stage: 
For the prophets were not when the vorld came into 
existence, but the wisdom of God which vas in Him, 
and His holy Word which was always present vith Him. 86 
This quote is slightly ambiguous. It may be that here ve do not 
I I 
find a description of Wisdom and the Logos both being (:V$Ld.&,,"i:"~ , 
I 
but being 'i\~o~Or\"'-OS before creation, that is in the interval 
after the coming forth of Wisdom and the Logos and before creation. 
But it also may be that the phrases 'in Him' and lalvays present vith 
Him' do refer to the t"S.iI9r:-'tt>~ state, in lJhich case we come very 
close to a real Trinitarian concept of God. The argument for this 
view is slightly strengthened by Theophilus1s reference to the 
Trinity, which occurs in a rather oblique fashion and is dravn out 
of an analogy of the first three days of creation. These three 
days are said to be 
(85) II, lO(75,1064C). 
(86) II, lO(75,1065A). cf. also II, l8(84,108lB) and I, 7(58,1036A). 
(87) II, l5(82,1077B). 
.' 
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Theophilus also departs from the other Apologists by identifying 
88 Wisdom ~ith the Spirit and not the Logos. This is clear from 
~hat has been said above about the distinction bet~een the t~o. 
One ~ould suspect that this ~ould create havoc vith the exegesis 
of Prov. 8.22, since it sould make the Spirit and not the LOgOS 
) I 
the ~~ '1 of the ~orld. Theophilus does not seem to have really 
noticed this difficulty, but in one instance ~hen referring to the 
~X1 he sho~s a measure of confusion: 
He (the Logos), then, being Spirit of God, and governing 
principle (~X.1 ), and ~isdom, and po~er of the highest, 
came do~ upon the prophets.89 
The inspiration of the prophets is else~here also attributed directly 
to the Spirit.90 These references all point to a similar confusion 
to that ~hich occurs in Justin, although here in Theophilus these 
confusions are more the exception than the rule, and so ve can 
safely conclude that Theophilus has progressed significantly to~ards 
a proper Trinitarianism. 
The Logos, or the Spirit, ~ho created is engaged in some form of 
revelation through both the la~ and the prophets.91 Theophilus 
also uses Justin's argument of the impossibility of God appearing in 
a tbeophany and thereby ascribes revelation to the Logos. 92 On 
this there is no need for comment. 
Where Theophilus fails is in having no theology of redemption. 
Although there is a vague idea that keeping the commandments ~ill 
result in receiving immortality, 93 it is not at all clear ~hy the 
la~ and the prophets existed. While there is reference to the fall,94 
(8S) II, 9(74,1064A). cf. Pollard, op. cit. p. 40, Wolfson, op. cit. 
pp. 234, 236, 246, and Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. IV.20.3 (M7,1033C). 
(<' I ) 1""1 (89) II. 10(75,1064C). cf. also II, 22(88,10S8A): ••• 0 ut- 1\.0..0. ) olllLiS\:) 
~ I )\ \ lJ I ,,.., 0 
••• OUVd.f-l\ """ \l..d.l 60,lc:l. oI.ll~c1\). 
(90) II, 9(74,10641). 
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it is not reversed in any way. Interestingly enough the major 
sections of Theopbilus' s work dealing with man's kn01l1edge of God 
occur in Bk. I, that is before the Logos has really been introduced.95 
In all of this there is simply no reference to Jesus or to the incsi-na-
tion of the Logos. His thought just does not include this. Because 
of this, Laechli is quite correct that Theophilus might well 
convert a pagan to Dia.spora Judaism instead of to Christianity. 96 
Apart from his development towards Trinitarianism there is nothing 
in Theophilus which is peculiarly Christian This is a great 
pity since in so many ways he has prepared the way for a developed 
and orthodox Cbristology. 
(c) Athenagoras: 
We have already dealt fairly exhaustively with Athenagoras's adoption 
His use of this 
\ ) ,., 
schema and of the almost automatic iicl.r (l.1I1:c1\J limits the tendency 
of the Logos to become detached from God.98 Athenagoras also uses 
(91) cf. II, 14(81,1076A), and III, 9(1l4f,1l33C) where God reveals 
rather than the Word, Spirit or Wisdom. 
(92) II, 22(88,1088A). 
(93) II, Z7(92,1096A). The creator Logos is linked with the 
bestowal of immortality in I, 7(58,1036A). 
(94) II, 21(86f,1085Af) and II, 26(9lf,1093Af). 
(95) cf. I, 2(54,1025B), were kno\lledge of God is hindered by 
man's blindness caused by sin, and I, 4(56,102%), where he 
can gain some kind of kno\lledge 'through his works' • 
(96) Ope cit. p. 165. 
(97) cf. above, pp. 76f. 
(98) i.e.4(379,900A). 
.. 
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the Johannine reciprocity to good advantage. 99 But vhen ve move on 
to consider the Logos as revealor, this clarity of thought does not 
emerge. 
The play on the vord )..~ctS occurs fairly fl'equently. In one 
instance the ),~OO) appears as 'Christian doctrine', creation is ' 
~\ '"'-')..,\( )\/100 
ClL<l.. 'to\) "~ o.u'tN "~0'3 , and the Christians suffer d...I\OC/'~S. 
\( n' AI ,... 
This is continued with the, I\oO\») being the VIS\) S I.:.d-~ "60\ r4N 
\I d. i:~~S ,101 which is also echoed in man being able to knov the 
,.... I \ \ I 11 I 102 
Deity by mind and reason ("'Z rlN'j} I.(.d-c.. I\ob": Ctf-WrcNr"" 
)I~ And finally, it becomes 'irrational (01. OdIN) for us to cease to 
believe in the Spirit from God,.103 All this is very similar to 
, what we found in Justin, but Athenagoras does not make it clear 
precisely how the divine Logos and human reason are related. The 
only hint of a direct connection between the tvo is in his reference 
to man's 'affinity with the afflatus fl'om God' ,104 The knowledge 
resulting fl'om this 'affinity' is contrasted with the knowledge 
which comes 'from God concerning God', which comes through the 
prophets 'who have pronounced concerning God and the things of God, 
guided by the Spirit of God'. Thus, probably, as in Justin's 
I Apol., this 'affinity with the afflatus' should be understood to 
('\ '"' yc...... ) -. \ \ - , ) n '" (99) i.e. 10(385,909A):)'Ov'to) <Ie,. 'teN eN (:-V \loI-~fl) \<.d-l I'oI-tfO) (:-V l~ 
(100) 4(379,8978f). 
(101) 10(385,909A). 
(102) 4(379,8978). 
(103) 7(383,904C). 
(104) 7(382,904B), cf. above, pp. 60f. 
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be an impure participation in the Logos, and .. hen he refers to 
,.... I \ \ I 
knoving God Vw M-o-/vJ ""'-l ".~vJ , .. e should understand this both 
'" I'" U " 
as an apologetic device and as the purified reason being in full 
fello .. ship .. ith the Logos. In this regard ve can really take 
stock of Justin's tremendous achievement in sorting out this issue. 
Athenagoras novhere explicitly deals .. ith the nature of this affinity, 
and so, .. hile .. e knov that the Logos vill not reduce to human reason, 
ve do not find out hov the t .. o relate. 
Athenagoras does, in a rather different vay to Theophilus, make 
notable advances in his thought on the Trinity. The first thing 
to note is his introduction of the Spirit .. ho is 'an effluence 
,_ ,,, ( 
(otll 0pf Cl'\d.v) of God' .105 The background to this appears to be 
Wis. 7.25.106 The Trinitarian structure of Ch. 10 is taken up in 
Ch. 12 in a most sophisticated .. ay: 
••• they kno .. God and His Logos, .. hat is the oneness 
(&'vb't,S ) of the Son .. ith the Father, .. hat the 
I 
communion (1-<.<1\ vWVlol.) of the Father vith the Son, 
.. hat is the Spirit, vhat is the unity (~vw6.S) of 
these three, the Spirit, the Father, and their distinc-
r- I ( I 107 
tion in unity (ol.",'{'f-IhS (-vINt-rvuN ). 
Here there is a very skilful balancing of the unity of the Trinity 
and the distinctions .. ithin that unity. It is probable that the 
use here of the term K.Cl'\ ""-lAo{ is not derived from the Platonic 
(105) 
(106) 
(107) 
10(386,909B), and cf. also 24(405,945B). 
cf. A.J. Malhe.rbe: "The Holy Spirit in Athenagoras", JTS, 
20(1969), p. 53.8, .. here he notes the interesting variants in 
the tradition of Wis. 7.25 resulting in the 
to J.\(.~~'i , wich .. e find in Athenagoras. 
) I 
change of OJ. ~t-' ~ 
12(388,913Bf). cf. also 24(405,945B), were the ANCL translate 
, M \ 
1Y.'td. OVVdf'-lV as 'in essence'. At this stage Kd.t.a. 
$/ , \ I 
VVd-./'-LV seems to mean the same as 1 ........ ;: <N 6 l.olv' , as is 
sta;ed in n. 32 of Migne 946c: 'A~vrJ..",,~ hoc loco idem est ac 
~'I.ol et divinitas'. cf. also Hipp.: c. Noet. 8(MlO,816B) 
for J'J'V~q and Ref. 1.20(Ml6,3045D) and 10.33(3450B) for a3.~oI. • 
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idea, but from the Christian tradition, especially as it is represented 
in II Cor. 13.14.108 Any argument that this passage portrays a 
quasi-Sabellian viell is more than mildly ridiculous. But despite 
these tremendous tecbnical achievements, Athenagoras does not 
seem to have placed Trinitarianism as such on quite as sound a 
footing as Theophilus. In Athenagoras the real distinction is 
between God and the Logos and the Spirit suddenly appears as an 
~ I~" 
extra 01-'\\ 0 ~~ <n ol , and one gets the feeling that he mentions the 
Spirit just to enable him to speak of the Trinity. 
In the abov~ quote Athenagoras refers to the 'distinction in unity' 
I ( I (cS\·.cI..'rl-U\5 (""' tNf1" v...x). Later he refers to the Trinities 'power 
\ , ~ c, <;-' 
in union and distinction in order' ('i:IY &'" ~~ (-vw6c--. c!UVo!flV 
K.oL'.. 't1v 241 ~~ ~~~n J'~a..~rf'<V).109 By contrasting the 'distincti<;m 
in unity' with the 'distinction in order' he avoids any subordination-
",I <; ism altogether. Here (~~lS is used in the sense of 'order' rather 
than 'rank', that is it describes the arrangement of the three 
Persons without any preference. This is different to Justin's 
use of the term. It is strange that this tecbnical achievement is 
not paralleled in his theory of the origination of the Spirit. 
There is some evidence that Athenagoras would have agreed with the 
Filioque clause. He describes the relationship betyeen the Father 
and the Son as being 
, I \ C" I - I 110 &vo~t~ l I<oL.l OUVcif('1 IIv(~to~. There 
is here a difference of opinion between Migne and the ANCL translators 
as to yhether or not there is reference to the Spirit, but the 
easiest sense is that the poyer of the Spirit is the bond of unity 
(108) cf. Barnard, op. cit. p. 110. 
(109) 'lO(386,909B). 
(110) 10(385,909A). 
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bet\leen the Father and the Son. III If Athenagoras was really intending 
this, he is a precursor of much later thought. It is difficult to 
be positive about this because of the paucity of evidence. Indeed 
the \lhole of Athenagoras's thought on the Trinity is rather isolated 
from the rest of his thought, and even the technical advances in 
the description of the Trinity are some\lhat disjointed from the 
descriptions of the origination of the Logos and the Spirit. 
There is a very different side to Athenagoras's Trinitarianism 
\lhich is especially evident in his treatment of the Spirit. It 
is A.J. Malherbe \lho has noticed that the Spirit in Athenagoras 
corresponds closely to the \lorld-soul of Middle_Platonism.112 
His argument deals \lith several issues, Which we must briefly 
summarize. The first point is the interesting problem of the 
exegesis of the follo\ling, \lhich in turn introduces a reference to 
Prov. 8.22: 
\ \ 
~ ~o 
The usual exegesis, reflected in the ANCL translation, is that 
" \ I ,,~ "O't refers to the previous argument. Malherbe believes 
instead that it should refer to the Logos, in \lhich case the sense 
is that Prov. 8.22 refers to the Logos and therefore that the 
'prophetic Spirit corresponds to the Logos in its creative activity'. 
In Athenagoras generally there is no absolute certainty about 
whom Wisdom is to be identifies \lith. The different functions of 
the Spirit, that Malberbe finds in the above, are definitely found 
in the follo\ling: 
(111) An interesting feature of this language is that S~VcJ.rl) 
is not used, as in Justin and the others, as a description 
for or synonym of the Logos, cf. Barnard, op. cit. p. 97f. 
(ll2) op. cit. 
(113) lO(385,909A). 
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God ••• has framed all things by the Logos, and holds 
them in being (buV ~~(;-,t6-l ) by His Spirit.1l4 
This quote follows on a reference to Timaeus 4la, which is a discussion 
on the Platonic world-soul, and so one begins to suspect that we 
are not here concerned so much with a division of Platonic trans-
cendence and Stoic immanence, as with an appropriation of the world-
soul into the Trinity. Halherbe also finds a link between 'by 
\.lhose Spirit they are governed ,115 and the Phaedrus 2.45-7. As 
we have shown, much of Justin and Tatian appears to have been influenced 
. 116 by a similar problem. Malherbe concludes: 
Athenagoras thus conceives of the function of the Spirit 
in creation along the lines of the Hiddle Platonic 
Word Soul. In this respect the Spirit corresponds to 
the Logos, \.lith the exception that the Logos is the 
agent through which God created the world while through 
the Spirit He maintains and controls i t.1l7 
Our problem, which is Dot mentioned by Malherbe, is now to try to 
understand how this aspect of Athenagoras's thought is to be reconciled 
\.lith the other side of his Trinitarianism, for there we find no 
inkling that the Spirit referred to is really a spiritualized or 
') I ) ( 
divinized world-soul, except perhaps in the Spirit being an o(\\orrO)ol 
of God. ifuat we seem to find here is an excellent example of what 
Pannenberg calls the 'appropriation of the philosophical notion of 
God' • The appropriation of the world-soul into the Trinity is both 
an excellent means of illustrating the threeness of God and of 
relating God to the created order. In Athenagoras we find a remark-
able illustration of theology in transition. It does not appear to 
(114) 6(381,901C). 
(115) 5(380,900B), cf. Malherbe, op. cit. pp. 540f. 
(116) cf. above, pp. 22£, 8lf. 
(117) op. cit. pp. 54lf. 
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be correct methodologically to ask whether he started from Trinitarian-
ism and then developed the theory of the Spirit's association with 
the world-soul, or indeed vice-versa. What we can discern, however, 
is the influence of the traditional Trinitarian formulae on the 
Middle-Platonic background, and the amalgamation of these two. 
Athenagoras provides us with a very good eXample of theology being 
produced from a meeting of traditional faith and philosophy, and 
even in his theology we can discern the influence of both sources; 
the more orthodox Trinitarian passages show the influence of the 
traditional forms, and the Spirit and world-soul association the 
influence of the philosophical background. 
This tremendous theological achievement does not however seem to 
help Athenagoras in other areas. Like both Tatian and Theophilus, 
he is completely deficient in any proper reference to the incarnation. 
There is only one reference to the Logos as man, and this only 
refers to him giving commands about the kiss of peace, and seems 
to be derived from some missing apocryphal writing. lIS Revelation 
is therefore not connected with the incarnation. The pattern is 
completed by an absence of any soteriology. This is especially 
apparent in the de Ress., Vhere one would expect the argument to 
proceed from the resurrection of· Jesus. This illustration is still 
appropriate even if, as Grant maintains, the de Ress. was not written 
by Athenagoras. Dani~lou maintains that the doctrine of the 
resurrection 'occupies a prominent place in the writings of Justin, 
Tatian, Athenagoras and Theophilus' .119 The evidence that Dani~lou 
brings forward for this view is not sufficient to justify his claim. 
It does hovever shov that these writers seem all to be concerned 
with their ovn, or the Church's resurrection, without real reference 
to Christ's resurrection. 
(lIS) 32(417,964C). 
(119) op. cit. p. 24. 
The attempt to .ationalize the very 
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concept of resurrection vas probably an attempt to remove the 
'offence' that the resurrection undoubtedly vas to the Greek mind. 
Barnard criticizes those Yho point out the problem of Athenagoras's 
omission of both the incarnation and the resurrection, by laying 
claim to Athenagoras's apologetic intent.120 But surely an 
apologetic Yhich just avoids the offence is either a rather under-
hand trick or a prostitution of the gospel. While not Yishing to 
be embroiled in such a theoretical debate, ye must conclude that 
Athenagoras, by avoiding the incarnation and the resurrection, 
reveals in a very clear yay hoy difficult it is for the Logos theology 
of the Greek yorld to come to terms Yith this nettle. 
It is at this point that ye must refer back once again to Justin and 
the question of tradition. We have shoYn hoy Justin's thought falls 
into wo camps and hoy the tradition of the Church appears to have 
kept him from losing himself in his apologetic. What ye seem to 
find in all the other apologists is the loss of this restraint 
especially Yith regard to the incarnation. The influence of 
tradition in Theophilus is slight, but in Athenagoras it definitely 
surfaces in his treatment of the Trinity. Also remarkable is their 
apparent ignorance of the New Testament. And so, yhile Athenagoras 
makes some giant leaps forward, ' it appears that it is by his failure 
to come to terms Yith the traditional teaching on the incarnation 
that he has in fact failed in the real apologetic endeavour of the 
Church, Yhich is to present 'Christ and him crucified'. 
And so it is that Justin must be regarded as the greatest Apologist, 
even if he is not the most sophisticated. Theophilus shoys an 
advance concerning the question of creation and in the separation of 
the Logos and Wisdom, Yhile Athenagoras has developed the doctrine 
(120) op. cit. p. 180. 
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of the Trinity, but they all fail in developing Justin's doctrine 
of revelation, and perhaps as a consequence, succomb to the Greek 
mind in avoiding the incarnation, and by so doing they lose the 
historical basis of their faith. While Justin may not have success-
fully managed to synthesize his apologetic, at least he presents 
the problem. The others do so only by avoiding it. 
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III. CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. 
(1) Introduction: 
When we turn from the Apologists to Clement we enter a very different 
world. The chronological difference betwe.en them is small, so 
small that in fact the similarity of outlook between Athenagoras and 
1 Clement has led to the conjecture that Clement was his pupil. 
There is, however, no real evidence for this, "lU1d it seems more 
likely that Clement comes from a Christian background which was more 
permeated with the ~stical Middle-Platonism that was shortly to 
become Neo-Platonism. Because of this, it has been suggested that 
Clement, at least for some time after his conversion, was taught 
2 by Ammonius Sac cas • This in turn provides a connection with 
Posidonius, whose influence appears to be discernible in Clement's 
treatment of the relationship of Christianity and philosophy.3 
From the complexity of Clement's thought and the short time span 
between the Apologists and Clement, it becomes abundantly clear how 
rapid both the development of Christian thought was and how success-
ful the missionary endeavors of the apologetic age had been. From 
the Apologists' defence of the faith against the attacks of the 
pagan world, we move to a much more confident statement of the faith 
in Clement. This is even true of Clement's Protrepticus which, 
when compared with the earlier apologies, reveals a different tone, 
almost as if one has moved from jagged, jarring chords to placid, 
flowing cadences confident of their own beauty and worth. Even 
(1) cf. R.B. Tollinton: Clement of Alexandria (London, 1914), 
i, p. 12. 
(2) cf. R.E. Witt: "The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria", QQ, 
25(1931), p. 195. 
(3) cf. below,pp. ll4f. 
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the title of the work is positive rather than defensive. Tollinton 
writes that Christianity in Clement 
is at once more positive, more aggressive, more 
religious, than either Justin or Athenagoras had dared · 
to represent it.4 
This positive attitude seems to have been made possible by Clement's 
intimate connection with Hellenism. While the details of this are 
to be the subject of constant discussion in this chapter, we can note 
here that only one ·part of Clement's work is devoted to the refuta-
tion of paganism, that is the Protrepticus. The other works contain 
Clement's 'esoteric' teaching, in vhich he strives to achieve an 
acceptable synthesis betveen Christianity and the higher forms of 
Hellenism. 5 In the Apologists, apart from Athenagoras, Greek culture 
is regarded as something alien to the Christian· faith, even if this 
separation is not carried through in practice. But in Clement, 
although he can be extremely critical of Greek thought and especially 
of the Greek laxity of morals, there is an open attempt to bring the 
Greek mind and the Christian faith into harmony. It is because of 
this that he has been called the first Christian thinker to contribute 
meaningfully to the rapprochement of Christianity with Hellenism and 
classical philosophy.6 It is this synthesis that we need to analyse 
in order to understand the dynamiCS at work and to assess its lasting 
value. 
(4) op. cit. pp. 225f. cf. also E.F. Osborn: The Philosophy of 
Clement of Alexandria (CUP,1957), p. 54, and Jaeger, op. cit. 
p. 133, n. 29. 
(5) cf. Witt, op. cit . p. 199. 
(6) cf. Osborn, op. cit. p. 122, and Witt, op. cit. p. 195. 
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But this is no easy task. Clementls ~itings are 
perplexing and present many difficulties to his readers and especially 
to his critics. Firstly Clementls practical concern, Yhich is 
alYays his first priority even yhen he is at his most mystical, 
tends to obscure the theological issues lying behind it. But 
more than this, Clement himself even claims to be Yriting in order 
to confuse the uninitiated reader.? At times one seriously yonders 
yhether this confusion is not so much in order to confuse the reader, 
but to hide Clementls 0 n .confusions. Clement's intentions expressed 
in his 'programmatic statements I certainly do not appear to have been 
fulfilled. S But this attempt to hide his real meaning, so characteristic 
of the Gnostic attitude, gives yay to a more serious consideration. 
Osborn claims that Clement's methodology is 'multi-systematic'. 
'He will give several different solutions to a specific problem and 
not indicate an exclusive preference for any.19 This is probably 
a deliberate attempt to accurately reflect all that is good in his 
eclectic background. In this transitionary stage in the history of 
both pagan and Christian thought, Clement is not the person to rise 
above his background to give the world a new system or direction. 
He rather presents both the fragmentation of eclectic Middle-Platonism 
and the fragile nature of the emergent Christian theology. Osborn 
concludes: 
The answer to the riddle is that Clement is at once 
breaking up old systems and creating a neY synthesis. 
The disconnected style and thought of the Stromateis 
deny old connections and the autonomy of old systems.10 
(7) i.e. Strom. I, 1(359,70SA). 
(S) cf. R.P. Casey: "Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of 
Christian Platonism", HTR, lS (1925), p. 46. 
(9) op. cit. p. 90 
(10) ibid. p. 13. 
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It is this that renders the critic's task almost impossible. Hoy 
in this rambling jungle of ideas is one to find out Yhat Clement 
himself thought? This aspect of Clement Yill make us most suspicious 
of clear-cut anSYers and rigid systematisations of his thought. 
We must rather attempt to submerge ourselves in his problems in order 
to understand his difficulties and some of his partial ansyers. 
Because of the difficulties surrounding us on all Sides, this chapter 
has to keep fairly ruthlessly to the point, ignoring large sections 
of Clement's thought Yhich could be relevant. Thus ye cannot 
consider the nature of Clement's ethics, yhich Yould have a definite 
bearing on all aspects of his thought, nor can ye deal explicitly \lith 
Clement's relations yith the mystery religions and Gnosticism, both 
of yhich yould probably shed much light on Clement's attitude 
toyards philosophy. But despite these limitations, the narroy 
preoccupation yith Clement's Logos theology and the incarnation does 
seem to yield positive results. 
(2) The Doctrine of God: 
Clement's doctrine of God is mainly derived from the Middle-Platonic 
tradition, but there is abundant evidence in his Yritings of the 
emergence of Neo-Platonism. And so in this section we will be 
concerned with eXamining this development and how it influences 
some aspects of the rest of his thought. ll 
Once again it is the transcendence of God Yhich is the focus of 
interest. The Greek suspicion of anthropomorphism is taken up, and 
Clement is very emphatiC that God has no human shape and is devoid 
of every human quality: 
(11) A large part of Yhat folloys has been taken from S.R.C. 
Lilla: Clement of Akexandria, A Study in Christian Platonism 
and Gnosticism (OUP,1971), pp. 212-226. 
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Wherefore let no one imagine that hands, 
are said by the Hebrws to be attributes 
and feet ••• 
12 
of God • 
. This naturally leads to the more general statement that God is 
'above both space and time, and qualities of objects' (~1S ~~ 
d~dOV:rv't"'; iJ"~(;l toS ).13 So far we have mentioned nothing that is 
not found in similar form in Middle-Platonism, but Clement also says 
that God is even 'beyond the one, and above the Monad itself' 
) - I ~ <I \ ~ \ ), I ~ 14 ( <!oil E-,,_':W(j. 1:N HOS t.,p.,l lJill:P ",,,tl" t""NJIi) • This appears to be 
a development on Philo, who Yrites: 
The "one" and the "monad" are, therefore, the only 
standard for determining the category to which God 
belongs. Father we should say, the One God is the sole 
standard for the "monad".15 
R.P. Casey follows Inge in speculating that it is significant that 
') ( _I "I ) I 
Clement does not use the formula E-"~tLn"cI. '\oL6,\~ "IS <N 6loLS , 
which we find in Middle-Platonism, Justin and in Athanasius.16 
) I 
He deduces from this that Clement regarded God as having "".lo! and 
therefore that this is a point of contrast with Neo-Platonism. This 
, I 
argument is defective and while Clement may seem to ascribe c:N61.cl to 
God, this is not to be taken in the sense that God shares in the 
~,~ of the world, and indeed might \oIell not really be ascribing 
any kind of ;:,,{jJ. to God.17 The real differences beween Clement 
(12) Strom. V, 11(262,1048). cf. Philo: De Sacr. Ab. et Caini 96 
and De Somniis 1.235, and also Albinus: Did. 10. 
(13) Strom. II, 2(4,937A). cf. Philo: De Post. C. 2.7 and 5.14. 
(14) Pd. I, 8(161,336A). 
(15) 'c9' "cl I o !-"S ~~oL ~o e-v KPLl 
\ ," I 
' ..... e.l. 7:N t-vrJ,. Sc-c..t. 
(16) Ope cit. pp. 74-78. For this question cf. below, p. 135f. 
(17) cf. belo\ol, po 103 and Strom. II, 2(4, 936Af) where God is 
-.(')1 , )) I 
described as 1I0f'fw ~I:-V .... c tr\J~d-V 
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and Nee-Platonism are set out by Lilla. lS He notes two main 
differences between Clement and Plotinus: (1) Clement's God is a 
VeNS comprehending the ideas in himself, 19 whereas in Plotinus God 
is above the v~~ ;20 (2) God in Clement ·has thought, whereas in 
Plotinus God is beyond 'noetical activity,.21 These differences 
tend to modify Clement's Nee-Platonism in the direction of Plato's 
Timaeus, but despite these modifications Clement can be seen to 
represent a stage of the development between Albinus and Plotinus.22 
When we move on to the issue of the knowability of God, a similar 
pattern is discernible. As in Justin, God cannot have a name, and 
is ineffable. 23 God is aloof and 'difficult ·to reach,.24 God 
is not comprehensible by human intellect.25 In this Clement appears 
to be following Philo. The Neo-Platonic development of this is 
discernible in the follOWing: 
(IS) op. cit. pp. 22lf. 
n g I ) J. '" .., J'~ (19) cf. Strom. IV, 25(212,1364C): Y<NS Xv..lFci. , I-w-.! , V6\lS 
( &I-~~ 0 • 
(20) cf. Enn. V.l.S(6-7). 
(21) cf. Enn. V.3.13(35-36) • 
(22) cf. Osborn, op. cit. p. 26, and R.E. Witt, op. cit. pp. 197f. 
(23) cf. Strom. V, 12(270,12lAf). Here the influence of Parm. 
may be discernible. cf. also Origen: Contra Celsus VT.65 
and Hippolytus: 
and J& rd-tO) 
)'H Ref.6.20. For Clement's use of ol~r~coS 
cf. Danielou, op. cit. p. 332. 
(24) cf. Strom. V, 12(267,116B) and the quote there of Tim. 2Sc. 
cf. also Albinus: Did. 10(164.15-16) and Parm. 13Sa. 
(25) cf. Strom. II, 2(4,936B): 'God is not to be known by human 
wisdom' (~ ,,"ott- ~.&(' ... ;\i~v~ 60~(ct:·~V"':'6bl1 '~6c9t"..l) j and 
142a 
Strom. IV, 25(212,1365A): ' 'God, then being not a subject for 
, _," 
demonstration, cannot be the obj ect of science' ( ••• 6("c;." 00 hl"'C':'~ 
)\ ») - I 
WY , ~K €-6t'" f-""'ll"O""lI..oS). 
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••• we may reach somehow to the conception of the 
Almighty knowing not 10Ihat he is, but what he 
(
",) c\{"I) , OVX 0 ~t:L'I , 0 <I~ t, (,-b'tL ~ VvJt 6<1..VU-S is not ).26 
This via negativa is, however, only one side of the picture. In 
Strom. II, 2, where we find the statement that 'God is not to be 
known by human wisdom', there is a clear indication that God is to 
be known by his own Wisdom. In addition Clement uses the general 
Platonic epistemology: 
For bound in this earthly body, we apprehend the objects 
of sense by means of the body; but we grasp intellectual 
..... ('I 
obj ects by means of the logical faculty itself ( ?....>-I Ci~ 
v0'i~~ $ .. ' Cl..0t~S ~1S ,,~,,(.ql ~cLi1~~rf-A:l Ju+~S ).27 
This theory, uhich ue noted to be the essence of Middle-Platonism,28 
is used as the basis for a doctrine of revelation by the simple step 
of identifying God uith the supreme intellectual object,29 uhich 
is knouable by the gnostic's purified reason. Corresponding to the 
Platonic epistemology, his thought also reflects the Platonic 
anthropology: 
••• the soul consists of three divisions; the intellect 
(?~ VOI:-P'N), which is called the reasoning faculty 
C f>\ \1 I ~ ~ (0 cJ'i AOb"~' I<"IN Kook (--). 't .. , ), is the inner man 
uhich is the ruler of this man that is seen. And that 
'l \ ('I'''' C"'I 
one, in another respect, God guides (d..u t.<N 0(,- I:-tl..nVtN 
t'A.'A.ws ~dh ~ 6l(-~.! ). 
As ue have hinted, this anthropology is used to describe the 
gnostics, who have their intellects illumined so that they can 
() ..... 
paradoxically be 'the Gnostics of the unknown' (0' I:v 't'" 
... 
(26) Strom. V, 1l(264,109A). cf. also J. Kaye: Some Account of the 
Writings and Opinions of Clement of Alexandria (London, no 
date given), p. 190. 
(27) Strom. V, 1(224,16Cf). 
(28) cf. above, p 
(29) C' ) ';' cf. Strom. IV, 25(215,1372B): '1 J oll.) \ _, _ ,_ C.l 
1\°0 l ""'" Kd-I. I'.~< <: < I<.4V ~ 0 " ~ • 
> , 
, (~)(''1 ) 
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) , , 30 ".~ v~6't'" aV..:>n.\1oI.U1). In this section Clement stresses that the 
gnostic's knoYledge is by faith. Indeed 'There is no knovledge 
)/,' ~ ,,\ 'I C 
without faith, nor faith without knowledge' ( """I cI~ O\lU; ~ 
,... y _ ' "/\ \, I . " I \ ~vw&lS o(vhl ',,6\:~~S I O\)C' 1 ii\cl:l\ <l.,VC'\J a"jJ"~S). This adaptation 
of the Platonic epistemology is also revealed in the theological 
language of grace as follows: 
It remains that ve understand, then, the Unknown, by 
divine grace (&<-4 XJfl'~.L)' and by the vord alone 
(rfsv"2 'Co.? il<l.~1 ",3tci:S ,,~~) that proceeds from Him.31 
From this cursory glance at this problem in Clement, there appear to 
be three strands of thought. The first is the Neo-Platonic adaptation 
of the Middle-Platonic ·doctrine of God,32 vhich tends to render God 
absolutely remote and unknowable. The second is the Middle-Platonic 
I "" idea that God can be knoYn Al-UVW t..., vw. 
f \. " ... 
It would seem that 
these two have been synthesised by saying that God is unknoyable 
only to unregenerate human Yisdom, and that, Yhen Ye speak about the 
I ,,", 
1>..cN"Y» (w vvJ, ye are really speaking about the mind led by grace r - \. Co " 
and by the Word from God. This strand of faith and grace, as the basis 
for revelation, is the third strand Yhich unites the seemingly 
(30) 
(31) 
(32) 
Strom. V, 1(220,9B) • cf. Danielou, op. cit. p. 338. 
Strom. V, 12(270,124A). 
cf. Witt, op. cit. p. 197, 1olho maintains that the via negativa 
originates in Middle-Platonism. He cites Albinus: Did. 
10(165.5) as an example. There God is described as 
:V, ( r' ) \ '"' "' I >''1 iCtbS oI.rr'1eo~ cI E-6tl r.u.~ ~~ "'f "IN";!,, and then Albinus continues 
. ll~ ·"'" 
with a ser~es of negations, """e ... <Nt:~ ... """tE- .... 
This is undoubtedly evidence of a via negativa, but it is the 
, " .... 
really Platonic interpretation of the }4.Nw tw Vw which / \,. (. .. 
falls avay in Neo-Platonism. 
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opposed first tvo. But even in this schematization ve can see 
hoy Clement has a foot in every camp. Not alvays is he consistent. 
He can in one instance state the one point of viev vithout the others. 
This makes it very difficult to come to terms vith his thought. 
This subject vi11 be taken up in more detail in our next section. 
There is another perhaps more philosophical element in Clement's 
thought. He follovs Philo a distinction betveen the 
'essence' and the 'pover of 
in draW'ing 
God:)) 
"I am a God that draW's near", says the Lord. He. is 
( _/>(. , ) '\ I in essence remote .oFf"" /IAW ~~ <N6"~" ) ••• but 
He is very near in virtue of that poyer vhich holds all 
),.. I r' ~ I ~ , , 
things in its embrace (<;<l5\)~.~..J "~""Vd-f'-h 1 t..l \ld.V<.(j.. 
C:~ ... el<.~~".6oI-L ) .34 
We viII later shov hoW' such a distinction probably is not only 
conditioned by the need for revelation, but even more importantly 
by the problem of having to relate 'the One' to 'the Many' .35 
Important for us here, hoW'ever, is not thiS, but the evidence of the 
problem of God's remoteness, and indeed hoy this remoteness necessitates 
the doctrine of the Logos. It may just be because of Clement's 
diffuseness and rambling methodology that the remoteness of God does 
not, as in Justin, tend to lose God altogether, so that the doctrine 
of God tends to reduce to the doctrine of the Logos. This may be, 
but on the other hand Clement does not seem to divide the remoteness 
and the immanence of God so clearly betveen God and the Logos, nor 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
\1 ("\c.I ,) I ~ > \ 
cf. De Post. C. 6.20: ..... IHal..L <l O'tL I<. ... L ~05\1C"';::ck 0 o/I.>1:oS 
')\, I ') 
""" I'd..L r"'/'""" ~"'-~"" cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, 
) ) I 
p. 335, and also cf. above, p for hoW' 1<.01.1; <Ntnd.v 
and ~~ f~v'f<v appear to be synonymous in earlier times. 
)1 L Strom. II, 2(4,936Af). Here the 1 should probably be ~ • 
This is the only yay any grammatical sense can be obtained, 
cf. M1gne 936Bf, n. 20. 
cf. belov, p . " 
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does he describe God almost totally as the source of the Logos. 
And so, yhile the Logos is for Clement God in his immanence, he gives 
a much more important place to God as such. 
One such place is in his doctrine of creation. There is not as 
much evidence for Clement's thought on this issue as one might like, 
and that yhich ye have involves some tricky exegesis. But before 
ve begin thiS, it does seem fairly clear that ClementIa thought about 
creation is in conscious opposition to the Gnostic dualism,36 This 
is especially manifest in his treatment of the problem of evil. 
Rejecting dualism he Yrites: 
But nothing exists, the cause of yhose existence is 
not supplied by God. 37 
By this Clement undercuts any radical dualism and especially a 
dualism yhich connects the ~, yith evil. This last point is 
brought out in all Clement's lectures on morality, although it is 
somevhat undermined by his more Gnostic passages.38 But in this 
particular quote Clement cannot be said to be really speaking about 
a creation ex nihilo. God could easily be the cause of the being 
\ ) I ..... ~ t./. ('tl" olL't.C"'-'" -e"" hV<l.l) of something created from the 1.)}.1' 
In another passage describing the relationship of God and the 
vorld, Clement writes: 
But God has no natural relation to us, as the authors 
of the heresies vill have it; neither on the supposition 
) \ >, 
of His having made us out of nothing (h:. r, <N~~), 
nor on that of having formed us out of matter (~~ ~~15 ), 
(36) cf. W.E.G. Floyd: 'Ciement of Alexandria's Treatment of the 
Problem of Evil (OUP,1971), pp. 1-4. 
(37) · Pd. I, 8(155,3258). 
(38) cf. beloy, pp. l24f. 
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\' , r) 
since the former did not exist at all (1:0 rt-V (NO 
'1\ )/ O""'S 0>1), and the latter is totally distinct from 
God, unless ve shall dare to say that ve are a part of 
Him, and of the same essence as God.39 
This is very interesting, because he does not attack 'the authors of 
the heresies' by refuting the idea of the 'I). . u , and developing a 
doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. In actual fact Clement's argument 
is defective since the point he vishes to defend, namely that 'God 
has no natural relation to us', finds its vay into his final statement: 
'unless ve shall dare to say that we are a part of Him'. If ve 
"I 
care to adopt this position and the doctrine of the .... )., as a Gnostic 
emanation, Clement has not touched us. But nevertheless, this 
~ \ 
passage is interesting in that it shows that Clement equated b~t'1 
In other vords, 
he has not separated the absolute and relative use of the negatives. 
But again this quote has nothing to say about creatio ex nihilo. 
Another ?assage is claimed by Floyd as evidence for a belief in 
creatio ex nihilo. Here the reference to the ';!kj occurs in the 
context of a polemic against idolatory of a gross sexual form. He 
vrites: 
Matter always needs art to fashion it, but the deity 
. ')('\ '/~ (.(/ ,.., / 
needs ~othll1g (~()~IS ""n lIot~ "\ 0\1 'tIC, <E-X"'1 S1 ~ 
SH\~ t f:- ht-vc:!' 6-1 S ).40 I 
But this says nothing about the origin of the 'u'}.,. It is therefore 
also useless for our purposes. 
Apparently the only other evidence is the following: 
(39) Strom. II, 16(44,1012C). 
(40) Protr.4(61,153B). 
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But the philosophers, the Stoics, and Plato, •••• 
suppose the existence of matter among the first principles 
(, (_ Il\ ,~ ) ,., ( •.• \h'i" "~o't .. C;fhl~ ••• '->I \: ...... ~ o.rxG.LI); and not 
)' ~\ I 1 I 
one first principle (<N~. c:J1:- )"-IJJ->I 'l.pXj" ). Let them 
kno~ that vhat is called matter by them, is said by them 
to be vi thout quality, and vi thout form (~\;"'" eN ll-<l-l 
'> I o(.6~'V"<>l1:'''1:''''') and more daringly said by Plato to be 
, V 
non-existence (r'l 0'1 ). . And does he not say very 
mystically, kno~g that the true and real first cause 
is one (r',~" ~1" t~s :J6 .... " ~PX~" ~!.lS), in 
these very vords ••• 
This is a marvellous piece of argumentation since he attacks an 
opinion held by Plato be appealing to Plato. He rejects the idea 
(/, '> I 
that the V~~ is an ~X~ on the grounds that there is only one true 
) I ')I 
~Xl ' vhich vou1d presumable be described as ~~r~~S. But the 
question cannot rest here, because Clement apparently rejects Plato'S 
vie~ of the ~>-'l being an ~fX1 by saying that something vhich has 
. \ )/ 
non-bel.l1g <t-1 IN ) cannot be eternal. While Clement might be trying 
to point out the inconsistancy in the Platonic view, and vhi1e he 
\ )/ ) )/ 
may be interpreting 1"1 <N in the sense of a-JII.. ~ , his rej ection 
of the Platonic vie~ cannot hold vater, since all he does to reject 
it is to state it again, agreeing ~ith the position of Gen. 1.2. 
This is very similar to the argumentation analysed above . Later 
in the same chapter he vrites, quoting Plato indirectly: 
••• he not only sho~ed that the universe ~as created 
(tv'l~W), but points out that it =s generated by 
him as a son, and that he is called its father, as 
deriving its existence from him alone, and springing 
t ~) I I \~ from non-existence (wS dov e-K. fJNrN ~tv0i'"I:VN ......... l el-l.. 
\)/ '--... I r\ Nto~ v\\o6~\lto)). The Stoics, too, held the 
vie~ that the vorld vas created.42 
(41) Strom. V, 14(274,132A). 
(42) (276,136B). 
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From this we can deduce that Clement has not grasped the issues at 
stake. He approves of the Platonic theory but tal<;es exception at the 
~ '). I 1 being and Ol.rXI • We must therefore disagree with Floyd that 
Clement had any doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This may seem a 
little strange in the light of Clement's rej ection of the ~\\ being 
) / 
an '1X.~ and his treatment of the problem of evil, but there is just 
no clarity in Clement on this issue. But at the same time, Photius's 
)/ q\ 
claim that Clement taught that the u~1 was d.xro-ltN , is unsubstant-
iated by the evidence available to us.43 
Only one further issue need be mentioned in this section. Since 
) I 
God is the d..r~1 of 
) r I 
he is OlV~()""1 ~ and 
all things and the only self-existing entity, 
~iI~S~~.44 A lot of other predicates typical 
of the deity of the Greek philosophical world are used, but it is 
, ~l. 
God's ot\t~ which has the most influence on Clement. God's 
) . l\ I d"~hcl. is absolute since he is in need of nothing and cannot be 
influenced by anything other than himself.45 The notion of suffering 
is completely incompatible with the Deity. Clement's use of the 
negative attributes are part of the continual process of avoiding 
the Stoic cosmology. This particular attribute of God is important 
in its own right and becomes of immense Significance when it is 
carried over into Clement's thought on the Christian life. Here 
it provokes tensions in Clement's Christology and consequently in his 
soteriology.46 
(43) cf. (MB,45D). 
(44) cf. R.M. Grant: The Early Christian Concept of God (Charlottes-
ville,1966), pp. 111-114. For this in Justin cf. I Apol. 25.2 
(28,365B), II Apol. 1.2(71,44lA) and Dial. 124(257,765B); and 
also Irenaeus: Adv. Haer. II.17.7(M7,764B). 
(45) cf. Strom. VII, 6(426,440B) and (428,444A). 
(46) cf. below, pp. 125ff. 
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(3) The Doctrine of the Logos: 
(a) The Logos and God: 
Before beginning the investigation as such, it is as ~ell to note 
that Clement's thought seems to move on "hro levels. The first is 
the level of practical faith and experience. Here the doctrine of 
God is deduced from his experience of faith both in his personal 
communion ~ith the Logos 'in Christ' and through his participation in 
the on going traditional life of the Church. The other level is more 
philosophical, and here ~e see ho~ his thought on the Logos has been 
influenced by his acceptance of a particular idea of God. In actual 
fact, of course, Clement did not distinguish bet~een these t~o factors, 
but the tension be~een them explains a lot of the diversity in his 
thought. 
On the philosophical side of his thought, Clement appears to have 
been ~ell a~are of the problem of the relationship bet~een 'the One' 
and 'the Many' • To this problem he finds the Logos to be a partial 
anwer. For instance he writes: 
••• all the po~ers of the Spirit, becoming collectively 
one thing, terminate in the same point - that is, 
in the Son ••• And the Son is neither simply one thing as 
one thing, nor many things as parts, but one thing as 
all things; ~hence also He is all things. For He is 
the circle of all po~ers rolled and united into one 
unity.47 
In this ~ay the functions of the second bypostasis of Middle and 
Neo-platonism (~v~S as distinct from cb ,&" ) are taken up in the 
Son. The problem is solved by the Son being both one and many at 
the same time.48 But since this merely pushes the problem back one 
(47) Strom. IV, 25(212,1365A). 
(48) cf. Osborn, op. cit. pp. 4lff. 
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stage, in that it does not explain \/hy God himself cannot have such 
contradictory attributes, this solution sho\/s that Clement regarded 
the problem to be insoluble.49 
') , 
On a slightly different tack, Clement can call the Logos the l;-c .... wJ 
f\~ , , , " .. , ~ 
Ct. uv , who is the 'genuine Son of Mind' (~L . ,ho ~ ~N ,,,I\) 
I ) 50 aV,,\6l0~ • Clement has thus not completely adopted the Nee-
Platonic triad. The Logos is also identified Yith the Platonic 
world of ideas. In Clement the powers are closely associated \lith the 
Platonic forms, uhich come to be unified in the Son. But the Logos 
is also the first idea and, as Tollinton puts it: 'His agency is a 
necessary condition for all process and all becoming,.51 This 
thought is also influenced by the problem of 'the One' ~~d 'the Many': 
••• and amongst intellectual ideas, ~lhat is oldest in 
origin, the timeless (J!XfcNW ) and unoriginate 
First Principle (~\(tl.~XOO ~fX1~)' and Beginning of . 
existences (~""'fX~" t.:J.J ~'tW>l ) - the Son -
from whom we learn the remoter Cause.53 
HO\lever, \lhen Clement describes the relationship between God and the 
Logos, he often shows himself to have been influenced by the Wisdom 
tradition. Quoting Prov. 8.30 he writes that the Logos, Who is also 
I 
Wisdom, is 'the counsellor ('u ~ ~<N~"" ) of the Father "in which" 
the Sovereign God "delighted'"" and he is the 'power of God' and 'the 
Father's most ancient Word before the production of all things 
y _ \ I '"" I I AI - I (.J,Cf: 11ft> ihLI/t'W>I 'CWoI '5t->10tI-VIoX ~fX:lII..W=OS I\'()o~ "'~ Iltl-t(0')J and 
His Wisdom' .54 
(49) ibid. p. 60. 
(50) Frotr. IO(91,2l2C). 
(51) op. cit. i, p. 339. 
(52) This is a misprint for ~V"'f.xN ~eA1V . cf. Wolfson: 
The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, p. 206. 
(53) Strom. VII, l(407,404C). 
(54) Strom. VII, 2(4ll,412A). cf. also Strom. VI, 7(337,28OBf) 
and Kaye, op. cit. p.197. 
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Precisely vhich theory of the generation of the Logos Clement 
adopted is a matter of some controversy. This controversy can 
once again be seen to be due to Clement's methodology. Many passages 
in Clement seem to reflect either a one-stage theory or an eternal 
generation of the Logos. 55 Some of these have already been mentioned 
or quoted above. Wolfson systematically examines these statements 
and argues that they do not necessarily imply a one-stage theory, 
but in his exegesis he seems to be a little too rigorous. He 
concludes that 'there is no evidence to prove a belief in the 
single stage theorY',56 but ve vould like to conclude that elements 
of a belief in the eternal existence of the Logos are present although 
they are not developed 
the idea of the >-~O"C:; 
into a detailed theory. Clement does reject 
U-~'4cf"'-~S, 57 but in many instances seems 
to indicate that he really does accept this theory of the origin of 
the Logos. In one instance Clement uses the almost t echnical 
it~,,~~: 
Nov the lford issuing forth ('iir (-).. Ei • .;J) was the 
cause of creation; then also he generated himself 
"when the Word had become flesh", that he might be 
seen. 58 
Other evidence brought forward by Wolfson is the apparent distinction 
between N~) and "~o~ .59 In this he discerns a similarity with 
Philo, who apparently regarded N~ 5 as the equivalent of the 
(55) cf. Wolfson, Ope cit. p. 204ff. 
(56) ibid. p. 207. 
(57) cf. Strom. V, 1(224,16B), and Witt, OPe cit. pp. 199f. 
(58) Strom. V, 3(230,33A). 
(59) cf. Protr. lO(9l,212Cf), and Wolfson, Ope cit. pp. 209ff. 
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~) 'l-vS~.{&€-t.os.. While this is possible a definite conclusion, 
which Wolfson makes, seems rather to force the issue, since there is 
no definite proof that Clement had firmly identified God described 
as NoGs with the ~~¢o~ ~""JJ6}~S. Other evidence has been brought 
forward from Photius's reporting of the Hypotyposes. 60 Here there 
appears to be a definite distinction between the Logos as Son and 
the 'paternal Logos' ('r~ ",f-tP,~ ~~'::?), 61 and there is also 
reference to 'a kind of emanation (q."O~~ <.(j..) of his Logos that 
~ I 
became reason' (VIN ~ '(/'/() t-I:Vo~) • This is undoubtedly the two-
stage theory. But how much weight are we to give to this evidence? 
As always with Clement, it is incorrect to try to weigh text against 
text with a view to getting one consistent picture. This just does 
not work. And so Ye get no really clear picture of Clement's use 
I '<;,/~ I 
of the ~.~C>~ ~V()vO- t-~S flir o~c fl¥-or, schema, except perhaps that 
formally he rejected it Yhile in actual fact, elements of it remain 
in his thought. 
We also find other descriptions characteristic of the same type of 
~I $.. I I I 
thought. The Logos is a duVoI.)-'-l) h141 or '"~l''' uill-f l<.06f"LO~ 
I ' I 62 
and iio.1:f"',\ hS i:VI-f~hCl.., and in this regard Clement seems to 
echo the qualifications of both Tatian and Justin: 
For the Son of God ' never leaves his own place of view, 
1 C. I ) 
not being divided nor severed (av rl-f' I "ft:-vo~, iN 1'-
~"O t"'-l'"v~"oS), not passing from place to place, but 
being at all times in all places and in no respect 
Circumscribed, completely tJ~S , completely light of 
the Father. To this the paternal Logos, all the hosts 
of angels and of gods is subordinate. 63 
(60) cf. R.P. Casey: "Clement and the Two Divine Logoi", JTS, 
25(1923), pp. 43ff . 
(61) (MS ,48A) • 
(62) cf. Tollinton, OPe cit. i, p. 349f, and Kaye, OPe cit. p. 198. 
(63) Strom. VII, 2(409,408Cf). This abbreviated translation is from 
Witt, Ope cit. p. 200. 
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This quote is actually important evidence against the t~o-stage 
theory, especially in the light of the phrase 'the paternal Logos' 
" !\~l:r"\<.~), wich is evidently not used in the sense 
b.vJL<~ .. ~(:-t(N. But this does not mean that Clement 
could not use it in that sense in the other passage mentioned above. 
There is one passage, of some~hat doubtful authenticity, ~hich clearly 
reflects the true beginnings of the theory of eternal generation: 
Cum enim dicit quod erat ab initio, generation em 
tang it sine principio Filii cum Patre simul exstantis; 
erat ergo Verbum aeternitatis significativum non 
habentis initium ••• 64 
As Wolfson, ~ites, it is possible that this has been ~itten by 
Cassiodorus rather than Clement, or Clement may have come under the 
influence of Origen late in life. 65 
In all of this ~e see ho~ Clement never comes firmly do~ on anyone 
side. He represents all positions from the ~o-stage theory to 
the one-stage, and even perhaps eternal generation. He can use 
emanantist together ~ith Plotinian language. But despite these 
uncertainties there can be no doubt that Clement regarded the Logos 
as God. He like Athemagoras is fond of the Johannine reciprocity: 
For the Son is in him (the Father)and the Father is 
in the Son.66 
This language is used in one instance in a significant manner. 
'", -)/ 
Clement =ites that 'He, ~ho is in Him ~ho truly is (0 N t<f <Ntc. 
" 67 UN) has appeared'. Here the implication is that the Logos does 
(64) Ad. in Epist. I Jo. 1.1(M9,734D), cf. also 755A 
(65) op. cit. p. 216f. 
(66) Pd. I, 7(149,312Cf). cf. also Pd. I, 5(130,277C) and Kaye, 
op. cit. p. 196, n. 2. Note the interchangeablity of the 
, d - I ~v an 'ICOS, cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, p. 344. 
(67) Protr. 1(22,61C). 
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not have true existence. But in many places the Son or the Logos 
is directly described as God,68 as 'the divine Word' (~ er:o,) 
I <. I 
l\oboS ), and 'He that is most manifest Deity' (0 ~\Ie-f"'~"'"t'oS 
'h'tw~ ()"..!,S). 69 Perhaps the strongest assertion of the full 
divinity of 
easily be a 
the Logos is the following, Yhich in other authors could 
I ) ~/f\ 
description of the }..o().~ HClC",()'f-tI!>S: 
But ye speak in this yay about the Word Yho is God in 
God, yho is said to be 'in 
inseparable (J S~ 6 'tdo- t..OS 
one God.70 
the bosom of the Father', 
), indivisible (at ~f"toS). 
There is however once again no certainty that Clement Yrote this, 
although it is a strong possibility.71 And so, while there are 
uncertainties and ambiguities in Clement, ye have found no evidence 
to support Photius's accusation that Clement brought doYn 'the Son 
to the level of a creature' (~S 1<.'t~"r).72 
To conclude this section Ye must mention Clement's belief in some 
{' kind of a Trinity. There is one explicit referenc e to o.~"-,, 
- I r 73 74 \ ~"t!-dc/.. , where the background is the famous Platonic statement. 
r" .., ~ '-(68) cf. Pd. I, 2(115,2520), where the Logos is C1(-o~ H c/..v~"'''\.,,;) 
I " ~\ - '" 6Xjf-O-tl ; Pd. I, 7(151,316Bf): oL~LOS -oS ..L~b(NS ; 
J"I\ v l' It. ')/ Pd. I, 6(131, 280C) : ... <:7{."<101 ""w". eN ~~ /",L-" I wv 'ClS t-..: ~ 
~.N I\~~~ ; and the comprehensive list in Kaye, op. cit. 
p. 196, n. 1. 
(69) Protr. 10(98f,228Af). 
(70) Exc. ex Theod. 8(M9,657C). 1 S' Is '" I>b'td-toS another misprint? 
(71) cf. Tollinton, op. cit. i, p. 344. 
(72) (M8,45D) • 
(73) Strom. V, 14(282,156B). 
(74) II Epistle, 312e. 
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In one instance the Trinity seems to have a fourth member in the 
Virgin Mother, who apparently represents the Church.75 As in our 
previous authors, there is considerable vagueness over the identity 
and nature of the Holy Spirit.76 While there is no doubt that 
Clement knew of the Spirit, and that he had some idea of the special 
work of the Spirit, there is no clear demarcation between the Logos 
and the Spirit. This problem is clearly a result of Middle-
Platonism, where there is no need for two intermediaries. In the 
following, which could have been written about Justin, Tollinton 
writes: 
••• there is no place left in Clement's system for a 
Third Person, because every office that has been assigned 
to Him is so fully discharged by the Logos.77 
There is a possibility that Clement regarded the Spirit as a deified 
Platonic world-soul, but there is no real evidence to support this 
view other than the Platonic analogy.78 There is thus no real doctrime 
of the Trinity, nor does Clement show any interest in it. 
(b) Christianity and Philosophy:79 
-In a previous section we mentioned one of the points to which we 
must now pay special attention. This was Clement's adaptation of 
I '\ "" 
of the Middle-Platonic tlN"i! 't't' ""2 • In this regard Clement can 
perhaps be best understood as a development on Justin, although 
there does not appear to be any reason to suggest that there is any 
(75) Pd. I, 6(142,300B). 
p. 195, n. 1. 
(76) cf. ibid. p. 208. 
(77) op. cit. i, pp. 359f. 
For other references cf. Kaye, op. cit. 
(78) This is hinted at by C. Brigg: The Christia'l Platonists of 
Alexandria (OUP,1968), p. 101. 
(79) For this cf. Dani~lou, op. cit. pp. 48-73. 
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direct connection between the two. In Justin's I Apol. we found 
that knowledge of God by the pagan philosopher was a real possibility, 
but in the Dialogue this position is charply criticised. This 
leaves Justin expressing an extremely critical attitude to philosophy 
and stressing the absolute priority of revelation. This leaves us 
, """ \ I 
with the doctrine of the (, iI~r~ 1:'"" "'(}c.1'O , but does not alloY 
philosophers independent knowledge of God. What Clement does is 
to establish a compromise position by retaining the Middle-Platonic 
'"' " 1'w vw, while at the same time stressing the necessity of revelation. 
L ~ 
As is his wont, Clement approaches the problem from many different 
viewpoints and nowhere expresses what can be taken as a definitive 
answer. Philosophy is admitted to have real value, and its approxima-
I 
tion (~~~"~WV.~) to the truth is derived from several sources. 
Clement distinguishes between a 'general' and a 'speCial' revelation 
by appealing to the Stoic/Middle-Platonic theory of the 
"tVVIS\rj.. or t<-a\V~.s v~ ~ : 80 
)/ 
For there wa~lways a natural manifestation (~/,,~,j.6\.S 
••• ~u ~ Il.;) of the one Almighty God, among all right 
thinking men; and the most, who had not quite divested 
themselves of shame with respect to the truth, apprehended 
the eternal beneficence in divine providence. 81 
The mind, which enables man to catch glimmerings of the truth, is ) I" . 82 
'infused (e-vc-6"t.tlXO'll-l) into Man at his creation'. This gives the 
;(.t,\V6S v~S a connection with the t?lv..~ ~.::; Sl-~. This is all 
fairly similar to the theories of Justin,83 and the following 
reflects a similar qualification as that of Justin to the theory: 
(80) cf. Strom. I, 19(415,8098), and Strom. V, 14(298,197A) where 
the ~vvV\<J.. is shown to be identicle with the "r6)"~~S • 
(81) Strom. V, 13(273,128C). 
(82) Strom. VII, 2(411,4128). cf. also Protr. 6(70,173A). 
(83) cf. above, Pp. 37f. 
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The Platonists hold that mind is an effluence of 
~ 'oil ~ divine dispensation in the soul ( ••• "INV ••• i::v fUll 'I 
I I '\ I' c. <. I '\ q c9~~) rC\Fd-S ... iiorf"'clV 1Jiid.(J«(Ni:O... ), and they 
place the soul in the body...... But it is not as 
the Spirit is in each of us 
.J'\\) (/ (,., I>"-o~ c.~ e-0<.6-6t: 'i yw 
The knowledge of the philosophers is also seen to derive from the 
devil or evil demons. 85 This is, of course, not as complimentary as 
\ )/ 
the idea of the ~,,6)\L1 &N6\<A. AB in Justin, the history of 
philosophy is closely aligned with demonic interference.86 Clement 
is, however, more systematic in that he traces philosophy back to 
some Posidonian philosophers who are barbarians and who, in turn, 
derived their knowledge from the Jews.87 This is a more sophisticated 
version of the loan theory than that of Justin and the historical 
proofs of Theophilus. Clement uses this loan theory in both a 
positive and a negative sense. Chadwick maintains that Clement 
gives it an anti-Hellenic force, mBking his use of the theory similar 
to that of Tatian rather than that of Justin.88 This seems to be a 
rather simplistic verdict, since Clement uses it in both senses to 
suit his immediate purpose. An interesting suggestion is that 
Clement's use of the loan theory is a conscious polemic against the 
opposite use of the theory by Celsus,89 although here one must be 
(84) Strom. V, 13(273,129A). 
(85) cf. Strom. I, 16(405,796A). 
(86) cf. Strom. V, 1(226,24Af) • 
(87) cf. Strom. I, 15 (398f ,777Af). 
(88) op. cit. p. 44. 
(89) cf. Lilla, op. cit. pp. 34ff. 
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careful since the theory has a venerable tradition beginning perhaps 
"'i th Philo. 90 
Alongside this historical theory, Clement does allo", that certain 
Greek philosophers are directly inspired,9l and this leads on to the ' 
distinction bet",een the natural kno"'ledge and the revealed kno",ledge. 
While philosophy is al",ays regarded as inferior to the direct 
revelation in the la",,92 and both the la", and the prophets culminate 
in and are fulfilled by Christ, 93 it is still a cl""'&~\L1 and is 
regarded as the equivalent of the la", to the Greeks. 94 But for the 
Christian Clement can, on the one hand say: 
Wherefore since the Word Himself has come to us from 
heaven, "'e need not, I reckon, go any more in search of 
, ) ) L\ -' t'r \1 human learning (t->, ol"""(,W\\ L "'1¥ ••. ,:>,""ol,,~co.l\Ul.V) 
to Athens and the rest of Greece, and to Ionia ••• and the 
",hole "'orld, lIith Athens and Greece, has already become 
the domain of the Word (d!:-61N~ t~ I\~'t). 95 
But, on the other hand, Clement can balance this overridingly negative 
stance by regarding 'philosophy ••• as ••• a stepping to the philosophy 
Yhich is according to Christ·.96 This introductory function of 
philosophy appears to be useful to the gnostic but not to the simple 
believer: 'Philosophy (for the gnostic) is a preparation for theology 
(90) e.g. Quaest. in Gen. 4.152. 
(91) cf. Strom. VI, 17(398f,389Bf) and Protr. 6(7l,176C). 
(92) cf. Strom. I, 5(336,717C) and VI, 5(327, 26lB) • 
(93) cf. Strom. VI, 17(399, 392Bf) and V, 5(238,52B). 
(94) cf. Strom. VI, 8(3~.2,288Cf) , and also VI, 5(326ff, esp. 327,26lB). 
(95) Rrotr. ll(lOO,229A). 
(96) cf. n. 94 above. 
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just as 97 grammar prepared for more advanced study'. Thus Clement 
,.. 
other preparatory instruction' (~'\ s refers 
)/ ol).)..I~ 
to 'philosophy and 
uro it6.uI'~olS ),98 and philosophy can have the function of 
, - , 
seed' (6it-prd. 1\ V~~I~ which is nourishing 'the spiritual 'cast 
into it,.99 But even in this positive use of philosophy Clement 
is careful to stress that the gnostic must only use it as a tool 
and it is not absolute in itself: 
Not preferring to the truth itself what appears plausible, or, 
according to Hellenic reasoning, necessary; but what has 
been spoken by the Lord he accepts as clear and evident, 
100 though concealed from others. 
Philosophy is thus given a positive content, both in itself in the 
Greek world and in the gnostic's search· for God, but in both cases 
Clement stresses that the natural knowledge has to be supplemented 
by revelation. Even while they use their reason, the philosophers 
rely heavily on inspiration and on the revelation passed down 
ultimately from the Jews. But because of demonic interference the 
whole philosophical tradition needs the corrective of Christ, who 
came to be the true philosopher/teacher. It is most interesting 
that philosophy as such is not directly attributed to the Logos, 
but rather to reason implanted into man, and even this needs to be 
judged in the light of the di vin·e Logos.) Clement can use the 
ambiguity of the term, but unlike· Justin,· he avoids using it as an 
apologetic device. lOl By this he escapes the theological dilemma, 
but still gives philosoph~ its due place. It is not a matter of 
reason versus revelation, but of revelation supplemented by reason 
which in turn comes from God. The revelation and reason stay 
(97) cf. Chadwick, op. cit. p. 40, who refers to Philo: Congr. Essid. 
pp. 56ff. passim, and to Albinus. 
(98) Strom. I, 1(358,705A). 
(99) ibid. (359,708A). 
(100) Strom. VI, 9(348f,300A). 
cf. also Lilla, op. cit. 
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stay separate, but are shovn not to be fundamentally opposed to 
each other. In this advance over all the Apologists, Clement is 
shoving hov the debate of revelation versus reason, vhich for most of 
the Apologists vas betveen Christianity versus the pagan philosophy, 
has moved into a debate vhich is domestic to the Church. The Church 
is no longer opposed to the world but attempting to come to terms 
vith the problem of hov to use the sanctified vorld in its midst. 
As vith his appropriation of the Gnostic terminology into his language, 
Clement here shovs himself to be a synthesizer rather than a dialectical 
analyst. 
(c) The Logos and the Salvation of Mankind: 
In this section ve are to follov a particular method of enquiry. 
Initially only the Protrepticos and the Paidagogos are to be examined, 
and after this ve viII proceed to the Stromateis. 
this viII become clear. 
The reason for 
We have already shovn hov the Logos is active in human reason and 
in special revelation, which combine to make up philosophy. 
Philosophy vas a special covenant for the Greeks vhich prepared them 
for the true revelation in Christ. As such it was a vay of salvation 
for the Greeks. But Clement vas emphatic that reason by itself 
could not discover God: 
••• so, had ve not known the Word, and been illuminated 
by Him, ve should have been novise different from fovls 
that are being fed, fattened in darkness, and nourished 
for death. l02 
And in contrast to this, it is through the Logos that man can 
enjoy immortality: 
(101) cf. Strom. I, 9(380,741C) and Pd. I, 13(184,372Af). 
(102) Protr. 11(101,232A). 
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Jesus, yho is eternal, the one great High Priest of the 
one God and of His Father, prays for and exhorts men ••• 
do not only have the advantage of the irrational 
creatures in the possession of reason; for to you of all 
mortals I grant the enjoyment of immortality ... I desire 
to restore you to the original model, that ye may become 
also like me. l03 
The Logos brings salvation to man as the Instructor, the Teacher and 
the Revealor of the 'true gnosis~. He can do this because: 
. I 
The face of God (iif o '",ii..J) is the Word by yhom God is 
7' ~ '~ , r"\. I manifested ('" I.)'t~ 0 """oS) and made knoYn 
\ I· 1 4 (1oUI-I. ~vwr7t-CD.I.). 
It is in the accepting of this revelation that man finds his salvation 
in being made 'also like me'. It is this that is characteristic 
of Clement, and Yhat seems of great significance is the yay in yhich 
this theology of revelation is connected Yith the incarnation. 
None of the above quotes refer to the incarnate Logos. The Paidogogos 
of man is not thought of as incarnate: 
The Logos is like this: he is the Paidagogos Yho is 
the creator of the yorld and of man. l05 
The full implications of this wil~e drawn out later, but noy we 
turn to the Logos as the incarnate Revealor, primarily to examine 
how the two phases of the revealing activity relate. Unlike our 
previous writers, Clement does in a fairly meaningful way relate the 
divine Logos and the man Jesus. 
are equated: 
(103) Protr. 12(108,24lBf). 
(104) . Pd. I, 7(152,320A). 
(105) Pd. III, 12(341,680Af). 
In the folloYing passage the two 
cf. also Strom. VI, 8(343,2890) 
and Kaye, op. cit. p. 198, n. 6. 
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••• our Instructor is like His Father God, ~hose Son 
He is, sinless, blameless, and ~ith a soul devoid of 
~ - & 1 \ l~ I • passion (<>lll.d- ~S ~1" T")\'\v'); God ill the form of man 
r.. \ ) ) A.,/- I (D'~O~ IN <1.11_,I.0.Il''''' 6)(~t<.); stainless, the mini"Ster 
of His Father' s ~ill, the Word ~ho is God (1\1~oc, S<~~), 
who is in the Father, ~ho is at God's right hand, and 
\ . \ "I 1'1. I 106 ~ith the form of God is God (6<.>" IU4. T!'e' 6xr~l C'(-()~). 
. ~ \ , 
Leaving aside the Christological problem implied by the .IV:d-~\S t:i" 
\j>uXl'" just for the moment, 107 ~e note in this quote a most interesting 
f\ \ 'I) t-.. 1- I " .... I 
balancing of C7'-o~ (--v OI.IIC>'F' eN 6X\~l and bW K<k. T't 6A~t' 
• The relationship of the Logos ~ith man in the incarnation 
is very closely r .elated to the relationship of the Logos to God 
vithin the godhead. But even here in this identification, the 
reference to the incarnation is perfunctory and the main stress 
remains on the divine Logos ~ho is 'the minister of His Father's 
vill' • 
As al~ays, the best approach to assessing the significance of the 
incarnation is to examine the ~iter's soteriology. Clement does 
consider the incarnation to be a special form of revelation: 
CAl < 
Yes, I say, the Word of God became man ( 0 I\OO&~ l> 
1:N [j~ tVl9f"'''OS ~~f'N.~' that thou mayest learn 
" , from man ho~ man may become God (, '/<:#. • •• lid-pel . 
ci,v~~l"'> r.9~ ~, ... iTo~c- . .. a:,9tW\i.~ b~t.,I.(, $~S ) .108 
(106) Pd. I, 2(115.252C). Similar identifications occur in: 
c I , ( )f" _ ,< &.:, 
Pd. I, 3(1l8,257A): () KUf"o~ ••• ,<Al w~ oI.IIO'f"""'oS ....... L ""1 \ ; 
-Jd. " J q $'-"" (J Pd. I, 7(151,316Bf): \Io.l 9wc)0\ ••• 0(0\.0) £-oS 1.16o\.i~ • 0 11016 111 
"Cq~ ~v~f"""\b C,tA\ 'oId.c9~~tll.llll\~~ 
and also Pd. I, 9(172f,356A). 
Also cf. Protr . 1(22,6lAf). 
(107) cf. Grillmeier, op. cit. p. 137, and belo~, P . I~+T . 
(108) Protr. 1(24,640). 
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But this still does not answer the question why the Logos should 
have to become man to teach man to become like God. There is an 
element of Clement and of the whole of Alexandria theology here, 
which regards the incarnation just as the highest form of 
revelation, that is revelation which comes to man on his own terms.109 
But Clement does go deeper than this: 
") I \/1'> 
Believe him who is both God and man (tlvl).,W\\-.) ~l Cft~); 
-r ~ .. 
living God, who suffered and is 
~ iip .. '''-\) ... '''7 .... :.v~ ~ 7w..,t~).110 
••• believe, 0 man the 
. ..... ,,/ . 
adored (1: 't' \t(/..b<N~\.., 
The purpose of this suffering is mentioned: 
Man ••• was found fettered to sins. The Lord then wished 
to release him from his bondS, and clothing himself with 
flesh (~ 'cI.~"-\. ?vJre(..{~) .. • vanquished the serpent, 
and enslaved the tyrant death. III 
This developed statement incorporates both the elements of Christ's 
identification with man (~J~~}) and his deliverance of man from 
his helpless, defenceless position. But even in this instance we 
find that this is not of central Significance to Clement, who proceeds 
immediately to his favourite theme: 'we have a Teacher from whom all 
instruction comes'. Indeed, while Clement certainly believed in 
evil demons and the devil,112 this seems to be the only place where 
the incarnation is directly connected with evil; moreover it seems 
to be the only place where the devil can really be regarded as having 
any kind of cosmological importance. Elsewhere evil is always connected 
with moral, or rather immoral, behaviour. The stress is always on 
(109) cf. also below on Athanasius, p . \S-:a.. • cf. also R.P. Casey: 
·Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism", 
p. 63, who refers to Clement's conception of the incarnation 
as having 'much in common with the Stoic notion of the perfect 
Sage' • 
(110) Protr. lO(96,224A). 
(111) Protr. 11(100,228C). 
(112) cf. Kaye, op. cit. p. 213. 
- 123 -
the Word as Instructor or Revealor rather than on his action as a 
man. But While this appears to be the direction of Clement's 
thought, there is no doubt that Clement regarded the incarnation as 
important from both a purely revelatory and a soteriological point 
of view. Most of his references to the incarnation do not even 
hint at any developed Christology but merely ident:ify the Logos who 
... 
is God with the Logos who is man. The references to the "~~ could 
be taken to refer to the outward form rather than inward content. 
) - & \ , Ill.. / ) !'. 1\ I The reference to 0/\,<:1.. is 'r1V T"A'lVand the use of tv"HIo'h~ could 
point to a docetism, but definitely the latter has respectible pre-
cursors. The evidence examined thus far does not really help us 
in this regard. For this and the development of our initial theme 
of the relationship between the divine and the incarnate Logos we 
must now turn to the evidence of the Stromateis. 
In the whole of Strom. I there appears to be only one reference to 
the incarnation: 
••• for those who in their own estimation are wise, consider 
it fabulous that the Son of God should speak by man and 
that God should have a Son, and especially that that 
'{'\ \ _ _ II I 
Son should have suffered (101-""'- (j 1 I-<R-t 'I t-I\ eN Co',-vok. 
~';'tcN) .113 
Examining this for its Christological content, we find little more 
than that the Son suffered. This the 'wise men' find difficult to 
swallow. This quote is interesting because it is set in the context 
of Clement's exegesis of I Cor. 1.21-24. He deals with the problem 
of philosophy, declaring that the 'contemned barbarian philosophy', 
that is Christianity, is the light which destroyed the 'wisdom of the 
(113) Strom. I, 18(410,8048). 
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yise' .114 But in doing this Clement misses Paul's point, which is 
that all visdom must be measured from the 'folly of the Cross'. 
Clement rather concludes that: 
The apostle designates the doctrine vhich is according . 
to the Lord, "the visdom of God", in order to shov that 
. 115 
the true philosophy has been communicated by the Son. 
Clement is almost there, but not quite. He has opposed one visdom 
Yith another as Paul seems to do, but misses the subtilty of Paul's 
argumentation. Clement spells out this true philosophy in terms of 
morality, yhereas Paul would speak of the poyer of the cross. 
Clement is alyays concerned with abstracts, vhereas Paul moves from 
the specific act of God to the abstract. 116 
In Strom. II we find the statement yhich has already been quoted 
_,,~ , , 1 117 
about the God who 'draws near' although he is '\'Prw.uIo"C (N6id.If. 
Obviously in this frameyork any part of God yhich became incarnate 
) ) I 
could not be 10\6-'- ""6o\.eI.V, and therefore not properly God at all. The 
difficulty Yith yhich Clement is grappling is most clearly revealed 
, ""I 
over the issue of God being tl.w..c,.'l5. Thus: 
••• the Divinity needs nothing and suffers nothing 
(JvtvJ~~S r'tv O~ t~ f)(:;'ov 1I<l.~ a.."~~) ) . lIS 
The context of this is morality. The quote continues: 
.. . yhence it (u. . [;I'::;'<H ) is not, strictly speaking, 
capable of self-restraint, for it is never subjected to 
perturbation, over vhich to exercise control; vhile 
our nature being capable of perturbation, needs self-
constraint, by which disciplining itself to the need 
of little, it endeavours to approximate to the character 
of the divine nature. 
(114) (411,S04C). 
(115) (411,S05A). 
(116) cf. Strom. I, 7(375,733A) and I, 13(390,756B) . 
(117) Strom. II, 2(4,936Af), cf. above, P.103. 
(lIS) Strom. II, lS(48,1020B). 
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l I 
In this \lay, through t he general doctrine of the () /,IJI "" '" S 
9(';:; vhich ve have noticed already, the gnostic attempts to conform 
c 
,- "" his nature to the divine nature and so, since God is d.II';'0-r" the 
, - ,,, 
gnostic must also become ~~~Co'1S • 
") 1\1 . 
While God's d.iio.Co'ho( is primarily 
")- ~ the quality of not being subject to anything, that is oI.\\~ IS, 
)( -is almost equivalent to o(.~fMIt: .. S, and God is al\lays active and never 
passive, this is integrally tied up \lith the question of suffering. 
This is most clearly revealed in the Patripassian controversy. In 
that controversy the matter of God suffering vas resolved. He 
did not suffer; only the incarnate second Person suffered. Clement 
reveals his uneasiness over this solution both in his aversion for 
the vhole concept of suffering in that the gnostic is trying to put 
himself beyond it, and in his Christology. Thus it is that, as ve 
have mentioned, in the Paidagogos it is the Son vho has a soul 
)- 1\\ \ U)., / devoid of passion (0( \\d..c> 1 ~ t'i V T ~X'1I1) vho suffers. The Son is 
here nothing more than the perfect gnostic. This is hovever contra-
dictory, and so it is that, as Clement moves more and more tovards 
the Gnostic gospel, this problem manifests itself. 
This Gnostic development results in a radical spiritualization of his 
anthropology, vhich culminates in a dualism of vhich the folloving 
gives clear expression: 
The severance, therefore, of the soul from the body, 
made a life-long study, produces in the philosopher 
gnostic alactrity, so that he is eaSily able to bear 
natural death, vhich is the dissolution of the chains 
vhich bind the soul to the body.119 
This division betveen the ~~1 and the ~..q.. is the logical conclusion 
of accepting the Platonic epistemology vhich underlies the vhole of 
(119) Strom. IV, 3(144f,1225A). In Strom. IV, 6(157,1252A) the 
true gnostic is described as being in a 'state of impassible 
identity' (~\)~~'\~") hd..ewS). 
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Clement's thought of man's knovledge of God and thereby of man's 
120 
redemption by God. This is, of course, quite different from the 
Pauline distinction beween .~;;jr I and '-olrs • The difficulties 
that Clement nov found himself in are reflected in the folloving 
statements: 
and: 
So that on these accounts he is compelled to become 
like his Teacher in impassibility (~S ~"~ Sh.oI. v') • 
I 
For the Word of God is intellectual (Yo ~poS), according 
as the image of mind is seen in man alone .121 Thus 
also the good man is godlike in form and semblance as 
respects his soul. And, on the other hand, God is 
like man. For the distinctive form of each one is the 
the mind by vhich ve are characterized.122 
For by going avay to the Lord, for the love he (the 
gnostic) bear Him, though his tabernacle be visible on 
earth, he does not vithdrav himself from life, for that 
is not permitted to him. But he has vithdravn his 
soul from the passions. For that is granted to him. 
And on the other hand he lives, having put to death his 
lusts, and no longer makes use of the body, but allovs 
it the use of necessaries that he may not give cause for 
dissolution.123 
This acceptance of the Platonic epistemology is really fundamentally 
at variance vith his stress on revelation vhich ve noted above. Here 
the v.0S of man is the connecting link betveen God and man. l24 Clement 
seems to allov himself these liberties since he is nov addressing the 
gnostic, or should one rather say that Clement can nov express vhat 
(120) cf. Strom. V, I and esp. V, 1(224, 16C). 
(121) For the confusion in the text at this point, cf. ANCL p. 345 
and Migne, 293. 
(122) Strom. VI, 9(345,293B). 
(123) ibid. (347, 296Bf). 
(124) cf. Casey, op. cit. pp. 55, 59-61. 
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he really thinks? If this is so, all his careful qualifications of 
the role of reason Year rather thin. This kind of contradiction 
n 
is characteristic of Clement. This use of VeNS as the connecting 
link betveen God and man, logically and practically has the effect 
of introducing the God-man dualism vithin man in the form of the 
lV I " dualism betveen T"X1 and ,.,,~. 
From such a background the appearance of an extreme docetic position 
is not at all surprising. In one passage, vhich incredible claims 
to attack docetism,125 Clement vrites: 
The Gnostic is such, that he is subject only to the 
affections that exist for the maintenance of the body, 
such as hunger and thirst, and the like. But in the 
case of the Saviour, it vere ludicrous (to suppose) 
that the body, as a body, demanded the necessary aids 
in order for its duration. For He ate, not for the 
sake of the body, Which vas kept together by a holy 
energy, but in order that it might not enter into the 
minds of those Who vere vith Him to entertain a different 
opinion of Him; in like manner as certainly some after-
vards supposed that He appeared in a phantasmal shape 
(S ""-1'h ). But He vas entirely impassible (~~d-t9~S); 
inaccessible to any movement of feeling - either pleasure 
or pain. While the apostles having most gnostic ally 
mastered, through the Lord's teaching, anger, and fear, 
and lust vere not liable even to such of the movements 
of feeling as seem good, courage, zeal, joy etc.126 
This amounts to a straight denial that 'the Saviour' could suffer. 
This is emphatically in contradiction to the previous claims that he 
(125) Chadvick, op. cit. p. 51, n. 99, mentions a polemic against 
docetism. In the tvo passages cited (Strom. III, 13(128,1192C), 
17(133,1206A)) Clement attacks ~ -r1~ b0 1<.1b&wS 2-$frx.."->o{ 
'~).lOS ~'6 L.w~S , but the substance of the attack is 
concerned vith regulations about sex and eunuchs, not vith 
anything Christological. 
(126) strom. VI, 9(344,292C). 
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did suffer, but it is the logical conclusion of the rest of Clement's 
thought in the Stromateis. If 'the Gnostic does not share ••• in 
those affectations that are commonly celebrated as good',127 
hoy can the Saviour of that gnostic suffer? As Clement puts it, 
'It vere ludicrous' , )\ " (t~""~!J..v hi ). It is in this that Clement 
reveals his true colours. He is arguing from his experience of the 
Christian life and concluding that his Saviour could not be different 
from the absolute tovards which he is striving. The appeal to 
I )\)( 
rationality vhich lies behind this t~""S cJ.v , .... , is almost the stamp 
of Alexandrian theology. But as with the I\~.~ - vW-S diiemma, it 
causes problems vhich appear to be only solved in the theology of 
Athanasius, vhere his appeal to vhat is 'fitting' is radically condition-
ed by revelation rather than by human reason.128 It is a dangerous 
mode of argumentation and only achieves the correct results if the 
revealed truth and the results of human reason are in fact identical. 
In this case Clement has clearly got it vrong. He should have been 
arguing from the reality of Christ to what is fitting in the Christian 
life, and not vice-versa. And so Clement vrites: 
., 8' For, in fine , it is impossible (d.. \)V ~ t: 0 Ii) that the 
iml!lUtable (~'o UerniZD'I') should assume firmness and 
consistency in the nrutable (?:v T~ ~f("'\j-;""~) .129 
1 (,I 
Poor Clement, vhat could he do about the <j..~\Jvq.:q.l ? The hold of 
the Greek vorld on his mind vas just that bit too strong. Revelation, 
the folly of the cross, has not broken doYn the citadel of reason, 
hovever much he might claim to the contrary vhen he is not dealing 
with the issue vhich presents him with the inescapable problem. 
(127) ibid. (346,296A). 
(128) cf. belov, -Po 164. 
(129) Strom. VI. 9(348,297B). 
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In Strom. VII Clement seems to double back on himself, for he stresses 
repeatedly that the humanity ~hich the Logos assumed could indeed 
suffer: 
And He ~ho for our sakes assumed flesh capable of suffer-
~ , l\ \ ). \ .. II.' I ing (0 ... 'Z1" iI .... 0'1't' .. <1."6.1\,_"'" "-rILD..) is far from 
being luxuriously indolent.130 
This statement occurs as an aside, but the same claim is repeated 
twice more in the same chapter, although they have not escaped some 
Gnostic adaptations: 
••• ~ho having assumed flesh, Which by nature is suscep-
,I ,") _ fI~ {)I 
tible of suffering ("1" U(\I-O. ~lV &),-"li-Cli \ \,16(1) 
trained it to the condition of impassibility (~S 
~w ail~~ho/.) ) .131 
Ho~ such a theory could be reconciled ~ith a doctrine of atonement 
is a mystery, but even the admission that Jesus could suffer is an 
important corrective to the previous emphatic denial of this. But 
even in this more acceptable context ~e still find traces of Clement's 
latent docetism. This is most noticable in his soteriology, or 
rather his lack of it. Gnostic training, rather than the acceptance 
of the death of Christ by faith, is the ~ay to salvation: 
No~ it is well-pleasing to Him that ~e should be saved; 
and salvation is effected through both ~ell-doing and 
kno~ledge, of both of which the Lord is the teacher.132 
The assumption of humanity by the Logos is explained thus: 
(130) Strom. VII, 2(410,409B). 
(131) ibid. (4ll,4l2A), and also: 
••• who, for .His exceeding love to human flesh, despising 
not its susceptibility to suffering (~\icLShclv ~x. 
(_ rl , (" I UIl~('lcllo.N'), but investing Himself with it (l:v()vw.t'~')' 
came for the common salvation of men. 
(132) Strom. VI, l5(376,345C). 
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But having assumed sensitive flesh, He came to show man 
what was possible through obedience to the commandments.133 
The incarnate Lord is once again revealed to be the Stoic sage, the 
Teacher and Revealor, but this, even his example leaves man still 
essentially untouched. The distance of the Logos from man is revealed 
in the statement that, 'The Gnostic even forms and creates himself,.134 
And so, while Clement notes the need for Christ to suffer,135 and 
in one instance actually Presents his reader with a statement which 
could really be described as soteriological, the deeper levels of 
his thought reveal that this whole issue has little importance for 
him. Indeed, his thought is much more conditioned by the concept 
">- I\.!.J ofu~o.O'< "" and Gnostic ascetism, which of itself leads to salvation. 
Here the incarnate Logos is only an example or guide. 
When we return once more to the question with which we first started, 
about the relationship of the divine to the incarnate Logos, we can 
now see that while the incarnation is certainly present in Clement, 
the functions of the incarnate Logos are identical or very similar to 
those of the divine. Logos, and so, as Tollinton puts it: 
••• throughout ••• (Clement's) faith and interest find 
their centre in the universal r,ogos, rather than in the 
human life of Jesus.136 
This interest in the divine Logos is a direct . parallel with Clement's 
interest in what we called the abstract rather than the specific act 
of the incarnation. Furthermore, this must naturally lead to the 
incarnation being regarded as but one episode of the total work of the 
(133) Strom. VII, 2(412,412C). 
(134) Strom. VII, 3(415,417A), and see the note in Migne explaining 
this. 
(135) cf. Tollinton, op. cit. ii, p. 14f. 
(136) ibid. ii, p. 2. 
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Logos, rather than the cosmic activity of the Logos being interpreted 
in the light of the incarnation.137 This means that, like Justin, 
Clement's thought must be regarded as Logocentric rather than 
Christocentric. But has Clement integrated the Logos theology and 
his references to the incarnation more successfully than Justin? 
In Justin the tension was revealed in the incursions of the credal 
formulae and the lack of other reference to the incarnation, but 
in Clement there is no such problem. His language is very uniform. 
The tension in Clement is rather manifested in his methodology, 
which can express contradictory pOSitions because of its diffuseness. 
It is perhaps significant that different Christological positions 
seem to be assumed by Clement as he maintains different stances on 
the issue of the rSle of philosophy. In the Paidagogos and the 
Protrepticos Clement is usually fairly scathing about human wisdom, 
and while little real mention is made of the incarnation here, there 
is no doubt of the Logos becoming really man who can suffer, even 
if there might be doubt as to his soul. But in the Stromateis, 
when philosophy is viewed positively from the perspective of the 
gnostic, a fully developed docetism comes to the fore. This is 
corrected in Strom. VII, but by then the damage has already been 
done. A similar point can be made about Clement's relationship 
with the Gnostics proper. His attempt to incorporate much of their 
terminology and perspective, results in the centre of thought moving 
from the Logos to the gnostic's own striving for salvation. When 
these two factors are borne in mind, we see that the fairly consistent 
picture that emerged in our study of Clement's attitude to philosophy 
has not itself been integrated into his thought. The careful 
balancing of reason with revelation seems to fall down when applied 
to specific issues. Why is this? The answer seems to be in 
Clement's whole concept of revelation. Because it is not centred on 
(137) ibid. ii, pp. 9f. 
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the incarnation, revelation tends to become a gnosis ~hich in turn 
is far too amenable to reason. The reason/revelation issue in 
Clement is, as we pointed out, an issue between two alternatives 
which are fundamentally similar, rather than totally different. 
Because he has failed to come to terms ~ith the historical nettle, 
Clement finds it very difficult to really distinguish between 
reason and revelation, between the Logos and the incarnate Jesus. 
The ·problem here appears to be ·directly connected with the whole 
Hellenistic thought world and is perhaps even more serious in Clement 
than in the Apologists, because of his tendency towards Neo-Platonism 
., 1'\' 
which manifests itself concretely in the Gnostic search for o(iio.O'hck. 
If one starts one's theology ~th the Greek thought on the nature of 
the divine and the created order, is it really possible to explain 
satisfactorily, that is in any Christian sense, their relationship? 
The question is most sharply focussed on the incarnation and the 
person of Jesus. Clement's failure to deal adequately with this is 
a reflexion of his failure to deal with the wider issue. 
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IV. THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF ATHANASIUS I S CONTRA GENTES. 
(1) Introduction: 
The natural thing to do after studying Clement is to move on to 
Origen, and then from there, to Athanasius. Origen is relevant to 
this study, despite the fact that he never formally wrote an apology; 
the Contra Celsus \lould admirable serve the purpose of one. We 
have, hO\lever, omitted Origen from this study primarily because of 
the complexity of the issues \lhich are raised by him. By leaving 
him out, \Ie unfortunately interupt the historical development of 
thought that \Ie have been tracing. This chapter is then, in one 
sense, a slightly disconnected postlude. 
it is still the fitting conclusion. 
But in another sense, 
In Athanasius, the conflict \lhich \las external in the Apologetic 
age and \lhich became internalized in Clement, has almost completely 
dissappeared. This is not to say that the mission of the Church 
had ceased \lith all nations believing, but nO\l the thinking or theology 
of the Church \las not so much concerned \lith the \Ie/they issue, but 
more \lith getting its O\ln thought right. In the Contra Gentes 
(e.G.), the debate is not \lith a pagan Gentile, as one might expect, 
but \lith a Christian, Macarius. None of Athanasius's other \lorks 
is concerned \lith the pagan \lorld directly, but \lith heresy internal 
to the Church. Because of the systematic nature of Athanasius's 
\lorks, it is helpful to analyse hO\l he deals \lith the same issues 
that \Ie have dealt \lith above, from his different perspective. 
As \Ie have just mentioned, typical of this change in perspective 
is the Christian audience of the C.G. But this is not all. The 
C.G. is, as \Ie shall see, really an introduction to the de Incarna-
tione (de I.). This is similar but not identical to the relation-
ship of the Protrepticus to the rest of Clement's thought, but the 
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Christian audience of the C.G. takes the matter a step further. 
The close relationship bet~een the C.G. and the de I. gives us an 
invaluable insight into Athanasius's theological methodology, and 
this insight illuminates a lot of ~hat ~e have already examined. 
Another indication of the change in perspective is the different 
approach to the Logos ambiguity. In Justin and in Clement, a large 
part of the evidence available to us for examining the relationship 
between the divine Logos and human reason came from their treatments 
of the relationship bet~een Christianity and pagan philosophy. In 
Athanasius this subject is not specifically dealt ~ith in any detail. 
His attention is focussed immediately on the relationship between 
reason and revelation, and this comes to a head in the incarnation, 
the very point ~here our previous writers ~ere all deficient. 
But in his attention to this issue, Athanasius is very subtle, and 
great care must be taken in analysing the C .G. in the light of the 
de I. It is truly fascinating ho~ the Platonic epistemology is 
accepted in the C.G. but put to such a completely different use. 
The extent to which the C.G. is a completely natural theology 
must be discussed, but more importnat to us is h~ Athanasius 
adapts his Logos theology to lead straight to the incarnation. 
How Athanasius accomplishes this conjuring trick is the subject of 
this discussion. For it is in his solution that the real difficulty 
of the earlier writers is revealed; their problem lay precisely in 
their inability to bring together the Logos theology and the 
incarnation. This is true ~hether their Logos theologies reduce to 
a natural theology, or remain entirely revelational. 
As a ~hole, the C.G. is built around the argument from deSign, that 
kno~ledge of God is possible from the order and rationality ~thin 
the ~orld. In order to justify thiS, Athanasius has to start from 
creation and to describe how the rationality of the creation is 
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related to the rationality of God, that is the Logos. In doing 
this Athanasius has to incorporate a doctrine of God and the Logos. 
Another important elementis the fall of man. This too has to 
precede the argument' from design, since the resultant knowledge of 
God is only a poor alternative to the proper and primaeval direct 
..... -
apprehension of God through the mind (c,,", v,,",). 
" . 
Because of this 
pattern in Athanasius's thought, it is correct for us to start the 
investigation with his doctrine of creation. 
(2) Creation: 
When Athanasius thought about God, he could not separate his thought 
into a compartment that dealt with God abstractly and one that 
thought of him as he relates to the world. Both God and the created 
order are thought of in terms of their relationships with each other. 
In this we can see a difference between Athanasius and Clement, for 
instance. Clement is interested in metaphysical or cosmological 
issues, whereas Athanasius remains a theologian whose centre of thought 
is always the redemption of man in Jesus Christ. There is no room 
in Athanasius for abstract speculation. It is irrelevant. 
But, nonetheless, Athanasius does show many signs of not being ignorant 
of abstract thought. The first , question that we must treat is, in 
fact, one such issue. In defining the relationship between God 
and the world, Athanasius first of all stresses their separation. 
~ I I 
He states that God is 'beyond all substance' (vil~fE-lLr"('" ;;0-' is 
'J 1 ~6~S). E.P. Meijering has correctly connected this phrase with 
another which is very similar: 2 'beyond all created existence' 
(1) C.G. 2.2(5C) 
(2) Orthodoxy and Platonism in Athanasius - Synthesis or Antithesis? 
(Leiden,1968), pp. 6f. 
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The use of these tyO phrases 
shoys conclusively that Athanasius Yas using ~~fI.. in the sense of 
The history of this phrase is of some interest. 
The tradition seems to have been 
') I 
started by Plato's mention of the 
idea of the good being 6-ilI:'14,,1/r/. ,.. ~ I 4 t'IS ()\.l6-oLS. From here it passed 
into Middle-Platonism and is used in Justin5 and in an adapted form 
in Clement.6 Meijering suggests that Justin uses the phrase in 
the Athanasian sense, but that Clement sho .. s the influence of Neo-
) I • . 7 
Platonism, in that the phrase denies all av&\~ to God as in Platinus. 
But Athanasius seems to have totally redefined his notion of ~~ol • 
He =ites: 
•• • by .. hat is, then, I mean Hhat is good, inasmuch as 
~ ,,)/ ,,~8 it has i ts pattern in God .. ho is (E-I<. ~cN eN to~ C>'hN ). 
Although such a definition occurs in the context of the problem of 
the existence of evil,9 the next sentence specifically mentions 
) I ') I 
wfr.';', and so .. e find that 0\)6'\", is that .. hich comes from God's 
creati ve activity and from no other source. 
') I 
The a\llhol. , the 
\ ) I 
tl/'\~' <NC'nck, has being because it is This 
radical focus on the creative activity of God, and the stress on 
the dependence of the created order on God is something ne .. , and 
(3) 35.1(69A) and 40.2(8OC). 
(4) Rep. VI, 509b. 
(5) Dial. 4(91,484A). 
(6) Pd. I, 8(161,336A) and Strom. V, 6(244,65A). 
(7) Enn. VI, 7,40.26-27, and cf. above, p .qq . 
(8) 4.4(9C), cf. also de I. 4.5(1048). 
(9) cf. beloY, Pl" I'tl-"f. 
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is an important step away from the Greek idea of God being the 
highest essence of the world. lO 
") I 
From this definition of (T\.)(nQl. 
it follows necessarily that God is 
He could not be otherwise. It follows that Meijering cannot be 
correct in identifying this use of the the Platonic phrase with that 
of Justin. Justin is far from such subtleties. Nor has Meijering 
dealt with Clement correctly, but we have already dealt with this. 
)_1 -( ) ,f. . The phrase ~.rlLnV$. "lIo1.6'1 S 0\).""..) does, then, sk~lfully separate 
the world and God, at the same time as describing the positive side 
of the relationship. 
Another element in Athanasius's use of J.,u& is probably his belief 
that the Logos and the Father are identical in their essence (~~QI. ) • 
.., _, () I 
This belief would be nonsensical if the phrase &\\"",,,"hV~ ""'-6, S 4N~d..S 
were 
with 
to be interpreted in the Neo-Platonic 
") I 
this definition of <N61d. a different 
sense.
ll But even 
sense of the word would 
have to be understood to incorporate this belief. 
The difference between God and the world is described directly in 
terms of the origination of the world. The race of men 'is made 
") ) )( 
out of nothing (e-\ <$\)\<. tN"twJ), while God is ingenerate or unmade' 
(~~ t~ J.O~"'YcN) .12 This distinction between the created order 
and God is also used with reference to the Logos, putting the Logos 
on the godward side of the divide. Rejecting the Stoic >.~O~S 
I 6i1~rt\"-05 doctrine, he says that the Logos 'is not that which is 
involved (?~ ••• '\lrllr\i~~(-VcN') and inherent (""tii~"u..'<Rd-.) 
(10) cf. above, pp. 8f. 
(11) cf. Meijering, OPe cit. p. 126. 
(12) 35.1(69A). 
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)." ,., '13 in all things created' (t:V' (;,.,J..;J.6r:~ i'~ 'dfNDI'.('-vW<I). He echoes the 
)f f)f q C! 6-i\~IL~"" i'i"-61S c:NIhcl-S , and Justin' s 6-t~pav ••• r:-UfttV, when he 
says that the Logos 'is different from things that are made and 
<I )!\ \ \)/ " .., , I . 
from all creation' (OS o<.Al\O\ /"-"" ~'t~ ~ ~~V1t:WV" \<ooll it~6~S 
" I 14 tr~ V.:t:\6C"\.lS). This distinction between God and the created 
order is also the difference between true existence and derivative ' 
) I 
existence, as expressed in the definition of 0\l11\.~ • Similar to 
this is the distinction between God, 
( ('\ t\ , )( ) 
not composite' (0 C)!:' C>'I-O) (..>J 6-6 't c.. , 
who has 'true existence and is 
\ ) } (\ 
K<4. CN 6\')VC1~toS), and 'men 
) ,., 
(1oIbo are) composed of parts and made out of nothing' (~,<. j'-frrWJ 
.. / \..,..... \ Y I 15 6I>d~""'h'dl, K.d-l G- .... 'tCN ;"'"'1 <NtoS 6f'V~-vC1\). This background 
to all of Athanasius's thought became one of the vital issues in the 
Arian controversy. The precise significance of the definition of 
the relationship in these terms becomes abundantly clear in his 
Christology.16 
After these introductory remarks we can move on to the actual 
description of the act of creation itself. This can be described 
solely as an act of God, but usually it is qualified with the now 
familiar I" \ "/\' clld- tN '(leN. The creative activity of the Logos 
operates at two related levels: firstly, in the creation of man, and 
secondly in the wider sense of the creation of the world. This 
order may seem surprising, since the creation of the world must 
temporally precede the particular creation of man. But Athanasius 
is sure that theologically the order is the other way round. 17 
(13) 40.4(8lA). 
(14) ibid. 
(15) 41.1(BIC) • 
(16) cf. below, pp. 165£. 
(17) cf. Ch.'s 2,35rf and 40f£. 
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The ~orld ~as created as a setting for the creation of man, and although 
both are for the glorification of God, man has a special relationship 
with God, ~hich sets him apart from the rest of creation. There is 
another aspect to this question. Athanasius is not primarily 
concerned ~ith describing the cosmological aspect of creation. 
He is much more concerned ~ith the implications of creation for his 
soteriology. And so, in dealing ~ith the . ("\ "1\' creat~on dee-. 'til'\) 0<fN' 
Athanasius is already pointing not only to the argument from design, 
but also to the de I. and the recreation of mankind in Jesus Christ. 
The more cosmological description of creation through the Logos is 
a necessary preliminary, but still a preliminary, to the salvation 
of man through the Logos, both by the order ~ithin the world and by 
the Logos as man in the incarnation. We deal then, firstly with the 
creation of man and then with the creation of the world. 
(a) The Creation of Man: 
In Ch. 2 of the C.G. Athanasius gives an idyllic picture of the 
original perfect man. This is, as has often been noted, a Platonic 
description of the bliss of Eden. 18 Although this is certainly 
true, the central point is not Platonic, but directly from Gen. 1.26: 
the human race is created after God's own image ( ..... 't\ ,J'vJ,.'V ti ... ~o.. ).19 
There is a direct relationship between the Logos being 'the Image 
of the Father' and the image after which man is made. 20 This is 
made especially clear in a passage from the de I.: 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
,lhence, lest this should be so (that man should be no 
different from the 'brute creatures'), being good, He 
gives them a share of His own Image, our Lord Jesus 
Christ, and makes them after His own Image and after 
His likeness. 21 
cf. Meij ering, op. cit. p. 5. 
2.2(5C) • 
2.2(8A). 
11.3(1l6A) • 
- 140 -
While the cent~al point is biblical,Athanasius describes both creation 
14-'-' '~'t-(.,.; and its implications in purely Platonic terms. The 
image results in man being able 'to know realities by means of this 
~\ (I 
assimilation (0\6. "C1C, ... 0f(i\~6("-olS) to Himself' • Man thus has 
r. \ \)- I 
'V'(-Wf'1"C'\" I~ H<L,e1~ together with the 'conception and knowledge 
,,)rl ) .. I' I )/ \..., /_1/ 22 
of His own eternity' ("I~ lel"'-S oI.l.0'0~'Fo~ ('VViJV;J..\{ ~ }VWo 1 ) • 
Man is made to know God and thus to 'rejoice and have fellowship 
(~\lVOf'~3) with the Deity'. This knowledge is also expressed in 
. \ I \) t\ J 
terms of the Platonic distinction between 'Cd.. vO'\'td.. and 'C~ cJ.l.6D~'1:ok: 
He is awestruck as he contemplates that Providence 
\'i.r0'f($\o.." ), which through the Word extends to the universe 
:) \-" (et<; <,0 1101." ), being raised above the things of sense 
,(_ I/,) & ..., 
and every bodily appearance \ \l\\l:fil.I{"" ••• 'l!wv oM 1tW0, 
but cleaving to the divine and thought-perceived things 
\ 
in the heavens by the power of the mind (Ccol. ••• Vo> '1~lI. 
'('~ J\ll{~rh t!.N I{N 6vVd.iiC~oS). 23 
This is plainly the Platonic and Middle-Platonic picture of the 
'"' .... I philosopher who perceives the deity "'~ "'t! j-rN":!. The implication 
is clear: the image of God is directly connected with the mind of 
man. But there is more to it than this, for the image of God 
directs man's mind upwards, 'and seeing the Word, it sees in Him also 
the Father of the Word' • Again the two images of God are connected. 
This relationship with God through the mind of man is also described 
in terms of the soul: 
For she (the soul) is made to see God, and to be 
enlightened by Him; 24 
The way to God 
is the soul of each 
which resides there 
it alone can God be 
one of us, and the intelligence 
\ , ') "'" .... (tiN t:v ol~1::" ViNY ). For by 
l\ 25 
contemplated and perceived. 
(22) 2.2(5C), cf. Albinus: Did. 3 , and Wis. 7.17 and Thaet. l76a-b. 
(23) 2.2(8A). 
(24) 7 .5(l6B). 
(25) 30.3(6lA). 
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The fact that man has a soul, 'and that soul rational', is important 
for Athanasius. This soul is shoYn to be immortal, although not 
in the sense of uncreated, and to live 'yithout ceasing by reason 
Christ,.26 of God yho made it thus by His oYn Word, our Lord Jesus 
To make sure he has made his point, Athanasius concludes: 
For the soul is made after the image and likeness of 
God ••• the soul beholds as in a mirror the Image of the 
. Father, even the Word, and by His means reaches the idea 
of the Father, Whose Image the Saviour is.2:7 
We have already dealt yith this concept 'as found in Middle-Platonism 
and hoy it is challenged by Justin. In Justin, as in Athanasius, 
the soul is made rational (>'o6'"IL-tS) by the activity of the Logos at 
creation, but Justin not only emphatically separates the Logos and 
human reason, but denies that human reason can knOY God. The diff-
" " erenee is that the Middle-Platonic <'~ v't carries an active connota-
tion that Justin denies, for he alloys only a passive role to be 
played by the mind. But this theory, as found in Athanasius, still 
regards God as being 'by nature invisible and incomprehensible' 
) I \) 1\ - ~ '~' 28 (OI.D('Q-\:OS \(O.l d.w.o."td."11l~O~ ~Hc ~1V ,1.)61",. This Philonic 
distinction between perceiving God and knowing his nature or essence 
has already been noted in Clement. 29 But even though God is incompre-
hensible by nature, there is no doubt that man can knoy him. At 
one point Athanasius remarks that because man is 'made out of nothing 
wile He is unmade', 'mankind yas likely to miss the yay to knwledge 
of Him,.30 Here the possibility of real knowledge of God remains 
open to man throUgh the God-created mind, the rational faculty of the 
(26) 33.3(68A). 
(2:7) 34.3-4(68Df). 
(28) 35.l(69A). 
(29) cf. above, p. 103. 
(30) 35.1(69A). 
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soul. The comparison between Athansius and Justin goes deeper than 
" " 
'" ... 
the acceptance or rej ection of the l''''' I/w. In Athanasius the Cv.> I/o..:. , L , 
is 'coupled with a very sophisticated description of God's relationship 
'" ~ to the world, and in Justin the rejection of the (\.l " .., is coupled , . 
with a complete lack of understanding of this problem. In fact, 
in Justin it could almost be said that, because he has not come 
to terms with how God relates to the world, his doctrine of the Logos 
tends to be reductionist and hence, apart from any other reasons, 
~ ~ 
it becomes imperi ti ve to rej ect the t'w V'" • In Athanasiu6 there . , 
is no such problem. 
This is then how God made man. Athanasius does not stop here, and 
it is part of his great achievement. that he comes to terms with man's 
fallenness. When we come to discuss this, more light will be shed 
on what man should be. 
(b) The Creation of the World: 
It is an interesting exercise to try to establish whether or not the 
C.G. by itself teaches a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. This is 
interesting for the general assessment of the nature of the C.G. 
As usual the issue is complicated by the question of absolute or 
relative non-existence. For this reason it is helpful to start the 
enquiry with the question of the nature of the existence of evil. 
Athanasius is quite clear that 'in the beginning wickedness did not 
~ ) .., \ .'" ") I 31 
exist' (6-~ c:lfX'1~ /'"''''' <N" I'" v.ol\L. l.(/.. ). This statement is linked 
with the rejection of dualism and Marcionism.32 The result is that, 
even when evil has COJ:1e into existence, it has a re.lative rather than 
a substantive existence, for 'good is, while evil is not' (~~o. st 
&6~l ~~ K~, ~IL ~Col 'I:- ~~ ~~)..c..).33 To avoid complete 
(32) Ch.'s 6-7. 
(33) 4.4(~). 
14.12f: aJT:(: O~;'I 6ii)d('X1\' 
which is quoted in 11.1(248). 
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this must be connected with the definition of 'being' mentioned 
above. In contrast to true being, which is derived from God, evil, 
which is not, has its source 'in a false imagination in the thoughts 
( '- / ) 1Ur,(- ./) of men' ~IlL"O\tM.S <I."~r""'I\""'" • Time and time again Athanasius 
stresses that evil does not have 'a substantive and independent 
) ( - I \ \ '- ,,, , I 34 
existence' (,"'-, \>Ilo'\:?-~h ........ l ",-,,-.9 (,d.v't,V twckl t'IY ~,"-Id.V). 
It is because of his definition of existence, that his statement 
, )/ 
that evil is 0\>1<. N';i.d- does not lead him to a position similar to . 
that of the Christian Scientists. The-issue is between absolute 
existence, which is solely God's and derivative from him, and some 
kind of relative existence, which seems to be derived from the 
) . I 
~uC"C1'.<7. of mankind. Now, could it be argued that Athanasius should 
, )/ ) )/ 
have described evil as /'I0vt0. rather than <NIL CN~", , while in the 
, 
beginning and at the end of time, evil would be described as ~\, 
V 
OV<'<A. ? From the evidence we have surveyed, it seems that some such 
conclusion should be reached. It seems from this preliminary 
study that Athanasius does not discriminate between the niceties 
involved in the distinction between ~" andJ1. 
When we turn directly to the issue of creatio ex nihilo, this 
conclusion may give grounds for regarding Athanasius's &'h~1<- ~l""" 
as not absolute. There is one extended passage in the C.G. which 
needs special consideration in this regard: 
" " For the nature of created things (Cu.N ••• .¥"1t w,t) , 
in as much as it is brought into being out of nothing 
(~~'L ~tv.N Sil06't~"'), is of a fleeting sort 
(fh>6 t 1)' and weak and mortal, if composed of itself 
only. But the God of all is good •••• for which reason 
he does not grudge even existence, but desires all to 
exist, as objects of his loving kindness. Seeing 
(34) 6.1(12D). In the next sentence ~~ is listed an another 
quality evil cannot have. 
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then all created nature, as far as its own lavs vere 
( J ) " 
concerned, to be fleeting (f~'<1v and subJect to 
dissolution, lest it should come to this and lest the 
Universe should be broken up again into nothingness 
", ,~ . (t\S CO /""'\ (-\."6-< ), for this curse He made all things 
by His own eternal Word, and gave substantive existence 
" () I \ I ) to Creat10n .,."11,,,,601.S 't"1" Ktl6<V , and moreover 
did not leave it to be tossed in a tempest in the 
course of its own nature, lest it should run the risk 
of once more dropping out of existence (f?\ d)-'1 
l:iVII-L ) .35 
Meijering vrites about the comparison of this passage with Plato's 
Politicus 273d, that the most 
" 
important change is the substitution of 
') ..... \ \ ,
"'-" ~. r,\ "'''<J..L for Plato's ) \ ,,) I ?I hS '1!N 1:1 S o("orcn~'\',t"s oli\hftN 
Meijering uses this change as proof that 'Athanasius's major 
objection to Plato's doctrine of creation is that Plato does not 
teach th& creat1"0 ex nih1" 10', .36 As 1"t stands th1"s argument 1"S not u , 
valid. In this vhole passage there seems to be a strong tendency 
to ascribe some kind of existence to the vorld before the creative 
activity of the Logos. 
) ) 
Despi te the fact that creation is 'i 0'\,) I<. 
)/ ~~..N , the vorld can be considered to be 'composed of itself only' 
",\ (\ I <: I (,,"-"" ~"~'\" '''6''1'<110''''''''1)' In this state it is fl""6~1 ' vhich is 
a technical term in Middle-Platonism used to describe the state of 
) I . I 37 being vhich is not the ""'~ ... vo,\,-,\ • This same thought is repeated 
vhen creation is considered 'as far as its own lavs vere concerned'. 
It is lest this state of being be broken up that the Logos acts and 
gives 'substantive existence to Creation'. It seems that there are 
three forms of existence described in this passage: firstly, there 
(35) 41.2-3(8lCf). 
(36) op. cit. p. 36. 
(37) ibid. p. 35. cf. Albinus: Did. 1(153.9) and Athenagoras: 
Leg. 22(401,937A). 
- 145 -
) ~ 
is non-being ('''S ~ r1 ",",VoLL ); then there is the state of being 
( I pn,6't'1' 1lhich is al1lays tending to1lards non-being; and thirdly, there 
is the proper existence 1lhich is a result of the activity of the 
Logos. 38 It is, of course, impossible to argue anything from the 
I ) \ \" rl of (.,.~ 'l:o /{ L'lw..L, since the construction does not allo1l the use 
of <k~ 39 
If this is 80, and it does seem to be the case, then the creative 
activity of the Logos could only be indirectly described, if at all, 
as creatio ex nihilo. There is further evidence in the C. G. for 
this contention. In the 1lhole 1lork, the activity of the Logos in 
the 1lorld is that of ordering the 1lorld. The previously quoted 
passage continues: 
••• but, because He is good He guides and settles the 
1lhole Creation by His 01ln Word, Who is Himself also God, 
that by the government ('rZl • •• ~a~,.wr"~~) and providence 
and ordering action (Tif""k ~ tui"-"~1bC1 ) of the 
Word, Creation may have light, and be enabled to abide 
al1lay securely. 
This is repeated in several places: 
••• for this cause God 
the Order it Has (t\v 
by His 01ln Word gave the Universe 
I C/" I 40 
1<."<6<V """w.) "~f-'L.~l'~ ) . 
••• our Lord and Saviour Christ, steer and preserves 
. , ~r ., I 
and orders all things (1:0( tr .. VI:d.t\"" "'..,.,. K \l ~'f'~ 'w"'\f' ...... S 
Kd-~ O,,", ... o~.;' ).41 
For being the good Word of the good Father He produced the 
order of all things (~11/ -.:~ nct~.....,. J'c.f-It.b ~16f- J'.i~,,~ .42 
(38) . Is it possible to find a similar pattern lying behind de I. 
4.5, where the state of being 'everlastingly bereft even of being' 
is described as being 'disintergrated' (I:~ ci' ... >." ~l1v~~s )'-tvhv') 
and abiding 'in death and corruption'? 
(39) W. Goodvin: A Greek: Grammar (London,1898), sec. I6ll. 
(40) 35.1(69A). 
(41) 40.2(8OC). 
(42) 40.5(8lA). 
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And the Logos also produces the harmony existing in all creation, 
bringing order out of warring opposites.43 At no stage, even when 
- I lI.t......, is used, does the activity of the Logos move from the function 
) ) 44 described by the verbs 1.00\LO~'\ola.nd 6uv~\.). Where the Logos is 
described as creator, maker and artificer, these designations all 
naturally refer to this function of arranging and sustaining. It 
would be pushing the argument too far to say that Athanasius regarded 
creation ex nihilo to be the function of the Father and the ordering 
of the resultant matter to be the function of the Logos, but some 
such such view is implied. So, when Athanasius vrites as follows, 
he need not be referring to creatio ex nihilo: 
I 
••• all things subsist (6u\rf.6L'J~1:- ) by the Word and 
Wisdom of God, nor would any created thing (t~ L~ 
I ~ht~ww.r ) have had a fixed existence had it not been 
made by reason, and that reason the Word of God.45 
It is not difficult to find the reason for this emphasis. The whole 
argument is the argument from design, from the order in the universe, 
not from the existence of the world. The only place where it is 
possible to observe anything resembling some kind of argument from 
eXistence, is in the section about the unity of God which is proved 
because the universe is one.46 But again, in the forefront of 
Athanasius's mind is the ordering of the universe into a unity, 
rather than its creation, that is, rather than the brute fact of its 
existence at all: 
(43) Ch.' s 42ff. 
(44) cf. 4101(81C). 
(45) 40.6(8lB). 
(46) Ch. 39. 
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Creation, then, being one, and the Universe one, and its 
order one, ~e must perceive that its King and Artificer 
( cl'V"'<>Jf d ~ ) also is one. 47 
And so, in terms of the C.G., Meijering is a little hasty. Neither 
creatio ex nihilo nor the exact status of the pre-ordered ~orld is 
clear in the C.G. In fact, it seems possible to find traces of the 
idea of an ~'>.j' and if this ~as the only evidence ~e had of Athanasius IS 
thought on creation, ~e ~ould have to conclude that he had come to 
some kind of compromise position. But ~e are fortunate that this is 
not the only evidence available. In the de I. there is a very 
clear rejection of the Middle-Platonic doctrine of the ~~~ 
The argument is very similar to that used by Theophilus.49 
Athanasius concludes: 
48 
So that if this be 80 (the doctrine of the ~~1)' God 
~ill be on their theory be a Mechanic only (t'~XjL'C'1\ ), 
and not a Creator out of nothing; if, that is, He ~orks 
at existing material, but is not Himself the cause 
(~t~loS ) of the material. 50 
He goes on to describe, in a setting almost identical to that of 
... ' ... ")", (\' C.G. 41, the creation CI.o/.. t<>3 ~"C"" "bIN , and in this context it 
") ") V 51 is quite clear ~hat the 1:-1,0\)1(, "'I'tw.t means. To complete the 
I Change, ~e find that here Athanasius has used the verb TI't·""''\ 1<' ~ 
('I ,,' I instead of Occl--","o~h ........ l 6uv"Kh . 
Returning ~ith this clear picture to the C.G., it is difficult to see 
ho~ to reconcile the t~o vie~s. One could perhaps appeal to 
(47) 39.6(80A). 
(48) Ch. 2, and esp. 2.3f(100Af). 
(49) Ad. Aut. II, 4(67,1052B) and cf. above, p . 
(50) de I. 2.4(100B). 
(51) 3.3(10lB). 
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C. G. 6, vhere the rejection of a substantive existence of evil and of 
dualism could imply a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, but this does not 
help in our exegesis of Ch. 41. There are tvo possible reasons 
for the difference in outlook. Firstly, Athanasius has purposefully 
and apologetically let these tinges of unacceptable Platonism slip 
through in order to accomodate his reader, knowing that this particular 
issue vould be modified in the next york. The second reaSon should 
probably be closely linked with the first: the argument of the C .G. 
is that from design, and so Athanasius is purposefully stressing the 
ordering of the vorld by the Logos, and it is therefore incorrect to 
place too much emphasis on the apparent lack of interest in the other 
aspect of God's creative work. 
(3) The Fall and its Reversal: 
After the Platonic picture of the bliss of Eden, Athanasius goes on 
to describe how men turned from the 'things perceived by thought' 
(t~ ... v .. ,\c~) and 'began to regard themselves' .52 This turning 
from the intellectual things to the world of sense perception results 
in man groving familiar with and preferring his own lusts. This 
movement of the soul from the contemplation of the good to the 'vain 
\ I 
imaginings' is due entirely to the 'mobile nature ( 't',v fVc:hV 
'.{,"'-~v'1'toS ) of the soul' .53 The fall is due to man's free-will 
rather than the action of evil. In fact, it is out of man's wrongful 
exercising of his free-viII that evil comes into being. 54 The evil 
choice results in evil action, which further corrupts the soul until 
it is very di·fficult for it even to catch a glimpse of God as it 
(52) C.G. 3.2(BC) and 4.1(9B). 
(53) 4.2(9Bf). 
(54) For the existence of evil, cf. above, pp. l42f. 
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should. It is as a result of this progressive decay that the soul 
first gives existence to evil, but then it even goes on to the depths 
of iniquity by creating idols for itself. 55 But in all of this the 
soul does not lose its capacity of being the way to God. 56 It 
is interesting that at this point Athanasius does not carry through 
the doctrine of the fall. It would appear that man's rational, 
immortal soul is inviolable, in that it can turn away from God, but 
not lose the ability to turn back and return to the knowledge of 
God: 
Or why, in like manner as they have departed from God, 
do they not betake themselves to Him again? For they 
are able, as they turned away their understanding from 
God, and feigned as gods things that were not, in like 
manner to ascend with the intelligence of their soul, 
and turn back to God again. But turn back to God they 
can, if they lay aside the filth of all lusts ••• until 
they have got rid of all the foreign matter that has 
affected their soul and can shew it in its simplicity as 
it was made, that so they may be able by it to behold the 
Word of the Father, after whose likeness they were 
originally made. 57 
This possibility of reversing the fall receives a startling contrast 
in the de I., where a more detailed discussion of the restoration of 
the imago dei occurs. 58 But even in the e.G., while it is acknowledged 
that man can return to knowledge of God, it is realized that mrul's 
will has been so corrupted that it is not willing to leave its 
lusts. 59 Because of thiS, another way to God is provided: 
(55) 8.1(16e). 
(56) 30.3(6lA). 
(57) 34.2-3(68C). 
(58) cf. below, p. 161. 
(59) 2.4(8B). 
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Or, if the soul's ovn teaching is insufficient, by reason 
of the external things which cloud its intelligence, 
and prevent its seeing what is higher, yet it is further 
possible to attain to the knowledge of God from the things 
which are seen since Creation, as though in written 
characters, declares, in a loud voice, by its order and 
('" 1\ I ,'),J 
harmony (<1<01. '-'''IS ~o-\{"""'~ ~l ~rrCNLtJ..~ ), its own Lord 
60 I ~ . . 
and Creator. 
The basic logic behind this 'way' is no different to the 'way' of 
direct knowledge through the soul. Both the soul and the ordered 
universe are created products of the Logos, and it is their rationality 
and order which point to the perfect rationality of the Logos. 
Athanasius makes it quite clear that the order within the universe is 
not the Logos, but is only a witness to the Logos. And so, while 
God remains in his being 'beyond all created existence', he has given 
'the Universe the Order it has, in order that since He is by nature 
invisible, men might be enabled to know Him at any rate by His works,.61 
Athanasius denies the Stoic solution, but is impressed by the same 
phenomenon. 
concludes: 
Pointing to the order of the stars and the moon, he 
••• who can resist the conclusion that these are not 
ordered by themselves but have a maker distinct from 
themselves who orders them?62 
The same argument is strengthened by considering how all the 
'opposite natures' combine into a 'concordant harmony,.63 This 
Heracleitian and Stoic argument is even used with reference to genera-
tion from the opposite sexes. 64 After dwelling on the universe and 
(60) 34.4(69A). 
(61) 35.1(69Af). 
(62) 35 .4(72A) • 
(63) 36.1(72A). 
(64) 36.4(72Df). 
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its order, Athanasius compares it to a peaceful city, and in so doing, 
reveals his premiss that order necessarily implies a ruler: 'for 
disorder is a sign of absence of rule, while order shews the governing 
authority,.65 This means that from the one order of the world, he 
can deduce that there is one ruler of the world. Similarly from the 
unity of· the universe, one must necessarily believe that 'its Maker is 
one,.66 This argument as it stands is fairly ordinary and cannot 
evoke much COID~ent, but the next stage of Athanasius's thought is 
most Significant: 
Who then might this Maker be? •• For if our argument has 
proved that the gods of the poets are no gods, and has 
convicted of error those that deify creation ••• it strictly 
follows from the elimination of these that the true 
religion is with us, and that the God we worship and 
preach is the only true One, Who is Lord of Creation 
and maker of all existence.67 
Of course the claim that 'it strictly follows' is incorrect, and it 
shows how Athanasius has had to smuggle the God, whom he had in the 
background all the time, into his argument. This is made even 
clearer in what follows: 
Who then is thiS, save the Father of Christ ••• Who ••• 
by ••• Ris own Word, our Lord and Saviour Christ, steers 
and preserves and orders all things, and does as seems 
to Rim best?68 
After revealing himself in this way, Athanasius goes straight back to 
the argument from the order of the world, but now he stresses that the 
(65) 38.2(76A). 
(66) Ch. 39, esp. 39.6(80B). 
(67) 40.1(80B). 
(68) 40.2(8OC). 
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order in produced by the Logos. There is another point vhere a 
similar shift is noticable. Here the argument from design slips 
into the revelation through scripture: 
••• for if vhen a word proceeds from men ve infer that 
the mind is its source, ••• by far greater evidence and 
incomparibly more, seeing the power of the Word, ve 
receive a knowledge also of His good Father ••• But this 
all inspired Scripture also teaches more plainly and 
with more authority ••• For the people of the Jews of old 
had abundant teaching, in that they had the knowledge 
of God not only from the works of Creation, but also from 
the divine Scriptures. 69 
The 'way' through the scriptures is, thus, a third way to knowledge 
of God. There are three ways to God described in the C.G.: through 
the rationality of the soul, the order of the universe and through 
scripture. To these a fourth is added in the de I.: through Jesus 
Christ, the incarnate Logos of God. It is of considerable importance 
to examine the relationship between these different ways, for in 
doing so, we come to the core of Athanasius's apologetic. By 
showing hOll Athansius moved beyond the bounds of the argument from 
desien, modelling his designer to the biblical witness, it is clear 
that, although he is employing the areument from design as his central 
theme in the C.G., the whole treatise keeps the revelation of God in 
scripture, and especially in Jesus Christ, in the background as a 
normative guide. The argument from design is not used absolutely, 
but as a preliminary to the real revelation in Jesus. The mechanics 
of how Athanasius does this become much clearer when the nature of the 
C.G. is compared with that of the de I. 
(69) 45.2, 4(89Af). 
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But even within the C.G. there is a clear indication of Athanasius's 
methodology. This is to be found in the opening chapter, where the 
purpose of the treatise is set out. Athanasius addresses his 
Apology to the Christian Macarius.70 His purpose is to present 
'the faith ••• of Christ the Saviour; lest any should hold cheap the 
doctrine taught among us, or think faith in Christ unreasonable' 
He then immediately goes on to show that the stumbling 
block to the reasonableness of the faith is the 'Cross of Christ': 
For they would not have scoffed at such a fact, had 
they too, been men who genuinely gave heed to his 
Divine Nature. On the contrary, they in their turn 
would have recognised this man as Saviour of the world, 
and that the Cross has been not 
" - I healing of Creation (O"6-r"''' t'\cl.1/' 
a disaster, but a 
'l!~ S 1 .... ~~6('\..JS). 12 
This amounts to a similar kind of inversion of reason as we found in 
Justin. In Justin, philosophy, which is characterized by the 
" n Middle-Platonic search for God by man's reason (~'i "'t'), becomes 
identified with revelation. Here, in Athanasius, reason is shown 
to be moulded from the perspective of the cross - the very thing 
which is the supreme obstacle to reason. It is this semantic shift 
in the ordinary meaning of 'reason' which in the de 1. is evident in 
the claim to what is 'fitting,.73 But in the context of the C.G. 
this causes a problem, since the rest of the treatise claims to be 
based on the reason of man, and does not even deal with the incarna-
tion let alone the cross of Christ. Because of this, Meij ering has' 
(70) cf.de1.1.1 
(71) C .G. 1.3(4B). 
(12) 1.4( 5A). 
(73) cf. below, p. 164. 
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suggested, follo~ing F.L. Cross, that both the C.G. and the de I. 
are a theological exercise, and that the C.G. is especially concerned 
. ~ith satisfying both the authors and his readers' tQ<}. o;"/;)(~ 74 
It seems as if the matter goes deeper than this. The C .G. is not 
solely concerned ~ith reaffirming 'hi~eader and himself in ~hat . they 
already believe: Christian faith is true and not unreasonable' ,75 
but the pattern of the introduction to the C.G., the body of that 
~ork, and the de I., sho~s forth the inner connection bet~een the 
reason of man and the divine reason. The 'reasonableness' of 
Christianity could only be sho~ if Athanasius started from the 
perspective of C.G. 1 . In actual fact, in the body of the C.G. the 
'reason' is not purely and simply human reason; we have pointed out a 
fe~ of the inconsistancies that indicate that it is rather the 'reason' 
of man used for a particular purpose, or perhaps viewed from the 
perspective of the divine reason. In this way the 'reason' of the 
C.G. has a dual nature: the work was written for Christians and 
operates from this perspective, but at the same time it incorporates 
into itself the reason of the writer and the reader in such a way 
as to include the Gentile reading from a different perspective. 
The structure of the C.G. points to a further level at ~hich the 
work operates. Ch. 2 sho~s that Athanasius regarded reason as at 
least pointing in the right direction, and his description of the 
fall entails man not following his reason. It is because of man's 
un~illingness to follo~ his God-given reason that God has to resort 
76 to the other 'ways' in order to establish fellowship with man. 
This structure both incorporates reason aDd shows how man has consistently 
failed to use it correctly. 
(74) Op e cit. pp. 106f. 
(75) ibid. p. 108. 
(76) ibid. p. 120. 
The positive and negative aspects of 
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this are similar to Justin's ambivalent use of the loan theory. 
Athanasius's methodology thus involves his reader but puts him in 
his place so that he is ready for the de I. But the methodology, 
although it is so apologetic, rests on the fundamental assumption 
that the reason of man is God-given; it is not then unregenerate 
reason, but the reason with which God endowed man. It is this 
human reason which does not stumble at the 'folly of the Gross' 
and which recognizes the Logos of God as the true reason. 
(4) The Logos and God: 
In this section we are specifically concerned with what hints the 
G.G. gives of the relationship between God and the Logos. We have 
already mentioned the strict distinction Athanasius makes between 
God and the created order and how he firmly places the Logos on the 
godward side of this distinction. He must examine how consistent 
Athanasius is in this, in the more detailed descriptions of the 
relationship. Athanasius seems to use three means for describing 
the Logos as God. The first is to describe how the Logos acts as 
God. This incorporates the second, which is a series of analogies 
concerned with the relationship of the Logos to the world. The 
third is a few examples which specifically deal with the relationship 
between God and the Logos. 
The Logos acts as God chiefly in the management of the world. In 
this the Logos is God's agent, who 'steers and preserves and orders 
all things,.77 Also: 
He being the Power of God and Wisdom of God causes the 
heaven to revolve, and has suspended the earth, and made 
it fast though resting upon nothing, by His own nod. 78 
(77) 40.2(8OG). 
(78) 40.5(8lB). 
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We have dealt with this function of the Logos in the discussion on 
the nature of creation.?9 This aspect of Athanasius's theology 
contains an element of subordination ism which may be impossible to 
avoid. The problem is in essence the same as that in Justin caused 
by the argument of the impossibility of God appearing in a theophany. 
There the argument works from the premiss that God could not relate 
to the created world, and the Logos was therefore postulated as an 
intermediary. Here "Justin's premiss is hidden, but it is pointed to 
by the Logos being God's instrument. The implication is that God 
needed the instrument. But on the other hand, it is made very clear 
that what the Logos is doing can only be done by God. 
This same element of subordinationism is present in the analogies 
which Athanasius gives to describe the cosmological functions of the 
Logos. The first is that of the musician playing an instrument.80 
This and that of the architect are perhaps the most satisfactory 
analogies, because of the ontological difference between musician and 
instrument, or architect and building.8l Those of the conductor of 
a choir82 and of the soul and the body83 both imply that the Logos 
is not different in essence but only in function. It may be signifi-
cant that Athanasius only uses the first two in his summary in 
4? .3~4 
In all of his descriptions of the cosmological functions of the Logos, 
Athanasius is presenting the Logos as the deified world-soul, who is 
(?9) cf. above, p. 1.45. 
(80) 42.3(85A) • 
(81) 43.3(85C). 
(82) 43.1 (85B). 
(83) 43.2 (85C). 
(84) (96A) • 
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I I 
also the ~oP~~ v'i~o~ The Stoic version of the vorld-soul, the 
A~~,> 6i\/;-fr"'t~~S is sensed by Atnanasius to be a real threat, and 
he vehemently denie.s that the Logos he is presenting is the Stoic 
~b60S .85 Indeed, the Logos is 'the poverful Word of the good God, 
the God of the universe, the very Word vhich is God,.86 
But as ve have said, this is not enough. We need to knov not only 
that the Logos is God but also, in order really to assess that 
statement, hoy he is God. Athanasius shovs very little interest in 
this question in the C.G. 
'I'I{\ I 
h'Ci ~o..~(-toVi\ro~o r'K.oS 
He avoids the use of the A&~oS 
schema, vhich he elsewhere rejects,87 
in the folloving we find an adaptation of the same idea: 
but 
But God possesses true existence and is not composite, 
wherefore His Word also has true Existence and is not 
composite, but is the one and only-begotten God 
(ro-l 0db.'1\ &-b)), who proceeds (i\r·~~&.N) in His 
goodness from the Father as from a fountain. 88 
I 
This analogy has very little to distinguish it from the A"00) 
, S I f'I. I 
C:v ~"-CI'l'LO\/1\~O~Op"'-"S analogy except that it avoids the temporal 
difficulty and is therefore much more suited to the idea of eternal 
generation. Athanasius shows that he was aware of the A~oS 
"'('fr.. I E-V<l-.6.D'{:-t.o~/i1eO~c.r'lU)\ schema, but only uses it in a way that is 
so qualified t.hat the analogy of human speech does not refer to the 
actual relationship between the Logos and his Father. The idea that 
the Logos has its source of being in the Father is also hinted at 
vhen Athanasius refers to the 'Word, ,Tho derives true existence from 
(85) cf. above, pp. 137f. 
(86) 40 .4(81A). 
(87) cf. Ex.Fidei 1 (20lA). 
(88) 4101(81C). 
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There is one 
further very important passage, where the Logos is described as 
the good Offspring (~~~) of Him that is good ••• 
.., \ ,,.. 
not being so by participation (""> \-<.O-~ )-'E-t'o~'1V 'C ... vc~ 
~ ), not as if these qualities were imparted to him 
from without, as they are to those who partake ~E-~~XOV~~S) 
of Him and are made wise by Him. 90 . 
Here the 
") \ I ~ ~~~ ... ~~oX~v is a rejection of both moda1ism and subordina-
tionism. The I~l\ idea is rejected within the godhead, but 
accepted as the description of how the created order relates to 
the Logos. It is very interesting to compare this quote with Justin's 
use of the /I.<.~il~ idea.91 Justin also used the idea to describe 
the participation of human reason in the divine Logos and stressed 
the difference between the two (~t~f~ ••• ~E-PcJ). Justin does 
however not use the idea to describe the relationship between the 
') \ ')_ \ c... 
Logos and God. His qualification is: a-., ~l!O- ol.\\O~'1'"'-\./, ""'~ 
) ~ I " '\ - '_~/.92 otuor('~ I"t-'''''~ 't'1\ teN !\c/.trS "'-'). Athanasius refines the idea 
) \ / 
by stating CN 't.J.~ )'-l-t~IV' Justin probably did think that the 
Logos shared in the ~&id.. of the Father, but Athanasius perhaps in 
opposition to Paul of Samasata,93 is aware of the difficulties of 
this position. As Meijering shows, t his statement does not necessarily 
show any indication of an awareness of Arianism. Justin's qua1ifica-
tion could almost be in Athanasius's mind when he describes the 
) \,., "-" "')1 94 generation of the Son as CN ••• )'-C"'(lb/,"" ~'1S ,"IN ""~ ~S • 
(89) 4103(84A) • 
(90) 46.8(93B). 
(91) cf. above, p p. 38f. 
(92) cf. above, pp. 24, 66f. 
(93) cf. Meijering, op. cit. p. 39. 
(94) Contra Arianos: I.16(45Af). 
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This later qualification is however, in contrast to the above, in 
direct opposition to Arianism. These idea hinting at an eternal 
generation of the Logos are found in the following: 
••• it follows that the Word is in Him that begat Him, 
and that He that is begotten lives eternally with the 
\' ,/II..'''' - \ J Ie,) 95 Father (~ ttN 6H''',\~ , .. '" t.., l'ol.fl L"-lWV< /"''' • 
But nowhere do we find these hints developed to the point that the 
slight subordinationsim which we have mentioned is completely contra-
dicted. In this regard the C.G. reveals itself to have been written 
before the bursting out of the Arian controversy, but even at this 
stage Athanasius is clearly opposed to the idea of a divine hierarchy.96 
It is, therefore, remarkable how the treatise shows the fundamental 
shift away from the earlier theologies of the Logos and paves the 
way for Athanasius's later rejection of Arianism.97 
But it is a characteristic of this work that Athanasius is not concerned 
with these issues. Yet from the glimpses that we get of his thought 
on the subject it is notable how far advanced he is over the Apologists, 
for instance. He seems to guard successfully against the God-Logos 
language being used to subordinate the Logos. One of the most 
important reasons for this is that he is concerned to describe the 
activity of the Logos as the activity of God and he seems to regard 
the more metaphysical questions as having a secondary nature. In 
this he shows himself to be a theologian of revelation describing 
God as he has revealed himself, rather than as we speculate he (God) 
must be. Another possible reason for this advance is that, by his 
stress on the argument from design, Athanasius hints at the Logos 
being the rationality of God. That is, the Logos always retains the 
(95) 47.2(93D). 
(96) cf. Neijering, op. cit. pp. 128-130. 
(97) Here we accept the early dating as given. 
· - 160 -
idea of the >.~~ "t,.JcJ..~os. 
grated into the godhead. 
In this yay the Logos is more inte-
We find in Athanasius then, a nev element, not found thus far in this 
study, vhich contains a circumspection and an avareness of the 
difficulties of the Logos theology. This caution bears the seeds 
of the rejection of Arianism and may even point to a subconcious 
avareness of the possibility of its erruption. 
(5) The Incarnation of the Logos: 
Although the de I. is not considered to be one of the basic texts of 
this study, it is necessary to include a section on it in order to 
compare it vith the C.G. It is also instructive to compare the 
doctrine of the incarnation as it appears here vith the thought on 
the same subject in the vriters that have already been discussed. 
In de I. 1 Athanasius briefly recaps the first part of his treatise, 
and then introduces the main topic of the second part of his york. 
He vrites that the de 1. yill be about hoy the same l-1ord vho vas 
active in creation and in the 'universal providence and poyer' 
became man. This straightavay introduces us to a ney element. 
As has already been shoYn, it is not the creative activity of the 
Logos as such Yhich is of centr~l importance in the C.G. 98 In 
the de I. the critical issue is the linking of the creative activity 
of the Logos yi th the recreation of man in the incarnation. It 
is the same Logos yho created, yho also came t o recreate his 
creation. 99 As we have shoYn, creation in the de I. is ex nihilo, 
yhereas in the C.G. it is regarded more as an ordering of the chaotic 
(98) cf. above, p~ J45f. 
(99) 7.5(109A). 
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(/ l.>~1 • In the de I. then, the recreation of man is compared with 
a creatio ex nihilo. This complete recreation of man is necessary 
because of the complete corruption of man. Parallel to the difference 
in outlook over the matter of creation is the difference over the 
fall. In the C.G. the possibility of man's return to God is open, 
but in the de I. the imaf,o dei is so destroyed that a complete 
restoration by the original creator is needed.lOOThe issues of creation 
and the fall are closely related. This difference of outlook between 
the two treatises shows up the apologetic nature of the first, and 
is also a fairly serious critique of the natural theology which it 
contains. In the de I. the only 'way' to God that is truly 
efficacious is through the incarnate Logos. 
the mention of the other ways:lOl 
This is true despite 
••• it was in the power of none other to turn the 
corruptible to incorruption, except the Saviour Himself, 
that had at the beeinning also made all things out of 
nought: ~~d that none other could create anew the likeness 
of God's imaee for men, save the Image of the Father; 
~~d that none other could render the mortal immortal, 
save our Lord Jesus Christ, Who is the Very Life; and 
that none other could teach men of the Father, and 
destroy the worship of idols, save the Word, that orders 
'all things and is alone the true Only-begotten Son of 
the Father. l02 
Even in the C.G. the central thrust is soteriological, but here in 
the de I. this is overwhelmingly the case. The purpose of the 
incarnation was the salvation of mankind. It is from this basic 
fact that so much of the treatise sterns. Athanasius goes to great 
(100) 
(101) 
(102) 
cf.14.lf(120C). 
This- is noticed by G.C. Stead: "The Platonism of Arius" , 
JTS, 15(1964), p. 23, n 2. 
20.1(129Cf) • 
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lengths to shoy hoy this salvation could be effected in no other yay. 
At no stage is it even considered that man may not need salvation. 
What is considered, is the reason Yby God should have had to save 
man: 
For if He had not made them, none could impute yeakness; 
but once He had made them, and created them out of 
nothing, it yere monstrous (;t1:0\l~1:do.c.N) for the york 
to be ruined, and that before the eyes of the Maker. 
It Yas, then, out of the question to leave men to the 
current of corruption; because this yould be unseemly 
(~~fhlbS), and unyorthy of God's goodness. l03 
Since, therefore, man has to be saved, the only remaining question is 
hoy. Man has to be saved by the Logos yho created him, in order to 
be recreated. 
because 
Athanasius explains that the Logos has to become man, 
the threat aeainst transgression gave a firm hold to the 
corruption yhich yas upon us, and that it yas monstrous 
that before the lay yas fulfilled it should fall 
throueh ••• ~~d thus takine from our bodies one of like 
nature, because all yere under penalty of the corruption 
of death He gave it over to death in the stead of all, 
and offered it to the Father. l04 
This penal theory is the kind of emphasis totally lackine in all the 
yorks studied thus far. It is ,largely for this reason that Ye had 
reason to criticize their doctrine of the incarnation. Without this 
element of the identification of the Logos Yith man in his sinfulness, 
it is difficult both to justify and really to establish t.he humanity 
of the incarnate Logos. In this regard Athanasius goes so far as 
to mention the satisfaction of the "debt': 
(103) 6.9f(l08B). 
(104) 8.2, 4(l09Bf), and also cf. 9.1(l12A). 
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For being over all, the Word of God naturally by 
offering His own temple and corporeal instrument for 
the life of all satisfied the debt (r~ b~I:t>'~r(-V"" ) . 
by His death.105 
A further reason for the incarnation is the necessity for God to 
106 
condescend to man's level. The different 'ways' all represent 
one further stage in God's condescension. The incarnation is the 
climax and the end of this series.107 But perhaps most importantly, 
there is the necessity for the Logos to become man in order to 
conquer death. The background to this reveals yet another major 
difference bet"een the two treatises. We have already mentioned 
the different attitudes to the fall. In the de I., the reason why 
the fall is so absolute, and why man cannot of himself return to 
God, is because a metaphysical change has come over man: 
••• and from henceforth (they) no longer remained as they 
were made, but were being corrupted according to their 
devices; and death had the mastery over them as king. 108 
The incarnation, death and resurrection of the Logos are regarded as 
one event by which the mastery of death is brought to an end.109 
The redemption offered by the Logos is not just personal or a way 
out of the difficulties of the present world, as in Clement, but 
is a cosmic or metaphysical conquest. The cross is not only t hat 
which conquers the evil spirits, as in Justin, but is the ultimate 
victory over the pm18r lying behind the evil spirits: 
(105) 9.2(112Af). 
(106) This is a feature of Alexandrian theology, cf. above, p. 122. 
(107) 11.1(113Af). 
(108) 4.4(1048). 
(109) 27.l(14lC). 
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And if, while previously death was strong, and for that 
reason terrible, now after the sojourn of the Saviour 
and the death and Resurrection of His body it is despised, 
it must be evident that death has been brought to 
nought and conquered by the very Christ who ascended 
the Cross .110 
This too is an aspect which does not occur in the C.G. and has difficulty 
emerging in our previous writers. Hhy is this? Athanasius is 
arguing, as they were, for the 'fittingness' or rationality of his 
arguments. We can regard Athanas ius , s work as an amazing attempt to 
rationalize the 'folly of the Cross'. It is this indeed which offers 
the clue to the processes at work. Athanasius has adapted his 
'reason' to the 'folly of the Cross' and translated the term as used 
in the philosophical sense. The unlti.'!lately rational is not part 
of our human eA~erience and cannot be judged in terms of our reason, 
but when we have made that transmutation, so that the 'folly of the 
Cross' is the ultimately rational even of the Reason of God, the 
Logos, then the Christian faith is most reasonable. The C.G. 
seems to be attempting to show the rationality of the faith without 
openly accepting that transmutation. Thus it is that it cannot 
arrive at the fully Christian conclusions of the de 1. We have 
already noticed how the tension,between the two kinds of rationality 
are present in the C.G., where the reason which has not been recreated 
in Christ has been adapted and modified by the new and perfect reason. 
A very similar adaptation of terms was noticed ,7ith regard to Justin's 
adaptation of the philosophical tradition. III 
(110) 29.2(145B). 
(111) cf. above, p. 31. 
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On the more technically theological side of his thought Athanasius 
makes an astounding advance. This is in dealing with the incarnation 
from the point of view of the divinity of the Logos while he is man: 
For He was not, as might be imagined, circumscribed in 
the body, nor, while present in the body, was He absent 
elsewhere; nor, while He moved the body, was the universe 
left void of His working and Providence.112 
Athanasius goes on to reveal how this can be, and in so doing defines 
in a definitive way the true relationship between God and the world: 
••• but, thing most marvellous, .Tord as He was, so far 
from being contained in anything, He rather contained 
all things Himself; and just as while present in the 
whole of 
from the 
aJ~v ) 
Creation, He is at once distinct in being 
'), I) "t ) 
universe (.r.ILU~ /","W H"i:.< 'l'N rtd.V~OS ...... t:. 
and present in all things by His own power.113 
Hhile this is partially similar to the distinction between ~~ and 
J'Jvol;U~ especially found in Clement, who seems to be following 
Philo,l14 the real advance is not to be found in this line of 
thought but in the change from God being regarded as separate from 
the world to God containing the world. As Athanasius puts it: 
fl., )\ ) 1 '< , ~ ~ ,_I '">\ \ • ) I ~oS 1..o.N) IN ,"uvhXt-tc ,""hi V\'i'D t',"oS~ "'Vh)(t- "I:- to ... II ... ""'" J"A1V\iN o(u~os . 
1-Then this line of thought is used to describe the actual incarnation, 
we find: 
Now, the Word of God in His man's nature was not like 
that; for He was not bound to His body, but rather was 
Himself "eilding it (t.."-~t:h ), so that He was not 
only in it, but was actually in everything, and while 
) 1 
external to the universe, abode (o<vcj..~(,-t:o ) in His 
Father only.1l5 
(112) 17.1(125A). 
(113) cf. also C.G. 47.2(93C): 'But this being so, and nothing 
being outside Him, but both heaven and earth, and all that 
(is) in them is being dependent on Him ••• ' 
(114) cf. above, p. 103. 
(115) 17.4(125C), cf. also 43.6(173A). 
-~-
These hints in the early theology of Athanasius are, perhaps, the 
key to the refutation of Arianism. In Arianism the Greek (Platonic) 
concept of a separation between the sensible and the intelligible 
worlds reaches its climax in the radical separation, in the wrong 
sense, between God and his creation. The similarity of the dualism 
between created and uncreated entities in Arius and Athanasius has 
116 been noted by Stead. In Arius, however, the attempted solution 
is to place the creaturely Son in the position of mediator, while 
Athanasius resolves the matter in its entirety by a redefinition of 
the nature of the dualism. Athanasius shows that the dualism does 
not .exclude God from the created order, but in fact God holds it in 
being at every point. The dualism is therefore open from God's 
side but closed from the creaturely side. T.F. Torrance has 
succintly shown how this problem is related to two different concepts 
of space. He describes the dominating concept of space in Greek 
thought to be the 'receptacle or container' notion of space. 117 The 
other Greek concept of space is that of the Stoics. They regarded 
space as a body which creates space for itself within which there is 
'a sphere of operation and of place,.118 The difficulty with this 
view, although close to ~~e biblical view, is that it conceived of 
the "orld as a finite body in an infinite void and 'failed to reach ••• 
any understanding of the transcendence of God'. But it is the tremen-
dous achievement of Athanasius to go beyond both of these concepts 
and to model his concept of space on the incarnation. God and the 
Logos hold space in being and therefore are not alien in space or 
(116) op. cit. p. 22. 
(117) Space, Time and Incarnation (OUP,1969), p. 4. 
(118) ibid. p. 9. 
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time, and neither has to force himself into our creaturely existence. 
And so, because of the incarnation we see quite clearly that the 
notion ·of God's transcendence is not to be interpreted in terms of 
remoteness, but more in terms of the relationship between creator 
and creature, Saviour and redeemed. Torrance writes of this: 
Since space is reearded here from a central point in the 
creative and redemptive activity of God in Christ, the 
concepts of space as infinite receptacle or infinite 
substance, or as an extension conceived as the essence of 
matter, or as a mere necessity of our human apprehension, 
and certainly the concept of space in terms of the 
ultimate immobile limit of the container independent of 
time, all fall away, and instead there merges a concept 
of space in terms of the ontoloeical and dynamic relations 
between God and the physical universe established in 
creation and incarnation. 119 
In Athanasius then, the very basic preconceptions of the Platonic 
"orld view have been radically altered by his ultimate concern, to 
be true to the incarnation. By working from this point, the divine 
Logos can truly be both God and man without being untrue to either 
side. But more than this - the discovery of a true basis for a 
doctrine of the incarnation is clearly shown to be nothing other than 
an outworking of a true doctrine of creation. This in turn eoes 
back to a true doctrine of God. If one looks at the incarnation 
from this point of vie", the utter consistancy of the de 1. is most 
striking. Equally striking is the flash of lieht this sheds on the 
difficulties and tension with which each of OlIT previous writers 
was grappling. 
(119) ibid. p. 18. 
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(6) Conclusion: 
In all the previous writers Ye have studied we discerned a tension 
between the Greek Logos tradition and the orthodox tradition of the . 
Church. This has often emerged in the difficulty of the distinction 
beween the Loeos and the Spirit, in the whole issue of the incarnation 
and then indirectly in ~he doctrine of the Trinity. We yill be 
dealing with all this in ereater detail in the conclusion of the 
thesis. Is there such a tension in Athanasius? 
vlliat is really so different about Athanasius in this connection is 
that he reveals the tensions in the C.G., as we have tried to show, 
but that he turns the tables completely in the de I. It might seem 
as if Clement, for instance, tried to combine the type of apologetic in 
the C .G. Yi th the type of theology in the de I. ui thout the sound 
adaptation of concepts that ,re find in Athanasius. The C.G. is 
for Athanasius a prolegomenon to the de I. It in itself is not 
intended to express the ,.,hole Christian truth, but it leads up to 
and prepares the way for the de I. In this ;ray Athanasius does not 
try to reconcile his whole theology with the preconceptions of his 
possible pagan opponents, but in a most subtle way he meets them on 
their own ground and, by leading them towards the incarnation, attempts 
to change their thought at its centre. Thus it is that Athanasius's 
Logos is not the Greek Logos as had been previously expounded, but 
this Logos seen through the 'folly of the Cross' and the incarnation. 
Even in the C.G. this perspective holds Athanasius on course and 
subtily changes the basically pagan argument from design into a 
Christian tool. It is this condescension, 1{hich is probably meant 
to be similar to the condescension of the Logos, that is meant to 
dupe the reader, or indeed to make the Christian reader with slight 
misgivings stronger in his faith. . But Athansius realizes that 
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unless he has met his reader in this complex and subtle yay he has 
no real chance of leading him on to the real centre of the Christian 
faith. Athanasius's apologetic is then not like Justin's yhere ye 
find tyO strands of thought moving parallel to each other but in 
reality remaining far apart, despite all his efforts. Ncr is it 
like that of Clement, yhere the Logos theology has led to a compromise 
yhich tends to mar the essential heart of the gospel. In Athanasius 
the Logos theology together Yith the whole philosophical background 
is put to a searching scrutiny and criticized. The result is that 
while the Greek can still identify yith the C.G., it cannot escape 
him that. he is beinG led to something strange. In this he yould 
not be dissappointed by the de 1. 
The discrepancy existing between the fall and the resultant redemption 
in the C.G. and the de I. is proof of this process. It is fortlmate 
that we still have the de 1., or we might yell miss the significa.Tlce 
of C.G. 1. The whole shift of emphasis can be described as a move 
from Logocentricity in the C.G. to Christocentricity in the de I. 
Before going on to our final concluding section it viII be as well 
to remember that Athanasius was writing at the end of a long tradition 
vith all its successes and failures. But more than this even, 
in the case of the Apologists they Yere fighting by themselves against 
a pagan world; by the time of Clement the battle is brought into the 
Church; and in Athanasius we find theology proper. The issues have 
settled and a calm seems to reign before the storm of Arianism. The 
C.G. is not a document written in the heat of debate; it is an 
orderly systematic treatise, Yhich represents the culmination of 
refined thought. An apology written perhaps as an academic exercise 
is very different from one yhich is the product of a deep and disturbing 
conflict within the individual. 
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V. CONCLUSION. 
The original question with which I set out in this investigation was 
whether or not there is a necessary connection between the doctrines. 
of the Trinity and the incarnation. It seemed that these two 
fundamentals of theology should be somehow related. It is also 
difficult to know from which one should begin. In a sense, the 
doctrine of the Trinity defines who God is and sets the scene for the 
incarnation. But on the other hand, one cannot find out lIho God 
is except through the revelation of himself in the incarnation. 
Further it seemed to me that slightly different solutions to the one 
problem must influence the solution to the other. Would not a 
modalis tic solution to the Trinity almost necessarily imply an 
adoptionist and docetic Christology? Or what effect would subordina-
tionism have on the doctrine of the Person of Christ? 
can also be asked the other way round. 
These questions 
It was with this kind of concern that I approached this study. 
Rapidly it became clear that these question were phrased in the wrong 
terminology. This in itself is significant. The relationship of 
the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation is a complete non-
issue. The writers do not write from the presuppositions of our 
developed dogmatiC theology. Rather, the matter has to be translated 
into the language of God and revelation. Whereas originally I 
was concerned uith the Trinity and the incarnation, I no" had to be 
concerned ~Tith the nature of God and the revelation of himself. 
This translation leads directly to the fundamental issue lying 
behind the doctrines of the Trinity and the incarnation. The is'sue 
remains the same, but the vieupoint is very different. In my 
original questions, the "hole development of theology is presupposed, 
but in this study lfe find ourselves at the beginning of this develop-
J!lent. 
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The issue is then reduced to the nature of God and his revelation of 
himself. There is, however, yet another semantic shift which is 
necessary. This perhaps leads away from the fundamental question, 
and is the translation of our terms 'God' and 'revelation', to include 
the Logos. This is a move away from the fundamental issue, since 
the doctrine of the Logos cannot be the solution to the related 
problems of the nature of God and of his revelation of himself. In 
a way this is the t r itos argumeht, used not to unite objects but 
doctrines. Unless the two primary doctrines are fundamentally open 
to each other, no changinG of the parameters is going to do atlay 
,Ii"t-h the problem. All that this can do is either to create new 
difficulties, or to obscure the problem. But it is precisely this 
attempt to overcome the difficulties which reveals them so clearly. 
In this study, a further problem has been discussed at length. This 
is the nature of creation. The reason for this has been that the 
issue of creation brines out a yet m01'e fUI!damental question t.han 
tha t of revela tion • This is the quest.ion of how God and the created 
order relate. It is by examining the nature of creation that we 
see quite clearly the presuppositions lying behind the doctrine of 
revelation, for this gives a different perspective on the nature of 
the revealor and of the recipient of the revelation. It is in the 
adaptation of the J·!iddle-Platonic background that these issues come 
to their sharpest focus. In Middle-Platonism, God relates to the 
world through the world of ideas and through the world-soul. The 
'''orld has, hOI.rever, a rather undefined status, but is in some way 
distinct from God. The thought on the tlorld is not centred on its 
creation by God, but rather on the ordering of the world by God. 
There is thus an underlying dualism between God and the ff~" and 
until Christian theology came to grips with thiS, the basic problems 
of the nature of God and of the world surfaced in different forms in 
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every aspect of their thought. This is where the problem lay. 
I I The skilful incorporation of the ...... 06r.~ VO"\"t<>S and the world-soul 
into the Godhead either into the Logos or even into a Trinity, does 
not solve the problem, although it is an effective apologetic device 
for those who are not aware of the prob~ems of Middle-Platonism. 
It is not necessary here to spell out in any great detail how this 
study has revealed these difficulties. They have been stressed 
often enough in the text and in the conclusions to the individual 
sections. I t has been apparent that the Logos theology failed to 
come to terms with the doctrine of God. In Justin this failure is 
ma.'1ifested in a subordinationsim, in the other Apologists in too 
close an association of the origination of t he Lo~os with the creation 
of the world. In all of these writers, including Clement, the Logos 
theology fails not only because of the doctrine of God, but also in 
their inability to describe the incarnation or to ascribe any importance 
to it. It is at this point that the relationship between the two 
original issues becomes clear. The difficulty with the doctrine of 
God is directly analogous to the difficulty with the incarnation. 
In fact, the obvious difficulty with the incarnation reveals just how 
sketchy is the cover-up of the other problem by the doctrine of t he 
Logos. 
This is one possible approach to this study, but it cannot be all-
sufficient, since it comes to the texts llith questions needing ansllers, 
and will thereby of necessity be blind to the real achievements of 
the wri ters • That their theology has its problems is important to 
know, especially when it is possible to t race these problems and to see 
them adding to the general milieu out of which Arianism sprang. But 
this cannot be all. A fair number of scholars, especially Barnard, 
have attempted to reinstate the Apologists as theologians of worth, 
by appealing to their particular purpose. They explain away their 
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difficulties over the incarnation, claiming that mention of it would 
not suit their apologetic intention. This appears to be specious 
argumentation for a number of reason. Firstly and most importantly, 
Justin and Clement, who mention the incarnation, have such problems 
with the concept that we can clearly discern why the others do not 
mention it. The theological structures of all of the writers from 
Justin to Clement are basically the same, that is Logocentric. The 
reason for the omission of the incarnation is not, therefore, primarily 
apologetic, but theological. Secondly, the claim resting on the 
grounds of apologetic intent presupposes a theology free from that 
intent. He have no evidence for such a theology at all. The difference 
bet,reen Clement's Protrepticns and the rest of his work does not lie 
in this particular. It is only in Athanasius's Contra Gentes that 
such a possibility arises, and this is part of such a developed theo-
logical work that. it cannot be really compared in this respect with 
the Horks of the Apoloeists. In actual fact, this claim rests on 
the assumption that the Apologists Here apologists in the modern 
sense of ~~e word, that apologetic is but one branch of the total 
theological work of the Church, and that the dogmatic branch exists 
alongSide of it. But this is not so. The Apologists .,ere not the 
apoloeists of the Church, but its theologians. That their theology 
incorporated at some points elements ,rhich Here directly apologetic, 
and others which were not quite so apologetic, does not meaD that a 
completely non-apoloeetic ~~eoloey existed. Rather, the central 
stream of theology Has completely apologetic. The thought of t he 
Church was in a process of rapid confrontation Hith and adaptation to 
the Greek mind. It is this 1,hich totally absorbed the Apologists 
and Clement. The Barthian dogmatics, reflexion on the pure kervgma, 
just does not exist. Nor could it exist, for the conceptual frame-
work for this kind of reflexion still had to be evolved. The dogmatics 
I 
I 
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of later years to a large extent rests upon the achievement and the 
blunders of these early theologians. 
But again this is not all. There is a very important element in all 
our writers, which hints at the later development of dogmatics, 
and the separation of apologetic and dogmatics as we find it in 
Athanasius. This is to be found in the strone influence of the 
tradition of the Church on its theology. In this study, 'traditions' 
of one kind or another ' have been frequently referred to, but in this 
sense we are not referring to oral tradition or even to liturgical 
traditions, although these are manifestations of what we mean. Nor 
when we refer to the tradition of the Church do ~Te refer, for instance, 
to the Hisdom tradition. This, with 1-Thich all our writers except 
Athenagoras were fully acquainted, belones rather to the theological 
world of exegesis. In Justin the credal and the 1i turgical traditions 
surface to e ive expression to his incarnational and TrLni tarian 
r eferences respectively. In Theophilus and especially in Athenagoras, 
tradition seems to have influenced their Trinitarian theology. In 
Clement it is not quite so easy to isolute the influence of tradition. 
But in every case, what we find is a tension between these elements 
and the theological basis for the writer's thought. It does not 
even seem really possible to speculate that the Apologists regarded 
their theological task as an endeavour to reconcile this tradition 
with either the pagan world or their theology. If this were so, 
a more concerted effort in this direction would be evident. 
It is at this point that our section on Athanasius is important, 
for here we found that the theological apologetic work is soundly 
based on the traditional. The theological methodology of the 
Contra Gentes leaves us in no doubt that in actual fact his startinO' 
o 
point is the Cross of Christ rather than the Logos. He find here a 
methodology very similar to that of Anselm. The remoto Christo of 
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the Contra Gentes is very different from the remoto Christo of Tatian. 
The difference lies in the fact that Athanasius knew that his thought 
was centred on Christ, whereas the Apologists did not have this focus. 
There were too many problems in the way for them to see that far. 
The other essential ingredient of Anselm's methodology is also relevent. 
The fidens guaerens intellectum or credo ut intellif,am also corresponds 
to the Contra Gentes, where there is a similar balancing of credo and 
intellectum as in Anselm. But in the Apologists this schema just 
does not appear to fit. The manifestations of traditional elements 
does not correspond to any credo, nor is the theology an attempt, as 
we have said, to understand these. The theological methodology of 
the Apologists has no firm direction. It is rather, and here one 
must be tentative, a scattered attempt to expound the Logos theology 
in various directions against various objections. In Justin we 
come closest, of all the Apologists, to theology proper in his reflexion 
on the Logos doctrine. 
"Then these writers are viet.red in this kind of light, there appear to 
have been only tHO really siGnifica'1t developments. The first is 
the adaptation of the Logos theology of Justin, which was the defL~itive 
step in introducing revelation, rather than philosophical enquiry, 
as ~he basis for the Logos theoiogy. The second significant event 
is the theology of Atha'1asius, which takes Justin's achievement to its 
logical conclusion by adapting the Logos doctrine not only to revelation, 
but to ~1e true nature of that revelation, that is centring it on the 
incarnation. In this development we discern a fundamental shift of 
emphasis. Justin really centres all his theology on the Logos. As 
we have sh01m, his whole thought has to be assessed as it relates to 
this central idea. But Athanasius centres his Whole thought on the 
incarnation, and not only on the incarnation, but also on the cross. 
In this we move from revelation to soteriology, from abstracts to an 
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historical act of salvation. It is probable that the movement a~ay 
from this central issue of the historical act creates in the Apologists 
the acute tension be~een their theology and the manifestations of the 
Church tradition. Is it not also important that the t~o points at 
~hich tradition manifests itself are precisely the doctrines of the 
Trinity and the incarnation? Until theological thought centred 
itself around these t~o central concepts, there could be no real 
hope of a consistent theology. These concepts should be the starting 
point of theological thought. The attempt to place them at the end is 
sho~ by the Apologists to be a futile exercise. 
l-/hat can ;1e learn from this? I suspect that the most important 
thing we can learn from the Apologists is that the rigid distinction 
between the I~orld' and the Church is, at least in one sense, limited. 
I have tried to sho~ ho~ the Apologists cannot be really understood if 
they are regarded as just beL~g apologists in our sense of the word. 
They were not battling ,with issues ~hich were external to them. By 
virtue of their existence and participation in humanity in their 
particular time, they were faced ;1ith the apologetic task as an issue 
of life or death. Their apol ogetic was not a luxury or something 
which, if not engaged upon, the Church could do without. Rather, 
if this task ~as not taken up, the Church \.10uld have turned away from 
its calling, from its true existence. The Church is in the world. 
In this way theology has apologetically the task of thinking ~ithin 
the Church which is in the ~orld. This it cannot cease to do. But 
more than t.his: the Church also has to take care lest this activity 
in the world render it of the world. Being in the world is as vit.al 
to its existence as beine not of the world. 
This leads directly to my second point. In many"ays it is possible 
to look back at these theologians and to see fairly clearly how they 
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were struggling with this problem of being in the world but not of it, 
and we can also see many instances where they are of the world. We 
can see how the thought forms of the world have dictated their theology 
and how this has moved them away from the central issues of the faith. 
In this way they have departed from strict orthodoxy. We can 
analyse their theology and show how it is defective in the light of 
our superior knOWledge, which is derived solely from hindsight. 
What we need to keep constantly in mind is that, in the struggle of 
the Church to be in the world but not of it, we find the grace of 
God operating in all its power. Just as the incarnation, in which 
the Logos of God was in the world but not of it, leads to the salva-
tion of man, so in the apologetic or theological endeavour of the 
Church, the grace of the incarnation is let loose. Also, and this is 
the difference be-Q.Teen the incarnation and the Church, the success 
of the Church's mission does not rest ultimately on its remaining 
uncon tamina ted by the 'lOr Id. The incarnate Loo;os never was in any 
way of the ;rorld, and it is the erace of forgiveness which he won for 
the Church which turns even its failures L~ its task to good effect. 
The success of the Church's mission in the second centlITY did not 
rest on the orthodoxy of its theologians but upon the grace of God, 
the victory of the cross, let loose in the whole Church, and their 
endeavours were but one part of God's activity. Looking back then 
to the Apologists, their struggle is not to be measured in terms of 
its success as \-Ie see it now, but on the measure of their obedience to 
their Lord. It is from this obedience that the truly significant 
advances came, not only for theology ~~d orthodoxy but also for the 
kingdom of God. 
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